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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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**POWER, PRIMACY, AND PERSPECTIVE:  
AMERICA AS NO. 1 NATION  
VOLUME III**

**THE FUTURE OF PRIMACY**



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Volume III,

THE FUTURE OF PRIMACY,


by

10 Anthony L. Wermuth

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


## FOREWORD

↙  
This volume is Volume III of a three-volume study which explores the domestic and international significance of America's being the world's number one nation. In two chapters, Volume III surveys important dynamics in the changing world context, and explores potential impacts and implications related to continued US primacy. An extensive bibliography supporting all three volumes is included in Volume III.

↖  
Volume I examines theoretical concepts for appraising the relative standing of nations, and Volume II compares numerous specific appraisals of US power and status. A summary of all three volumes has also been published.

In publishing such works, the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a means for timely dissemination of analytical studies on subjects of current importance. This three-volume work was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not necessarily reflect the official view of the Department of the Army or Department of Defense.

  
JOSEPH E. PIZZI  
Colonel, Infantry  
Director

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#### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

Dr. ANTHONY L. WERMUTH joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1974. He holds masters degrees from Columbia University in English and from George Washington University in international affairs and a doctorate from Boston University in political science. A West Point graduate, Dr. Wermuth's military assignments included brigade command; Assistant for Central Europe (OASD, ISA); and Military Assistant (Public Affairs) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He spent seven years on the West Point and US Army War College faculties. Following retirement, he served for seven years as Director, Social Science Studies, Center for Advanced Studies and Analyses, Westinghouse Electric Corporation. He has written many articles on civil-military affairs in professional journals, and is a member of numerous professional associations.



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### Summary of Volume III: The Future of Primacy

Although change advances on all fronts, many technological changes are now approaching certain natural limits; we may never have, for example, faster communications than we now have. Nevertheless, the following developments exemplify hundreds of more or less profound changes in human affairs affecting primacy:

- By some analysts, war is perceived to be no longer the "legitimate activity" it once was, and that "there is no war, nuclear or conventional, by which the so-called winner, assuming there was one, could conceivably win back by war the resources used and destroyed in waging it"; nevertheless, seeds of powerful conflict lie latent in such developments as exploding population; production and distribution of food; shifting relationships on energy resources; competition to develop the resources of the oceans and seabeds; nuclear proliferation; and heightened awareness of vast differences in standards of living.

- One event unprecedented in scale and significance has been the transition of over a billion people from colonial status to independence within two decades.

- Since 1973 unmanned satellites have been orbiting the earth, scanning, without regard to national boundaries, resource depletion, pollution, crop growth, and many other developments.

- About 1955, the majority of mankind became literate; concurrently, the dynamics of equalitarianism are eroding the status of elites; persons over 65 now constitute a substantial sector of national populations; and so on.

When, in July 1969, Americans landed near the Sea of Tranquility on the moon, the first human beings ever able to do so, the world prestige of the United States had possibly reached a peak.

The expansion of American power in the world encouraged more democratic government everywhere and strengthened democracy generally. It may be chastening to reflect upon how recently (only two generations) America emerged into a position of primacy, indicating that America has not wallowed in affluence while generations of foreigners suffered in misery; and that America's advantaged status today was not achieved by long-time exploitation of other nations. Britisher Henry Fairlie insists that in addition to physical strength, "America carries also an idea . . . what Americans have become and achieved in their own country has done more to change the world, and improve the life of its peoples, than any revolution in the past two centuries. . . ."

America still possesses valid claims to being the principal fountainhead of the revolutionary spirit, comprehensive growth, and



social justice within the framework of a genuinely free society. During and after World War II, the United States was a primary force in pressing for the end of colonialism, for self-determination, and for human rights among dozens of peoples; has usually been among the first to recognize genuine revolutionary regimes; and has aided dozens of nations with massive funds, material, concessions, technology, and know-how.

However, the direction of America's evolving relative status seems at the moment, possibly down. A number of observers hold that American power is declining. Others are not pessimistic; British political scientist Professor Max Beloff observes: ". . . on the whole, the United States is in a much healthier condition than the rest of the free world."

Few modern analysts accept any proposition that preconditions are present for any advanced system of world order. Most political analysts agree that today only a cohesive society with at least 200 million people and a GNP of at least \$300 billion can claim status near that of superpower. Nevertheless, even superpowers must concede that not even small states will accept management of any of their affairs by superpowers.

It may be that relationships with Third World nations will become prototypes of future American relations with most foreign countries. Despite moralistic assertions, neither poor nor weak individuals and collectivities are any better or wiser than the strong--possibly not as good or as wise. There is no logical (or mystical) justification or obligation for America to apologize for not being poor or weak. In comparison with the record of any other nation on earth, the United States has little reason to succumb to feelings of guilt, nor any reason to indulge in masochism over allegations of injustice by idealists, envious, neurotics, and ideologues. Meanwhile, much of every other nation's behavior, as well as some of our own, will remain not only unpredictable but also unexplainable.

Four propositions have been suggested as universal imperatives: Every individual in every country must realize that he is now also a member of the world community; a new ethic must emerge for the use of resources that is compatible with coming scarcity; attitudes toward nature should be directed toward achieving harmony rather than conquest; and a sense of identification with future generations must emerge.

A few implications attend conclusions about American primacy:

- Conflict between nations is not likely to disappear in our lifetimes, nor will the nation-state soon decline as the primary actor in international contexts. Until world government is firmly established, there will always be some nation identifiable as Number One, a status which, in an anarchic world, bears some responsibility for the maintenance of international order.



- Americans have worked hard and effectively in the attainment of the nation's current status, which has been achieved primarily in the context of power.

- Some crucial problem-situations can probably not be improved without the participation of the United States; on the other hand, certain international situations cannot be resolved soon no matter who participates.

- The possession of great power, the employment of it with restraint, sensitivity toward the legitimate interests of others, and self-confidence in proceeding toward its objectives appear to constitute the most prudent formula to be followed by a responsible Number One Nation.

Liberty remains a factor of profound strategic importance, for it is characteristic of free peoples that they refrain from roles of aggressor and predator.

Kenneth Boulding: "The conditions of success in the future are not the same as the conditions in the past . . . up to a point, wealth and military power create legitimacy; beyond a certain point, they destroy it . . ." Our first priority must go, not to preserving or perpetuating any particular feature or method from the past, but to making the future work. In the long run, likely to be more productive than confrontation is constructive address to resolving the basic problems. Scali insists that the United States "must walk the extra mile," while Knorr suggests a course "between ruthless power politics on the one hand and naively utopian unrealism on the other."

There is no need for America to live in anxious indecision behind ramparts, or to refrain from every opportunity to join with Communist states or any other states in genuine cooperative endeavors.

American primacy, while declining in relative terms, will remain until 1990, possibly until 2000 and beyond. Some reduction in the American standard of living vis-a-vis the remaining 94% of the people on earth can be expected.

For the Number One Nation, the real prize is not the "trophy," but the achievement. For America, the undertaking of "first things first" means that, to support the foreign policy of the only free superpower in the world, and in order to remain free itself and contributory to the freedom of others, the United States must continue to project among nations the embodiment of strength--to look strong, to act strong, and to be strong.



It is, I have been told, one of the most formidable of Chinese imprecations to wish that your enemy lived 'in interesting times.'

- D. W. Brogan

'To break sharply with the past is to court the madness that may follow the shock of sudden blows or mutilations' . . . To be ignorant of the past, is not to know, as the Durants have so clearly demonstrated in their The Lessons of History, that: violent revolutions do not so much redistribute wealth as destroy it; that every economic system must sooner or later rely on some form of the profit motive to stir individuals and groups to productivity; that a society cannot successfully sustain moral life without the aid of religion; and that freedom and equality are sworn and everlasting enemies.

- John D. Lofton, Jr.

When we recognize that the focus of politics is shifting from a mechanical to a human center, we shall have reached what is, I believe, the most essential idea in modern politics . . . the deepest error of our political thinking /is/ to talk of politics without reference to human beings . . .

- Walter Lippman  
Preface to Politics

We are not used to a complicated civilization. We don't know how to behave when personal conduct and eternal authority have disappeared. There are no precedents to guide us, no wisdom that wasn't meant for a simpler age. We have changed our environment more quickly than we know how to change ourselves . . .

- Walter Lippman



## CHAPTER 6

### CHANGE AND ITS IMPACTS

#### Indicators of Change

We live in what (despite Chinese misgivings) we are entitled to label "interesting times."

In 1973, Henry Brandon wrote, in The Retreat of American Power:

In my twenty-three years in Washington as chief American correspondent for The Sunday Times of London, I have enjoyed a privileged view both of the rise of the United States to world hegemony and its realization that such a position could not be held indefinitely.<sup>1</sup>

Change is running wide and deep; and it is impossible to escape awareness of its effects on American political, economic, social, military institutions, and procedures--in fact, upon almost the whole complex of human life. It would be fatuous to expect that America's status of being Number One Nation will not be affected.

Before we attempt to cope with change and its dimensions, we may benefit from pausing and realizing that, to some extent, we are so inundated with bulletins about change that we may develop a delusion that everything is changing and ought to change. In a review of Fernand Braudel's great history, The Mediterranean, Richard Mowery Andrews wrote about the dominance of the concept of change in modern life:

Since the late 18th century, most historical writing has concentrated on change, and neglected realities of continuity and tradition. In this fascination with change, modern historiography has reflected the ambitious optimism of Euro-American civilization after the great 18th-century revolutions: confidence in the power of science and industrial technology to remove the constraints of the natural world, to resolve conflict within and among societies, and even to overcome the limitations of human biology; a belief in the imperial vocation of Western rationalism among non-Western peoples; a conviction that the principles of liberalism or socialism are universally valid. The



dominant philosophical assumptions of modern historiography have been voluntarist--postulated on the notion that human will, moral and pragmatic, determines social and political realities. The conception of time most common among modern historians has been teleological, informed by a sense of progress toward a predictable future most often conceived as<sup>2</sup> morally superior to both the past and the present . . .

There exist a number of specialists in change and the future; and they are producing many books and articles, many of them imaginative and informative and recommendable. In this study, however, we are not attempting to be comprehensive, or near-comprehensive, about all the predicted impacts of change, even of those more or less directly related to the status of primacy among nations. We do cite here, however, a substantial number of indicators of change (and, later, of potential future impacts), in order to validate a broad foundation for conviction that significant change is in progress, directly relevant to the status of America in the world context in the decades immediately ahead.

John Cogley, editor of The Center Magazine at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, expressed in 1968 the basic change in broad perspective to an audience of students at the University of North Carolina:

It seems easily predictable that the America of the 1980's will be radically different from the America I grew up in, and vastly different from the country the youngest student in this college-age audience has known all his life. Already between most of you and me (who has children your age), there is a yawning generational gap. But between you and your children, there may be a Grand Canyon. The reason is that a many-sided revolution is moving in on us. The revolution was seeded by my generation and is being carried out by yours; but your children will be attuned to it from birth. It will strike them as neither novel nor revolutionary.



We who have reached our middle years have already lived long enough to feel displaced, at the very time we are supposed to be at the peak of our experience and wisdom. You who have been called on to straddle the dying world of your parents and the evolving world of your children are notoriously alienated from the past. Perhaps you will also be alienated from the future. For, of all the generations that have grown up in the United States, yours seems to have been marked to live out your entire lives in a state of collective instability and restlessness. . . .

The present revolution--which I will call the post-modern revolution . . . is worldwide in scope; it is universal in its grasp; and it is profoundly rooted in the human personality. For everything is changing in society--not just political conceptions and economic notions but morals and manners as well. . . .

Mine is probably the last earth-bound generation of man. The most dramatic (but probably not most significant) 'new thing' for your generation will be the leap from the confines of this earth to the distant stars.

. . . in my own lifetime . . . Earth-distance <sup>3</sup> /has become/ now fairly meaningless. . . .

Changes have been pervasive and rapid. Swift change, no matter how beneficial (and much current change does not at all appear to be beneficial), is unsettling. Possibly, three aspects of change are of overriding significance: scope of change, nature of change, and rate of change. The rate of change does not seem to attract our interest as much as the other facets do--until its pace becomes so rapid as to undermine yesterday's reliable tenets.

One aspect of America's primacy seems least appreciated: its newness, its recency. A. A. Berle makes this point, one we need to keep in the forefront of our awareness:

In two generations [*italics added*], most of the American population has been lifted from a condition of endemic want and privation to a condition of comparative comfort. The America of my childhood looked much like underdeveloped nations--such as Brazil or Argentina--in 1967. Most of its people then



literally struggled against fear and too frequently experienced want, hunger, even lack of shelter. By 1968, eighty-five per cent of Americans were well enough off to choose, within limits, what amenities of life they would seek. Their problem became not whether they could live, but how they wished to live. Prosperity and the wider diffusion of income removed most of them from the brute struggle for survival, and offered them modest but increasingly greater resources with which to determine the esthetic content of their lives.<sup>4</sup>

Greater scope for choice has brought greater uncertainty, out of which there has arisen widespread malaise of the spirit, lack of confidence, a pessimistic address toward the future. Something of this spirit pervades even scientifically-based forecasts, such as those represented by The Limits of Growth. In 1974, an Italian computer scientist, Roberto Vacca, published The Coming Dark Age, which assessed all the major systems on which modern life depends--transport, electricity, garbage disposal, postal systems, telephone networks, etc.--as being hopelessly overloaded and about to crack. Vacca predicts the collapse of modern technology and modern life, beginning in the United States and Japan between 1985 and 1994.

Archibald MacLeish recently expressed this insight with the poet's eloquence:

. . . what is true of the accomplishments of the age is not true of our feelings for it. . . . There is, in truth, a terror in the world. . . . Under the hum of the miraculous machines and the ceaseless publications of the brilliant physicists a silence waits and listens and is heard.

It is the silence of apprehension. We do not trust our time, and the reason we do not trust our time is because it is we who have made the time, and we do not trust ourselves. We have played the hero's part, mastered the monsters, accomplished the labors, become gods--and we do not trust ourselves as gods. We know what we are.<sup>5</sup>



Some citizens become apocalyptic, but not all. Barbara Tuchman, pondering what she and others call the "Doomsday Syndrome," recalls an earlier period in civilization when great disasters not only impended but actually occurred--such as the 14th Century, disastrously beset by famine, plague, the Hundred Years War, church corruption, alienation, harshness. Between 1347 and 1349, the bubonic plague ("The Black Death") swept the entire known world; it is estimated that over a 2½-year period one-third of the world's population succumbed.<sup>6</sup>

Certainly some malaise of the spirit has been reflected by Americans--many in official positions--regarding our previously stable institutions, and pervading broad assessments of American status. In a Times report on the Department of Defense, Secretary Schlesinger was said to have presented a "gloomy review" of the power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union; he emphasized that "the world no longer regards American military power as awesome."<sup>7</sup>

Probably, these are partly ephemeral moods and perceptions. Despite Schlesinger's glum report, America's military power remains awesome, and is still so regarded by most of the rest of the world, even by those lesser nations that may exploit sporadic opportunities to pluck a feather and hear the eagle squawk. The aftermath of America's Vietnam and Watergate experiences are bound to be depressing; but these, while the stuff of experience in the real world, will probably be less enduring in their effects than wider and deeper (though often very hard to detect) currents of change.

It would be helpful here to identify some of the wide and deep changes that are in process of (in some cases, radically) altering



fundamental relationships in domestic and international contexts. Again, no attempt is made here to recount a comprehensive litany of change, nor can extensive ramifications be traced here of each change cited. The following appear to be among the most important factors in generating more or less profound changes in human affairs:

- About 1955, for the first time in man's history, the majority of mankind became literate. The higher the literacy, the greater the demand for political participation and responsiveness, and the less autonomy surviving for elites.<sup>8</sup>

- Demands continue to rise for more education, more modernization. Even peasant farming is on the way out around the world; agriculture has become too serious an affair to be left to peasants.<sup>9</sup>

- In the past, particularly in colonies, minimal government spent about 6% of national income; today populations demand government activities that cost 20%-30% of national income.<sup>10</sup>

In late 1974, Mr. Roy Ash, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, expressed one perception of the changing role of government:

. . . the main role of government is no longer . . . governing. The main role of government these days is that of a redistribution of income . . . collecting cash from some groups of people and paying it out to other people . . . In effect, more than one half of all the cash that passes through the government these days is merely on its way to somebody else.<sup>11</sup>

(This statement recalls one by Voltaire in 1764: "In general, the art of government consists of taking as much money as possible from one class of citizens to give to the other.")

- The number and influence of innovations increases and pervades modern society. One of the hallmarks of the 19th Century was the "invention of the method of invention." For example, the number of important industrial inventions in the past several centuries has been calculated as follows: 15th Century, 50; 16th, 15; 17th, 17;



18th, 43; 19th, 108.<sup>12</sup> And, though the 20th Century is only 3/4 along, we are aware of hundreds of critical inventions, uprooting earlier customs, procedures, values, and capabilities; complicating social interaction; accelerating international trade; and intensifying communications, and other interactions among nations. The number of scientific periodicals in the world, for example, is expected to reach one million by the year 2000; one particular related dynamic, effective internationally, is that power tends to gravitate toward the possessor of knowledge.

- Former Undersecretary of State George Ball pinpoints one enormous political change radically upsetting to primacy, a change whose repercussions have not yet subsided, or are even yet well understood:

. . . one of the central challenges of our time--the problems that derive from the most far-reaching of all the postwar changes, the collapse of empire and all that has flowed from it. There is nothing in history to equal in scale or significance the perilous passage of more than a billion people from colonial status to at least juridical independence, compressed within the period of two decades. It has had profound and profoundly differing consequences for most of mankind.

For the metropolitan nations of Western Europe, it has meant the relinquishment of ancient dreams of world importance, compelling them to recognize that, measured by the present-day standards of world politics, they are after all only medium-sized powers. Although varying in degree from country to country, the impact of this recognition has tended to narrow the European vision to the point where today, as never before in modern times, the people of Europe look inward, concentrating their energies on their own small cape of the Eurasian land mass.

For the vast populations liberated from colonial dependence, the experience has been both sweet and bitter, exhilarating and disappointing, encouraging and frustrating. Out of the shards and wreckage of the old colonial systems, they have created a disparate collection of roughly sixty new nations, varying in physical size from the half billion people of India to the ninety thousand citizens of the Maldives Islands. The differences among these nations,



giant lands and mini-states alike, are great; their common qualities few but critical. All have been born weak and poor, many born prematurely. Each seeks self-respect, world recognition, and a better standard of living for its people. Thirty-nine, or two-thirds, of the new states have come to independence since 1960, and almost every one of them from Gambia to Singapore has a seat in the United Nations General Assembly.<sup>13</sup>

An Indian observer, Sisir Gupta, expresses a coherent perspective toward similarities and differences among third-world countries:

. . . to those who are concerned with the broad underlying dimensions of world politics it appears as a convenient device to group the poor, weak, and problem-ridden states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a distinct and different element in international affairs. . .

Notwithstanding the many dissimilarities among them, these states share certain qualities which are of considerable significance . . .

The most obvious of the common problems of the Third World states is that they are poor and that the gap between them and the richer countries is widening. It is true that there are great differences among them in terms of per capita income or of the level of industrial progress. But they are all technologically backward and relatively unindustrialised. What is more, the consciousness of difference in levels of development among them is much less relevant as a political factor than the consciousness of their collective inferiority in relation to the developed world. . .

The second attribute . . . is that virtually all of them are going through the first phases of modernisation of their societies and are engaged in adapting their political institutions and values to the needs of social change and economic growth. Hence, most of them, in varying degrees, are showing signs of political instability of one kind or another. [They constitute] . . . to most of the developed countries the chaotic and disorderly part of the world.

A third common characteristic of the Third World countries is that an overwhelming majority of them have, till recently, been under the direct colonial rule of Western nations.

A fourth quality, which is to some extent a corollary of the third, is that there is in varying degrees in all



these countries a consciousness of being non-Western and non-white.

To many Third World states, racial discrimination and colonial domination are but two facets of the same problem . . . and the North-South division has as much a racial as an economic and a political connotation.

Lastly, with perhaps a few exceptions, all the Third World states are relatively powerless and weak. . .

In brief, it is the fact of their being poor, unstable, new, non-white, and weak that gives the Third World states their common identity and their distinctive character as a group of nations or as a group of members of the international society.

Yet, it is easy to exaggerate the importance of these factors and overlook other realities regarding the individual and collective world views of these nations. . . .

In the first place, not many of the Third World states are radical in their attitudes to internal institutions and problems. . .

Secondly, the new have-not nations have more reasons to be afraid of international anarchy than the powerful 'have' states of the developed world. . . . in any situation where international might becomes international right the weak and powerless states of the Third World would have more to lose than others.

Thirdly, unlike the have-not Axis Powers of the pre-war world, only a few of the Third World states are territorially have-nots. . . . by and large the Third World states are content with their present boundaries. . . . their fear of international anarchy, as mentioned above, makes them status quo oriented, as far as questions of territorial changes are concerned.

What is even more important as a factor restraining their urge to achieve the solidarity of the have-not nations is that new nations, no less than the older ones, conduct their foreign policies to promote their national interests, as perceived by their ruling elites. . .

Some of them see the safeguarding of their security in the face of threats from neighbours (often fellow members of the Third World club) as the primary tasks of their foreign policies. . .



Many of the Third World states have in fact sought to promote their national interests vis-a-vis their neighbours' with the help of the very nations who are most unquestionably the haves of today's world.

Again, the Third World states are very different from each other in regard to one major motivation of international behaviour--their potentialities as powers. Some of these countries--India, Indonesia, Pakistan, United Arab Republic, Nigeria, Congo, and Brazil--may well be classified as middle powers. Others like Chad, Gabon, Singapore, Laos, Peru, and Ecuador are small powers and likely to remain so. It is extremely difficult to aggregate the interests of these countries on questions like the relative power and status of nations in the world.<sup>14</sup>

- Power is being eroded and diffused at almost all levels, sometimes in relatively subtle ways. Even the instruments of communication among nations are changing in importance. In eroding the status of ambassador in representing, in previous times, all of his country's interests abroad, one may be instructed by the published journal of U. S. Ambassador Armin Meyer, in Japan, 1969-1972. During that period, he never had a private conference with the President; he was excluded from summit meetings between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato; he was kept in ignorance of major American decisions affecting Japan; and he could learn of American positions only from press leaks--that is, from leaks by Japanese negotiators' to the Japanese press.<sup>15</sup>

- Despite improvements in regard to infant mortality and life expectancy, J. David Singer and Paul Winston extract a somewhat startling conclusion from their study of deaths from violent causes (combatants in wars, non-combatants in wars, assassinations, homicide, genocide, massacres, executions, upheavals, etc.) between 1915 and 1965:



. . . the evidence is that, along with what often passes for political development, the probability of a given individual living out his normal life and dying a natural death has steadily decreased over the past century and a half.<sup>16</sup>

- The still-low momentum but accelerating emancipation of women will continue to respond to the imperative of making full use of available brainpower to meet the complexities of future society; for the largest pool of unexploited brainpower in every society is that of its women. The tensions and turmoil resulting from changes in women's roles--and hence from contingent changes in men's roles, also--have hardly yet gotten underway. There may emerge greatly revised consensuses within societies toward, for example, war.

- The dynamics of equalitarianism are eroding the status of elites--political, organizational, religious, legal, social, economic--everywhere.

- For the first time, persons over 60-65 constitute a substantial sector of national populations, posing a number of critical challenges, such as increased economic burdens for the income-earning sectors.

- Predictions that life spans may be further extended are highly provocative and potentially disturbing. Harold Lasswell has confronted this apparently fanciful contingency:

We are told that worn out molecules in the body may eventually be located and reconstituted so that human beings can live forever. Even if intellectual and physical vigor can be continued for only a century or two it presents a fascinating set of policy problems for the choice of leaders. Shall we try to disqualify the men and women of experience and demonstrated capacity in order to provide younger people with opportunities 'to make the current mistakes?' Is it time to revise our norms by instituting



annual Retirement days on which anyone who has been around for even fifty years or a hundred years should be permitted, indeed subtly coerced, into community gas chambers amid ceremonial honors by the Marine Band? Or should it be recognized that young people are no longer necessary, and hence the practice of having children should be abolished? (Especially since the technology of machines can probably be relied on to create advanced forms that are indistinguishable from living species?)

It is doubtless whimsical to suggest that such potentialities will soon be actualized. However, it is far from whimsical to assert that unless we enlist instructed concern for these contingencies today, we will fail to take note of the policy questions about which something can be done before most of us face an accomplished fact.<sup>17</sup>

- John Rader Platt gives more or less precise statistical measures of rates of change:

The essence of the matter is that we are on a steeply-rising 'S-curve' of change. We are undergoing a great historical transition to new levels of technological power all over the world. We all know about these changes, but we do not often stop to realize how large they are in orders of magnitude, or how vast compared to all previous changes in history. In the last century, we have increased our speeds of communication by a factor of  $10^7$ ; our speeds of travel by  $10^2$ ; our speeds of computers by  $10^6$ ; our energy resources by  $10^3$ ; our ability to control diseases by something like  $10^2$ ; and our rate of population growth to  $10^3$  times what it was a few thousand years ago.

Could anyone suppose that human relations around the world would not be affected to their very roots by such changes?<sup>18</sup>

But then, Platt applies the brake:

What many people do not realize is that many of these technological changes are now approaching certain natural limits. The 'S-curve' is beginning to level off. We may never have faster communications or more TV or larger weapons or a higher level of danger than we have now. . . .

The trouble is that we may not survive these next few years.<sup>19</sup>

Among numerous dynamics being reconstituted, the concept of leadership has been affected. Lasswell has commented usefully:



John Gardner, speaking on this subject two years ago, said that universities are 'immunizing a high proportion of our most gifted young people against any tendencies to leadership'; that they are producing an antileadership vaccine, which encourages only the technical expert or the critic who stands aside, distrustful of power, aloof from action and responsibility, observing and giving sage advice. I go one step further: I believe our whole society, remote from youth as it tends to be, administers the antileadership vaccine . . .<sup>20</sup>

- John Cogley gives his impression of the nature of this most painful change in human relations:

There are signs everywhere that many of the traditional canons of leadership have already been outmoded. The man who would lead others is already finding out that, at least where the younger generation is concerned, he can get nowhere until he understands this new growth in human awareness of what it actually means to be a human being. His own task, he already knows, though he does not know quite what to do about it, is not to lay down the law; it is to show others how their desire to be themselves can be creatively implemented for the good of all, rather than employed destructively against society itself. In twenty years that task will almost be a definition. . . .<sup>21</sup>

It is difficult to grasp the contradictory condition of some facets of change, as mankind takes two steps forward and one step back (and sometimes the other way around), as man wins some and loses some. Certain trends may be exerting influence widely, while opposite trends manifest themselves in other areas. Despite the spread of the liberalizing spirit discerned by John Cogley above, Freedom House discerned exactly the reverse in selected polities. From New York, Freedom House issues an annual report on gains and losses of freedom in specific nations. Rating nations as free, partly free, or not free, the report covering 1974 indicated that personal freedom diminished for 85 million people during that year, a total among the world's people of 1% fewer in the "Free" category than at the end of the previous year. Some 66



countries with 42% of world population were rated "Not Free"; 34 countries with 23% were rated "Partly Free"; and 59 countries with 35% were rated "Free." The Soviet Union and India were called the "greatest imperial states today."<sup>22</sup>

- Among indicators and evidences of change, a number give witness directly to multiplying interactions among nations and peoples. For example, Table 6-1 outlines the tremendous growth in world trade between 1880 and 1970:<sup>23</sup>

Table 6-1: Growth of World Trade

<u>Decade</u>	<u>World Exports in billions of dollars</u>
1880s	6
1890s	9
1900s	18
1950s	110
1960s	275

- Another indicator is the proliferation of international organizations. The International Organization Yearbook of 1945 lists 566; of 1951-1952, lists 951 (of which 821 were nongovernmental organizations); of 1956-1957, lists 1116 (with numerous subdivisions across a sizeable spectrum of human activities, e.g., philosophy, peace, labor, professions, commerce, energy, youth, arts, transportation, etc.); of 1958-1959, lists 1290; of 1974, lists 4310.

- In 1973 an earth-orbiting unmanned satellite was launched to scan the earth's surface with highly advanced capabilities. It has been reporting information on environment, resources, pollution, crop growth, and even glacier movements. A report by the American Federation of Information Processing Societies, on "Social Implications of Computers Across National Boundaries," predicted as follows:



In the public sector, the use of computers across national boundaries will strengthen multinational public enterprises in such areas as public health, criminal justice; pollution, weather and disaster control, with major impacts before 1985. . . .

We may find that the use of computers across national boundaries will be one of the three or four most important factors tending to bring the world closer together through the creation of new multinational institutions and inter-dependencies. If this should happen, the impact on human society will have been truly revolutionary--perhaps equal to the impact of the invention of the printing press or of human language itself.<sup>24</sup>

Through communications, trade, and other forms of exchange, some degrees of familiarity with almost all of the world's cultures have been diffused to almost every corner of the earth. Says Kenneth Boulding:

The day of national sovereignty and of unilateral national defense seems to be clearly over, though it may take a major catastrophe to convince us of this. . . . The network of electronic communication is inevitably producing a world superculture, and the relations between this superculture and the more traditional national and regional cultures of the past remains the great question mark of the next fifty years. (Italics original)<sup>25</sup>

A generation ago, few knew or cared what went on in regions other than their own. Now, much of the world lives with awareness of events and developments in all other parts. In many important respects, the entire globe has become a single theater of international relations.<sup>26</sup>

One result, relative to primacy, is that "The elites are extremely sensitive to their country's status among their neighbors and in the world at large, and particularly to any slights or humiliations . . ."<sup>27</sup>

Thus, heightened international awareness, especially awareness of unequal status, is one of the significant results of proliferating



contacts among nations. Greater interpenetration among national societies is taking place, and hence exploitation of one nation's populace by leaders of another nation. One illustrative demonstration was provided when the President of Venezuela took a full page of the New York Times, ostensibly to "respond" to a letter from President Ford; actually, this was an appeal to the American people "over the heads" of the nation's official Administration.<sup>28</sup> Whether or not opportunities for interpenetration are exploited, heightened awareness of unequal status particularly intensifies dissatisfaction. Thus, observes Barbera, arises an ironic manifestation of our time, in that a rising tide of development lifts all nations, rich and poor, but also causes tension through increased perception of comparative disadvantage. Barbera calls inequality in development "the central drama of our time."<sup>29</sup>

I feel it pertinent to add here two important caveats about the potential future; each is a fairly well established premise:

1. Greater contact among different cultures, if it does not necessarily breed contempt, does not necessarily breed harmony and understanding. Most homicides, for example, occur among people well known to each other; most wars have occurred between neighboring countries. It remains unpredictable whether spreading political, economic, and cultural contact will harmonize or exacerbate international relations;

2. It has often been remarked that the peasant, serf, peon, and slave--the truly oppressed and downtrodden--do not revolt or strike for improvement. It is only peoples who have already begun



to experience improvement, who have benefited from some momentum in overcoming their disadvantages, that generate and accelerate determined activity to overcome perceived disadvantage. How far such movements might proceed in one country or another is, of course, unpredictable.

#### Great Factors of Change

##### The Great Problem of Population and Food

Various indicators of change merge into the major problems of which they give evidence. The problems themselves have either already occasioned major adjustment in relations among nations, or will soon achieve such effect.

One such world problem is food. In 1974, New York Times reporters pursued this topic in hundreds of interviews with economists and scientists around the world and found virtually unanimous agreement that a serious world food crisis has begun. "It is recognized generally that the world's nearly four billion people now draw upon a common pool of food-producing resources, including land, fertilizer, energy, machinery, pesticides, and global distribution systems." Some experts see only a temporary food crisis, brought on chiefly by a fertilizer shortage, that will subside in 4-6 years; others foresee "decades of unrelenting misery" for much of the world. There was almost total agreement that the most severe immediate impact will be felt in India, with repercussions throughout the world.<sup>30</sup>

Several other sources, estimating that 10 million people might starve to death in 1975, and 500 million more hover on the brink of starvation, discuss a provocative alternative: triage. Adapted



from the French verb, trier (to sort), a medical system of battle-field classification evolved in World War I to divide the wounded into 3 groups: those likely to die no matter what was done for them; those who would probably recover even if not treated; and those who would probably survive, but only if treated promptly. When supplies and manpower were limited, only the third group got attention.

The adaptation of triage to food distribution was proposed in a 1967 book, Famine--1975!, by William and Paul Paddock. They suggested that certain nations be cut off from food aid for the benefit of other nations. Which nations were to be cut off?--

Nations in which the population growth trend has already passed the agricultural potential . . . combined with inadequate leadership and other divisive factors, this makes catastrophe inevitable . . . to send food to them is to throw sand in the ocean.<sup>31</sup>

In The Population Bomb of 1968, Paul Ehrlich also made approving references to triage.<sup>32</sup>

Dr. Garrett Hardin, of the University of California, wrote one of the most famous essays of our time, "The Tragedy of the Commons." He used the analogy of a common pasturing area open to all in a community, predicting that it is sure to be overgrazed because it is in each user's interest to put on the commons as many grazing animals as he can. In the world's "commons," since non-practitioners of birth control will outbreed others to the detriment of the whole community (even a world community), nations must soon relinquish the unrestricted freedom to breed. When the planet was sparsely populated, the mankind-resources situation was bound by



certain limits; now, a different ethic is required. But agreement has not emerged as to what that ethic should be.

Dr. Jay Forrester, of MIT says we no longer understand the outcomes of some social actions because of the increased complexity of social systems; Forrester's student, Dale Runge, in "The Ethics of Humanitarian Food Relief," finds relief not ethical, because over the long run it creates more misery than it alleviates.<sup>33</sup>

This is a fundamental problem, involving primacy as well as other attributes of the United States. For there is only one nation in the world, the United States, that has or is likely to have a sizeable surplus of food. In earlier decades, we produced great surpluses without strain; but now, most of our reserves are gone. Quadrupled oil prices have made the United States increasingly dependent upon sales of food in order to maintain our balance of payment; in three years, annual food sales went from \$8 billion to \$21 billion, and now head the American export list.<sup>34</sup>

Dr. Hardin has argued what is called a "lifeboat ethic," that is, we must be selective with our help; if we took everyone aboard the lifeboat, the boat will swamp, and everybody will drown--if we try to achieve complete justice, we shall attain complete catastrophe. Others disagree. Roger Shimm, head of Union Theological Seminary, calls this an obscene doctrine. Some hold that considerable improvement would ensue from American reduction of consumption of grain-fed beef. A New York Times editorial, condemning the concept (but without proposing any constructive alternative), called triage "playing God."<sup>35</sup> Some contend that the United States already practices a



form of political triage through allocation of grain surpluses to some nations but not others, principally to nations selected according to their potential for enhancing American political status, balance of power, or balance of payments.<sup>36</sup>

As noted in Chapter 3, the United States occupies, in food production, a more dominant world status than the Middle East occupies in oil. Some analyses of the future conclude that the looming grain shortages in the world "could give the United States a measure of power it never had before--possibly an economic and political dominance greater than that of the immediate post-World War II years."<sup>37</sup>

The problem of food (and eventually of sharing affluence) appears to be closely related to the fate of United States primacy in the approaching future. Plato said that the main cause of all wars is money. Many of the great analysts of social conflict agree that material inequities are a major cause of wars, paralleling and reinforcing other causes--psychological, cultural, and ideological. Karl Deutsch observed that bloody conflicts over property within society diminish as internal per capita income rises. Noting that per capita income in the world in 1968 was about \$600, in the USSR about \$1800, and in the US about \$3000, Deutsch wondered whether some annual income level can be identified that, if reached by all people, would remove or minimize the economic incentive toward conflict; what might that level be--\$3000? \$4800?<sup>38</sup>

Predicting that world population may reach 12-13 billion by 2040<sup>39</sup> ("Actually, 12 billion people can be fed, housed, and quite decently accommodated in the world"; doubling China's population,



for example, would leave China about as densely populated as Switzerland. But beyond 12-13 billion people in the world, "things would get difficult"), Karl Deutsch wonders about one possible solution. Recollecting that the United States, despite threats to expropriate great corporations and other concentrations of great wealth in pursuit of redistribution, achieved partial redistribution through taxation of corporations, Deutsch wondered whether the affluent countries, rather than live in apprehension that they would be overrun by hordes of the world's poor and hungry, would undertake to pay an "international tax" in lieu of paying out equivalent amounts in foreign aid.<sup>40</sup>

Is there a correlation between population growth and development status? Henry Barbera says yes:

- The correlation is positive between power and population in industrial societies that already enjoy a high standard of living and full employment and that possess substantial unexploited resources; but

- The correlation is negative in other societies, with every additional mouth to feed a drag on progress.<sup>41</sup>

Robert Heilbroner describes this dilemma:

Like an immense river in flood, the number of human beings rises each year to wash away the levees of the preceding year's labors and to pose future requirements of monstrous proportions. To provide shelter for the three billion human beings who will arrive on earth in the next forty years will require as many dwellings as have been constructed since recorded history began. To feed them will take double the world's present output of food. To cope with the mass exodus from the overcrowded countryside will necessitate cities of grotesque size. Calcutta, now a cesspool of three to five millions, threatens us by the



year 2000 with a prospective population of from thirty to sixty millions.

Nuclear Proliferation. The dissemination of nuclear capabilities continues around the globe. Six nations, having detonated nuclear devices, obviously possess nuclear stockpiles: the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom, France, and India. Three others are said to be able to produce nuclear weapons "on short notice": Canada, Israel, and Japan. Eight others are said to be rapidly acquiring nuclear know-how and facilities: Taiwan, South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, Pakistan, Spain, Iran, and South Africa.<sup>42</sup> Three others are cited by another specialist as among "Nuclear Threshold Powers": Chile, Egypt, and Indonesia.<sup>43</sup>

The enormous nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers strike fear and apprehension in the hearts of citizens and governments worldwide, including many within the superpower nations themselves; however, 25 years of experience provide a basis for some measure of confidence in great superpower caution related to nuclear weapons. What lesser nations will do as nuclear nations proliferate--nations with no experience and perhaps no consciousness of nuclear-policy responsibility beyond the parameters of their own interests--no one can predict, for that situation is without precedent. One particular aspect of nuclear proliferation that is intensifying apprehension around the world in large and small nations is the possibility of acquisition of nuclear weapons, and their use or threatened use in connection with blackmail, hostages, national leaders, critical facilities, and political perversities by hardened criminals and fanatical political terrorists.



### Energy

The problem of access, availability, transformation, and reserves of energy sources will doubtless exert changes, now unpredictable, on primacy among nations. For energy is a sine qua non of industrial life, with no substitute (e.g., if oil supply runs out, air transport and air travel will cease around the world).

The United States, as has been cited in several ways, produces and consumes great amounts of energy; if China's per capita consumption of energy equalled that of the US, China's total consumption in 1970 would have exceeded total world production. At the present stage of technology, the United States is highly wasteful of energy via inefficient conversion means (e.g., the field of transportation uses 30% of all the energy consumed in the United States, but current transportation wastes 75% of the energy put into it).<sup>44</sup>

Princeton Professors Oskar Morgenstern, Klaus Knorr, and Klaus Heiss hold that medium-term alternatives (nuclear fission, nuclear fusion) to fossil fuel have great potential but will not meet future energy requirements, because little progress has been made over the past 25 years in their development. Fusion energy would be unlimited and nonpolluting. One cubic meter of sea water is said to contain enough deuterium to equal the chemical energy in 33,000 metric tons of coal. The total energy production in the United States in 1970 reached the equivalent of 2 billion metric tons of coal; total world production of energy in 1970 could be matched by the energy in the deuterium in 200,000 tons of sea water--about the same amount of sea water as contained within these dimensions: 10x10x200 meters.



The great obstacle, of course, is ignorance of means to extract and use the deuterium.<sup>45</sup>

Solar energy, also unlimited and nonpolluting, is in the same condition of "mystery." The earth's surface receives daily about 100 times the amount of energy consumed annually in the United States.<sup>46</sup> Unfortunately, no one yet knows how to harness that energy.

World reserves of coal and lignite constitute about 40 times world reserves of petroleum. Insofar as coal reserves are related to a status of primacy, it is interesting that both superpowers, and China, possess vast reserves of coal.<sup>47</sup>

Morgenstern and his associates predict that by 1980, Western Europe will be 85% dependent on imports of oil, Japan 100%, and even the United States 50% dependent. The same specialists forecast appreciable shifts in wealth and attendant power from oil importers to oil producers, but also point to the vulnerability of oil producers to the military strength of large industrial states (the USSR, not vulnerable itself to oil dependency, may take up the role of defender of oil-state interests). The United States, with its unique power leverage based on vast food production, may be able to offset its advantage in food against its disadvantage in oil.<sup>48</sup>

#### The Multinational Corporation

Jacques Maisonrouge, senior vice-president of IBM, has been quoted as follows:

The world's political structures are completely obsolete. They have not changed in at least a hundred years and are woefully out of tune with technological progress. The critical issue of our time is the conceptual conflict between the search for global optimization of resources with the independence of nation states. . . .



Because the global corporation rests its claim of efficiency on its ability to view the planet as a single economic mart and to shift money, resources, and people freely from one continent to another, it has transcended the nation-state and in the process is transforming it. . . .

There is every reason to believe that these corporations will supplant the nation-state as the most powerful force in our lives and as the major actor in the international system. . . . the most revolutionary aspect of the planetary enterprise is its world view. It is the first institution in human history dedicated to centralized planning on a world scale. /This last statement appears to be unaware of a number of 'planning' predecessors, such as the Catholic Church, the United Nations, the World Bank, and similar institutions./<sup>49</sup>

Professor Müller says that multinational corporations now account for the majority of transactions in the American economy; that 30% of total US corporation profits are derived from overseas operations, compared to 7% in 1960; that foreign dollar deposits of America's "largest global banks" are now estimated at 65% of domestic holdings, compared with 8.5% in 1960; and that these trends "have locked the United States into a new world of synchronized business cycles and relative financial flows."<sup>50</sup>

Aware that the gross annual sales of General Motors amount to \$28 billion, while the GNP of Switzerland, for example, amounts to \$26 billion, Barnett and Müller assert that the ordinary business decisions of firms such as General Motors, IBM, General Electric, and Exxon now

have more power than most sovereign governments to determine where people will live; what work, if any, they will do; what they will eat, drink, and wear; what sorts of knowledge will be encouraged by schools and universities; and what kind of society their children will inherit.<sup>51</sup>



Professor Charles Kindelberger is quoted: "The international corporation has no country to which it owes more loyalty than any other, nor any country where it feels completely at home."<sup>52</sup>

"The global corporation," say Barnet and Müller,

is revolutionizing the world economy through its increasing control over four fundamental elements of economic life-- technology, finance capital, labor markets, and marketplace ideology . . . What they are demanding, in essence, is the right to transcend the nation-state and, in the process, to transform it.<sup>53</sup>

In relation to primacy, Professor Harold Perlmutter, of the University of Pennsylvania, estimates that by 1985 about 300 global corporations, most of them American, will control most of the world's productive assets.<sup>54</sup>

Not all forecasters in economics share these views with regard to the future of multinational corporations. Eliot Janeway, for one, takes vigorous exception to the views of Barnet and Müller--

. . . nationalism is more than ever the order of the day  
. . . Barnet and Müller are obsessed with the quixotic notion that the multi-nationals are bland post-nationalistic pretenders to the mantle of the nationalistic nuts who have tried and failed to take things over and run them in the past. They . . . show no awareness whatever that the richest of the multinationals are running out of money.

Unfortunately, the simplest and most practical rule of thumb for rating any multinational corporation is by its prudence in avoiding all underdeveloped countries as the Thyphoid Marys of insolvency that, without exception, they are . . .<sup>55</sup>

We are not attempting to weld all these strands of change into a coherent tapestry. Some appear to be highly discrete indicators, others to be highly dependent. They all appear to be important.




### Predictions

Contemplating forces and indicators of change, some of us are tempted to predict the future course of one or more forces. To a certain extent, predicting is unavoidable; we all make personal and institutional plans based on regularized recurrent phenomena and behavior. But prediction in any detail is hazardous.

As Arthur Clarke has expressed it, "It is impossible to predict the future, and all attempts to do so in detail appear ludicrous within a very few years."<sup>56</sup> "Expectations" may be a more useful term than "predictions," if one employs "expectations" in a modest sense. Of what value, then, are surveys of opinions about the future course of events? Of very limited value. Take, for example, a question such as this: "What do you think will be the relative world standing of the United States in 10 years? Still No. 1? No growth? Decline? Resurgence?" Suppose 65% of respondents, in the grip of current recession and pessimism, predict decline? But how can even slow-changing trends be predicted even one year ahead? There are few trends which cannot, a year later, accelerate, decelerate, continue current rates, level off, or turn down or up mildly or sharply.

Let us look at an illustration of possible outcomes of a trend in a single important dynamic over 10 years.





Suppose we measure the factor after two years and find that it has declined to level X. What course will it take subsequently? Let us consider four alternative possibilities, labeled A, B, C, and D, as the trend is later measured at the 10-year point:

- In A, it is seen that the trend turned upward to high levels.
- In B, the trend recovered to the starting level, then stayed even.
- In C, the trend continued to decline over the entire period.
- In D, the trend declined for 3 more years, then turned upward to reach, after 10 years, a level higher than the one from which it started the decade.

The provocative question is: At the 2-year point, what can be confidently predicted about the next 8 years? Which will turn out to be the trace of the next 8 years--A, B, C, or D? Our human tendency (based on much experience) is to expect the same indicator to



continue in the same direction. In some instances, it would do so; in others, not. Every time a decline sets in, whether it is destined to last for 2 years, 10 years, 25 years, or centuries--i.e., whether represented by small dips in the curve, deep dips, long dips, or other dips, or whether they represent permanent turning points--they can all begin the same way.

At the 2-year stage, a number of publicists or shallow analysts may well leap to the presses to cite "recent evidence" and predict a likely future trend. As noted, they may be right; chances are that they are wrong--if right, it is by accident; if wrong, that is by accident, too. They cannot know the subsequent course any more than the merest indifferent can; collectively, however, they may "saturate" the electorates who respond to surveys.

Remember, however, that we have been considering a single force or dynamic. Obviously, at any stage of complex contemporary life, there will emerge many indicators of various strands, pointing simultaneously in all directions. Can they be clustered or aggregated to discern interrelated major thrusts? Partially. Sometimes. But how difficult it is to do, and how little confidence should most of them inspire!

It is tempting here to hold up for the reader's amusement and possible scorn a plethora of examples of unsuccessful prediction. Some have become quite famous. Arthur Clarke, for perfectly legitimate purposes, cites a number of them, and I shall borrow a few from him. But only a few; for I doubt that any of us, possibly tempted to heft "the first stone," would do any better than the eminences cited below.



Perhaps the most famous gaffe was, unfortunately, that of the great American astronomer, Simon Newcomb, who made the following statement in an article published just as the Wright brothers were affixing wings to an engine:

The demonstration that no possible combination of known substances, known forms of machinery and known forms of force, can be united in a practical machine by which man shall be able to fly long distances through the air, seems to the writer as complete as it is possible for the demonstration of any physical fact to be.<sup>57</sup>

As late as 1957, after Sputnik, Dr. Richard Woolley arrived in England from Australia to take up his new appointment as Astronomer Royal, and was asked his views on space flight. Only four years away from Gagarin's first space orbit of the earth, and only twelve years from Armstrong and Aldrin's landing on the moon, the eminent Dr. Woolley declared: "Space travel is utter bilge."<sup>58</sup>

When Harry Truman became president upon the sudden death of Roosevelt, Secretary of War Stimson informed him about the Manhattan Project for the creation of an atomic bomb. Some advisors supported the project; others derided the whole idea. Three months before the first device exploded, Admiral Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff from 1942 to 1949, assured Mr. Truman: "This is the biggest fool thing we have done. The bomb will never go off, and I speak as an expert in explosives."<sup>59</sup>

In December 1945 (of course, after much usage of the German V-2's), the distinguished Dr. Vannevar Bush, head of the entire United States scientific programs during World War II, said to a Senate committee: ". . . there has been a great deal said about a 3,000



miles high-angle rocket. In my opinion such a thing is impossible for many years . . . I think we can leave that out of our thinking . . . "60

The eminent British scientist-novelist C. P. Snow was quoted in December 1960 in reference to atomic bombs: "Within, at the most, ten years, some of these bombs are going to go off. I'm saying this as responsibly as I can. This is the certainty . . . a certainty of disaster."<sup>61</sup> We are quoting, obviously, sixteen years later.

These few examples, whatever the effect on the reader, are sufficient to dissuade the writer from rushing into prophecy--or, even, backing into it. We shall continue to swathe such few projections as we offer in such swaddlings as "may be" or "it appears possible," with only a rare "probable."

E. B. Haas has developed a predictive composite "scenario" of future world trends, some of which appear to be not subject to social learning or human manipulation, while others appear to be at least partially responsive to design. We have consulted a number of forecasts concerning the future of international relations; this scenario of Haas, presented in his 1970 book, The Web of Interdependence: The United States and International Organizations, appears to us plausible and prescient enough to warrant extensive quotation:<sup>62</sup>

There can be little doubt that the world will be characterized for many decades to come by the 'basic multifold trend.' . . . /with/ items that make up the trend not subject to any social learning that is now discernible. . . . culturally, the world will be more and more sensate, preoccupied with empirical perception, secular, humanistic, utilitarian, and hedonistic. People will be less and less willing to defer gratification; they will be bent exclusively on immediate enjoyment of what-



ever they value. Elites will tend toward both egalitarianism and meritocracy. Scientific knowledge of all kinds will accumulate even more rapidly than it does now. Society will change faster and more universally in proportion to the application of this scientific knowledge through technology and its diffusion. Industrialization will be worldwide, though its benefits may not be; both affluence and leisure will increase in proportion, but population will also continue to burgeon, thus giving us a continuing race between food supply and people. Primary occupations will decline even more in importance, and secondary occupations will begin a downward trend. Education and literacy will spread more evenly throughout the world, and so will the capability for mass destruction through war. Urbanization will reach the point of the megalopolis, if not the necropolis.

The major technical revolutions of the next twenty years will include a vast increase in computers, data retrieval, and their application, so that instantaneous factual information will be available to decision-makers on almost everything--but also to the increasingly literate and aware public. Developments in biology may result in control over heredity, motivation, and the length of human life. The oceans will be increasingly explored and exploited, and the weather will be subjected to manipulation. New forms of energy will be developed making man less dependent on coal and access to fresh water, with wide implications for location of industries. Some of the more obvious 'social problems' associated with these trends--not necessarily capable of being solved by such learned behavior as forecasting and planning--include unemployment, status deprivation, and society's inability to assimilate an excess of educated, aspiring counterelites. The race for food will imply agrarian unrest, and the reliance on cybernetic equipment will lead toward the meritocratic rule of communications scientists and technicians. Since more work will be done by fewer people, private life will become crucial; the home and the "communal pad" will be new centers of activity.

The dominance of these trends is likely to result in the arrival of a society now often labeled postindustrial; almost certainly, it will come quite soon to the West and to Japan, and eventually to the successfully industrializing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The postindustrial society is characterized by very high per capita income, the dominance of tertiary and quaternary economic pursuits and by effective floors on welfare. New social aggregates, neither 'public' nor 'private,' will be the major source of innovation; and as cybernation reigns supreme, the market will decline in decision-making importance. Since most institutions will become obsolete within a generation, 'learning' will be a continuous activity in the sense of making people adapt to change beyond their



rational control; quite literally, everybody will be going to school most of the time. Work-oriented and achievement-oriented values will disappear as the pursuits associated with a sensate culture predominate and all human group activity is legitimated as psychotherapy.

The role of government and foreign affairs in such a setting calls for a further comment. As accepted values erode, we can no longer expect a consensus on notions such as the 'national interest'; perhaps the postindustrial nation will no longer be an object of value at all to its citizens. The government may become an agency taken for granted as the dispenser of largesse and physical security that one assumes to be his right. More and more people will be able to afford to behave as spoiled children, and American society could become a loose network of self-indulgent groups profoundly indifferent to the issues that make up this book. But someone would remain to feed and exploit the data banks, to design and deploy nonkilling but lethargy-inducing missiles, to plan the curricula for the next generation of adaptive gene selectors and ocean ranchers. The ruling meritocracy would inherit government by default.

Can this sort of widespread alienation survive? Chances are that the alienated would eventually seek to influence public decisions once more and develop appropriate ideologies. The mood of soma-centered withdrawal from public values--and the withdrawal from world affairs implicit in this mood--may then give rise to a new chiasm of mission, reform, overthrow, and involvement. And the commitment-withdrawal-recommitment cycle of the American foreign policy mood might remain intact even in a postindustrial setting. Nor should we forget that while the West is working itself toward the satiation of the post-industrial psyche, whole nations in the less developed world will continue to be ruled by genocide, famine, guerrilla brutality, and messianic behavior.

All sorts of 'problems' will abound twenty years hence, problems bequeathed to us by the pace of change associated with the basic multifold trend. We do not know whether these problems are amenable to solutions other than 'progressive adjustment.' We cannot tell whether man will have a consciousness of danger of a need to forecast and to plan early corrective steps. We must suspect that technological and scientific innovation will go on growing exponentially. We must be dubious of man's ability to learn to mold these forces according to his hopes and fears. Thus we can affirm the tension between the Third World's desire to modernize and be rich and the West's ability to help, but we do not know whether the tension will result in a race war or a welfare world based on a regional economic division of labor . . . Economic growth may lead to bitter disenchantment; the sensate life may spawn boredom and crime. Megalopolis



may prove to be unbearable, and public order may come to depend on the regular administration of new and powerful tranquilizers. None of this is certain; all is possible. . . . the vexing question of whether the twenty new moderately industrial nations will soon have advanced weapons systems at their disposal, thus creating among themselves arms races and deterrence patterns of the kind familiar to the superpowers in 1969.

This is the evolving setting of world politics. It will determine the future of the web of interdependence if existing trends are simply accepted by policy-makers and if systemic learning continues to take the form it has enjoyed for the last decade.

. . . The characteristics of the era in which we are living are changing before our very eyes. Alliances are visibly declining in cohesion and purpose. The ideological struggle between the superpowers is being muted. New nations declare themselves nonaligned almost as soon as their flags rise in front of the palace of the government, as the North-South issue predominates in their minds over the East-West confrontation more familiar to us. Economics and economic blocs are therefore more important than many military and ideological groupings. This trend is well underway and it rolls on whether willed or not by the United States. What kind of configuration can we predict for the international system if the trend continues unchecked?

We must exclude certain kinds of futures as incompatible with any now visible aspects of the multifold trend, at least for the next twenty to thirty years. There will be no world government based on voluntary federation, and the logic of deterrence will prevent the evolution of a world empire. The large powers will not be sufficiently cohesive and purposeful to impose their hegemony in the form of a concert and the small powers--while more energetically independent than in the past system--will still lack the unity of purpose to dominate. It is conceivable, however that the nuclear powers might establish a "condominium" whereby they jointly guarantee the safety of non-nuclear powers, such as in the framework of a nonproliferation treaty. Nor can we count on a UN with a capacity for independent military action strikingly greater than is now incorporated in the familiar structure on the East River.

Totalitarian politics in Europe will become more benignly authoritarian as the process of bureaucratic embourgeoisement catapults them along the trajectory of the postindustrial society. The Western democracies will move further along the



road they have taken, implying more internal division and less willingness to take energetic international action. In Latin America, a few countries will become left-wing totalitarian polities, nine or ten will succeed in modernizing as democracies, and the remainder will oscillate between degrees of authoritarianism, including many of the features we associate with the fascism of the 1930's. In Africa, the bulk of the nations will alternate between mild authoritarian and rigid totalitarian forms of government and national purpose, thus keeping alive ideological tensions on that continent after the demise of the present leadership. In Asia, things will be somewhat more stable, with an East and Southeast Asian radical communist bloc, a few successful democracies, and a large number of authoritarian polities trying to modernize in the more leisurely fashion of contemporary Pakistan. Under no conceivable circumstances can we count on more than fifty-odd democracies in a 133-member United Nations, but there may be as many as eighty authoritarian polities.

If the present ideological cleavages will not survive, how can these nations be grouped? The slight proliferation of nuclear weapons, the rise of a cohesive West Europe, and the arrival of a powerful Japan, first of all, will prevent the polarization of power we now associate with the United States' and the Soviet Union's leadership. Poles of power will give way to a more decentralized system of blocs lacking clear leaders. These blocs, moreover, will be organized functionally rather than geographically, economic objectives will dictate one kind of grouping for a country, military objectives will dictate another.

Thus we can imagine common markets functioning in West Europe, Latin America, and Central America, a self-contained communist trading system in Asia, an independent African bloc and one tied to Western Europe, and some kind of Asian 'socialist' trading system for the noncommunist nations. In global terms, the Asian, Africa, and Latin-American economic blocs will be the 'developing nations group' in UNCTAD and UNIDO, while West Europe, communist East Europe, Japan and the United States-Canadian complex will constitute their negotiating partner. In terms of national and bloc objectives, of course the underdeveloped appear as the challengers of the international economic status quo, and the developed as its defenders. If there is to be an international class struggle, it will follow the lines of cleavage here suggested.

Military objectives, however, dictate a different pattern of bloc formation. It is probable that some form of attenuated East European bloc will linger on as understandings between the United States and Germany continue, while NATO decays. West Europe will be a weak military bloc, therefore, with some of its members seeking unity in nonalignment and others continuing to look to the United States. The United States and the Soviet



Union, however, will be more on their own than at any time since 1948. All these formations will in essence be defenders of the status quo, territorially and militarily. In the Third World, none of the conceivable groupings will possess the power, cohesion, unity of purpose, or strong central institutions required to challenge any of the industrial blocs. In Africa there may emerge a bloc of totalitarian states bent on intervention and subversion and a defensive bloc of authoritarian ones anxious to fend off such challenges: but these two are unlikely to be coterminous with the economic blocs sketched above. In the Western Hemisphere, the familiar pattern of the OAS is likely to change soon, as the nations of the hemisphere split into Washington-oriented, Havana-inspired, and nonaligned blocs. The pro-American as well as the neutralist blocs will contain both democratic and authoritarian polities. In Asia, much depends on the future vigor of China. If Maoism remains forceful we may imagine a defensive military grouping of authoritarian and democratic nations (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Thailand, Philippines, and perhaps Pakistan), an offensive grouping of China, North Korea, and Vietnam, and a bloc of genuine neutrals, such as Burma, Nepal, and Cambodia. If China were to become preoccupied with other matters, no military-ideological blocs need arise at all. In the UN, therefore, we would have a minimum of six or a maximum of ten military groupings, of varying cohesion and vastly different strengths, playing roles different from the economic blocs and offering a heterogeneous bundle of aspirations and demands as compared to past historical systems.



. The choice for America is probably to seek national security through unilateral means, instead of relying on alliances or on UN peacekeeping; but there is no reason not to use peacekeeping operations for the limited and localized purposes that have proved successful. We ought to aid in the redistribution of the world's wealth if we believe in minimal standards of welfare even at the expense of slower domestic economic growth; toward this end we should welcome the continued enmeshment in UN and regional agencies, just as we should oppose it in the field of military security. We shall grow more dependent on world trade, as will everybody else; and we should draw the inference from this trend that more centralized world trade and monetary rules are desirable. This, however, implies nothing in the field of human rights, where we should reform our own society as we have been doing, without taking notice of the sniping of other nations and without seeking to tell them how to reform theirs. Hence with the atrophy of the UN's decolonization task, we should welcome the decline of the human rights task as well. And if we wish to reap the benefits of benign science as we discriminately apply new technology, we must make our peace with a true UN planning function much more enmeshing than the faltering steps taken so far. All this demands resistance to the course of automatic enmeshment. It demands thought, questioning, and even trepidation. It calls for the will and the desire to resist and remake an international system that grew as the unwilling result of earlier error.

It may not be necessary to say that we do not subscribe to every large and small prediction contained in the foregoing Haas scenario--indeed, a number of discrete developments (perhaps among those already cited earlier) may thrust through existing structures so as to destroy even such balance as is represented in this forecast. Nevertheless, reflecting upon what we know in contrast to what we might expect in the future, there is much that appears prescient in this predictive scenario, much that makes sense as one possible context in which to project either the loss, or retention, of America's primacy in the coming world.



While we are on the subject of predictions, perhaps it would be worthwhile to assert that America cannot afford (in its own interests, as well as the interests of others) to be distracted from serious systemic and functional progress by millenarian movements--"movements that expect imminent, total, ultimately this-worldly, collective salvations." Many Americans participate in them, or even originate them. A few movements are plausible; some appear rational, but are not; most even appear irrational.

Three dynamic strands seem to underlie such movements:

- dissatisfaction with current society, part or all of it, sometimes relating to real inequities, sometimes reacting primarily to the society's shortfall from some imagined state of perfection, sometimes reflecting merely personal grievances;
- effective ignorance of the costs and risks of alternatives;
- commitment to one or more alternatives (almost always touted as certain to lead to betterment, or even to utopia), often pursued with fanatical singlemindedness.

Depending upon the degree of fanaticism involved, such pursuit of millenarian goals, thrusting aside to the maximum possible extent the goal-pursuits of others, must necessarily be fueled not only by confidence in one's own views but also contempt for the views of others presumed to be unable or unwilling to understand what is best for themselves.<sup>62a</sup>



## China

We turn to a single subject, China, which may experience a destiny in the next few decades that overcomes the primacy of the United States and replaces it with the primacy of that great enigmatic country. Three multi-discipline economists introduced earlier--Morgenstern, Klaus, and Heiss--have devoted considerable attention to projection of the future of China, and particularly to assessment of a 1965 book, Formeln Zur Macht ("The Equations of Power"), widely acclaimed in Europe, by Wilhelm Fucks, a theoretical physicist at the Aachen Institute of Technology.<sup>63</sup> Based on Volterra's analysis of evolution of biological species in a restricted environment, and projecting state power from the present state of industrialization of various countries into the next century, Fucks projects overwhelming expansion of China's power to the extent of achieving first place in the world.

Fucks postulated that mankind has experienced three massive "shocks" which eventually spread to all world regions:



- the change from nomadic pursuits to permanent settlements, beginning about 6000 B. C.;

- the introduction of iron and agricultural techniques, beginning about 1000 B. C.;

- the industrial revolution in science and technology, beginning about 1800 and accelerating since, through our current period.

Relating his data to power rankings in transitional times, Fucks constructed one index based on steel production and population, a second index based on energy production and population, and a third overall index averaging the other two. He assigned to United States status in 1960/1963 the value of 1000 (and again used "1000" arbitrarily as his basis for 1970 comparison), and calculated the relative status of all others in a hierarchy of power.<sup>64</sup>

Table 6-2 shows standings among nations, in 1960/1963 and in 1970:

Table 6-2: Steel, Energy, and Population

	<u>Population and Steel 1960/1963</u>	<u>Population and Energy 1960/1963</u>	<u>Population and Steel 1970</u>	<u>Population and Energy 1970</u>
United States	1000	1000	1000	1000
Soviet Union	840	508	1027	624
China	185	285	220	317
West Germany	205	89	250	56
France	110	31.8	125	18

Fucks then integrated these indices of power and produced the following composite indices of power (confined, of course, to the factors associated with population, steel production, and energy



production). (This hierarchy of power in Table 6-3 may be compared with those presented earlier in Chapter 3.)

Table 6-3: Two Indices of Power

	<u>1960/1963</u>	<u>1970</u>
United States	1000	1000
Soviet Union	674	825
Six EEC countries	463	510
Germany and France	274	322
China	250	281
West Germany	174	269
Japan	143	153
United Kingdom	120	103
France	71	72
India	67	66
Poland	43	50
Italy	37	48
Canada	31	46
Czechoslovakia	26	28
East Germany	20	20
Belgium	16	17

In any event, Table 6-4 below presents Fucks' projections of population statistics for China, the USSR, and the US in 2000 and 2040 (in millions):<sup>65</sup>

Table 6-4: Projections of Population

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>2040</u>
United States	180	195	245	280
Soviet Union	220	231	300	335
China	700	750	1700	2700

(In analyzing these projections by Fucks, Morgenstern and associates scale down their own forecast of China's population in 2040 to lie between 1 billion and 1.476 billion.) In the elements of power related to production, Morgenstern and associates forecast that by 2010, China will stand first, ahead of the United States, the Soviet Union, and any combination of West European countries.



The factor of population is critical in Fucks' (and China's) calculations of the future. As Barbera has pointed out, population can enhance development within certain combinations of environment but handicap development in others.<sup>66</sup> Morgenstern and associates take seriously the argument that vast population and associated population growth may retard development; but they believe that in the instance of China, the argument will turn out to be fallacious. They emphasize certain factors:

- China is slightly larger in area than the United States (including Alaska); it is rich in all major natural resources; it has a highly industrious population which rapidly develops technological skills.

- Compared to China, India and Pakistan (and Bangladesh) together have about the same population as China, but less than half the area of China, only a fraction of China's major natural resources, and practically none of the social discipline inculcated by Chinese culture.

- Also compared to China, Western Europe has half (about 400 million) of China's population, about half of China's area, and fewer natural resources than China. Western Europe's GNP in 1970, however, was \$672 billion.<sup>67</sup>

- Also compared to China, all of Europe to the Urals is comparable to China in population (712 million, compared to 800 million) and in area. In combined GNP, Europe is impressive, amounting in 1970 to about \$1.344 billion, about 34% higher than the US 1970 GNP of \$990 billion.



Thus, these analysts hold, major inhibitions to China's development cannot include natural resources, for resources are more abundant in China than in Europe, or population, for equal (e.g., Europe) or greater population densities already exist, combined (e.g., Japan) with high living standards.<sup>68</sup> Independent of China's population growth over the next generation, Morgenstern and colleagues hold that:

The development of China's economy and technology will be spectacular if she just adopts such known technological achievements as transistors, wireless communications, thermal and nuclear power plants, hybrid corn, wheat and rice production, large scale fertilizer plants, flood control and irrigation, deep well oil drilling, off-shore oil and gas ventures, etc.

To the major question--Will it be possible for China to progress while feeding and educating her growing population over the next generation?--these specialists answer: probably yes. Concurrently, they draw attention to China's military potential.

Thus, we present a limited analysis of one candidate, China, taken seriously by some eminent analysts as rival and even successor in primacy to the United States.

#### Political Interpretations of Change

Secretary of State Rusk on May 9, 1964, declared that absolute national sovereignty had become outmoded in the nuclear era. The United States, he said, accepted the fact that postwar events had led it to assume commitments that rigorously circumscribed its sovereignty and freedom of action.<sup>69</sup>



In this connection, a comment by scholar James Rosenau seems appropriate:

Political science . . . has yet to accommodate itself to this shrinking world. Even at the level where the changes appear most pronounced--the functioning of national units--events abroad are still regarded as external to, rather than part of, a nation's politics.<sup>70</sup>

The implications of these two crucial arguments are not, in general, taken very seriously.

Are conditions ripe for a system of world order to emerge?

One recalls the prerequisites for world order cited fifty years ago by H. G. Wells: common world religion; universal education; no armies, navies, or classes of unemployed people (either wealthy or poor); world organization of scientific research; free literature of criticism and discussion; direction of affairs responsive to the general thought of the population; private business enterprise as servant, not robber; a world currency safeguarded against abuse.<sup>71</sup>

Obviously, the world is still far away from these conditions.

Are the preconditions present for any system of world order?

Berle thought not:

Bluntly, there is no present consensus on an accepted philosophy of international relations. Beginnings unquestionably have been made, but how widely or deeply they go is not known.

Until consensus emerges on a philosophy capable of sustaining world institutions adequate to serve as a basis for their power, an institutional organization of world power like the United Nations must fight for its life--as it is now doing.



But this international organization has a minimal, and growing philosophical base. The science or technique of necessary worldwide facilities is gradually developing its own imperatives. . . .<sup>72</sup>

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, on January 10, 1964, issued a brief impressive summary:

World community is a fact

--because instantaneous international communication is a fact;

--because fast international transport is a fact;

--because matters ranging from the control of communicable disease to weather reporting and forecasting demand international organization;

--because the transfer of technology essential to the spread of industrialization and the modernization of agriculture can be assisted by international organizations;

--because modern economics engage nations in a web of commercial, financial, and technical arrangements at the international level. . . .

Adolph Berle concludes:

So, while nations may cling to national values and ideas and ambitions and prerogatives, science has created a functional international society, whether we like it or not. And that society, like any other, must be organized.<sup>73</sup>

. . . International law is still based, and continues to expand, chiefly on the principle of national sovereignty and the legal equality of nations. Professor Wolfgang Friedmann, after carefully canvassing the situation, comes sadly to the conclusion that the 'only serious justification for any hope that the deeply divided and antagonistic nations and power blocs of the world may merge their powers and purposes into a universal organization equipped with more than a debating function, lies in the overwhelming threat of contemporary technological and scientific developments to the security, and indeed to the survival, of mankind. . .'



Proponents of a universal system of law rarely face one of its cardinal realities. Power is an essential element. Power needs its institutions. Institutions need their idea systems. But idea systems are valid only when they are applied by institutions and--lacking almost unanimous acceptance--can be made effective only by power.<sup>74</sup>

J. L. Richardson echoes the urgency of coping with change, and  
cites

. . . a final aspect of the great mutation that has taken place in the structure of world power. This is the emergence of two 'superstates,' the United States and the Soviet Union, both commanding the resources of continents and, for the first time, possessing the internal cohesion and unified political will to deploy those resources around the world. Both superstates embrace extensive geographical areas and have vast populations that enable them to realize the economies of scale with great and growing internal markets that were always the implicit promise of the new technology. To these advantages must be added the fact that both possess enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons, which do not--as some have foolishly argued--tend to equalize the power of great and small . . . the logic of the bomb accentuates the special position of the superstates that alone command the technology and industrial plant required to produce one generation after another of increasingly sophisticated weapons, each with the life span of a June bug. Possessing the scope and power commensurate with today's requirements and possibilities, only the superstates can marshal that surplus of resources that nations must have to play big power politics around the world.

It is against the background of these changes, occurring so rapidly and on so vast a scale, that we must reassess the structure of world power and the play and press of national interests . . . the imperative is clear; the world today has grown far too complicated and dangerous for the United States to mold and manage world affairs without the active help of others who share our humane political heritage and aspirations and our security requirements. These are great common tasks and they are not easy. If they are to be performed adequately, if the rational, civilized ideals of Jefferson and Montesquieu and Goethe are to have any relevance in this changed world, ways and means must be found to reshape the structure of power to permit a more effective sharing of world responsibilities.

The super powers cannot 'manage' international politics. Not even small powers, so long as they are independent, will accept super power management of their relations. The secondary



powers will certainly resist two-power management of world politics: they are by definition the powers which have been playing a major role in Asian or European affairs or which now expect to play such a role. It is likely that the super powers will concede this claim: the United States at best will be a reluctant crisis manager for some time after Vietnam. Should the claims of the secondary powers be persistently neglected, however, they possess a remedy which amounts to a deterrent against super power arrogance: they have the potential to become virtual super powers, Japan individually, the European powers collectively. It would be very costly, and also perhaps very provocative and dangerous to translate this potential into reality hence there is a reasonable prospect that a certain asymmetrical mutual deterrence will bring about stability in the relationship between the secondary powers and the super-powers.<sup>75</sup>

George Ball communicates several additional useful observations, including brief assessments of primacy:

Power and responsibility in the lives of nations are not abstractions. Each has changing concrete meaning defined by the configurations of history, the special conditions and requirements of a particular time and place. . . . as a generalization, the few modern states that can make large contributions to the physical security and economic welfare and even the cultural advancement of all the world's peoples are those that possess in abundance the physical and intellectual resources of modern technology. The Romans showed us long ago that the spread of a nation's culture followed the expansion of its physical power, not the converse. This implied no moral virtue; it was simply an historical fact.

We have seen this principle in operation for the last twenty years. . . . [during which] the United States has been deploying enormous resources throughout the world. . . . since the 1940's, the crucial elements of power have been heavily concentrated in the United States and the Soviet Union, and the resources of Britain and France are in no way comparable. Each of the super-powers is organized to comprehend the territory and population of a continent; each commands enormous physical resources and highly skilled manpower to put them to work. Each possesses, largely by virtue of its size and scale, a highly advanced technology and a weaponry that includes sophisticated and effective nuclear armament--and, what is most important, the ability to stay the course when it mounts upward at a sixty degree gradient. Each has the internal cohesion and political will to employ its resources around the world. Each is a global power.

Thus, instead of a concert of great powers in the nineteenth-century sense, we have two competing global powers, with enough



domestic resources to obviate the physical need for overseas empires. Because the industrial heartland of Europe lies between those superstates, world economic and military power is largely confined to the Northern Hemisphere and, more narrowly, to the temperate zone extending over three parts of three continents; for it is North America, Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan that together produce eighty percent of the world's goods, as well as most of its helicopters and bazookas and political ideas. As a result of the cold war the largest nations in this area are great armed camps; but by the same token, because of their wealth and power, they have special relationships and responsibilities toward the less prosperous and politically less organized nations to the south. If my analysis, therefore, directs itself largely to the industrialized North, it is only because that is where the power is. If, narrowing the lens further, my focus fixes largely on Europe, it is because that is where most of the danger is . . . Europe, a continent that has been for three and a half centuries a battlefield of clashing dynasties and national ambitions, a theater of conflict in which first one and then another of her rival states has claimed a transient dominance. . . .

The tempo of modern technology accelerated the rise and decline of empire, shortening the life span of ascendancy. Spain held predominant place on the Continent for about a hundred and fifty years, as did France who followed her. Britain enjoyed a century of supremacy, while the latecomer Germany had only half as long in which to bid twice for dominance. In retrospect it seems clear that the fleeting primacy of a particular state largely reflected its superior population and economic resources.<sup>76</sup>

As we reflect upon this turbulence, how brief appears America's span of primacy! And as we reflect upon the transitory but powerful potential of technology, how relatively transient may America's ascendancy come to be!

Carsten Holbraad assessed the impact of change upon superpower primacy:

. . . the mid-1960's contention that because of its strategic, economic, and technical pre-eminence, the United States was the sole super power. . . . should rather be understood as a forecast (mistaken as it turned out) of change toward a hegemonial world order.



. . . Bull [Hadley Bull, perhaps the most eminent Australian analyst] sees the United States and the Soviet Union, as super powers, continuing to play the role evolved within the European system to befit the European great powers; nor does he suppose that the possible future emergence of China as a super power will significantly change the nature of the leading powers' role, though it may well 'signify the transformation of the Soviet-American world order' (my emphasis) 'into something quite new'. He is far from endorsing all of the super powers' works; but he suggests that on the whole they are effective and make for world order, normatively as he conceives it, and that they should be given that kind of benefit of the doubt which is the due of those cast in a perennial and indispensable role.<sup>77</sup>

The emerging status of secondary powers is addressed by J. L. Richardson:

" . . . little attention was paid to the role of secondary powers in the emerging international order. . . .

For present purposes, secondary powers may be defined as those which play a major role in the affairs of one of the two principal regions of tension in world politics, Europe and Asia. . . . In terms of this definition there are at least four secondary powers, Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan. The question whether China might more appropriately be regarded as a secondary power than as the third, still embryonic super power will arise. . . .<sup>78</sup>

The lack of cohesion among the secondary powers in the past is all too obvious. . . . In every challenge to the super powers by one of the secondary powers, one or more of the others was to be found supporting the super power.

The issue of super power hegemony has been pressed seriously only by France: though Gaullism found its echo throughout Europe, the remaining governments saw their interests compelling them to side with Washington rather than Paris when de Gaulle thrust this choice upon them, as in the case of France's withdrawal from the NATO organisation in 1966. . . . The prevailing tendencies, then, point in the direction of regionalism, European and Asian, with an enhanced role for the secondary powers solely within this context.<sup>79</sup>

Harold Lasswell asks a question about future primacy that is provocative at every level:

. . . the question is, as usual, who is going to use whom, how and for what purposes? Is it likely that our policy process will be characterized by shared power, enlightenment, well-being, skill, affection, respect and rectitude? Or is it more likely



that power will be narrowly held by a caste that utilizes knowledge as an instrument of self-enhancement and self-perpetuation?

Consider for a moment some of the grimmer potentialities. It cannot be taken for granted that the expectation of violence will disappear and that the world arena will be unified in a public order of human dignity. We cannot assume that Washington or Moscow or Peking will be willing to participate loyally in an organization in which each can be outvoted on matters that each elite regards as decisive. It cannot even be certain that the divisions on Earth will not be carried into outer space, much as the powers of Europe sought to sustain peace, however precarious, in Europe while they expanded in Asia, Africa, the Americas and the Pacific.<sup>80</sup>

#### Relations With Developing Nations

We have already benefited in this study from analyses of foreign aid and other dynamics involving small states and developing nations by Sisir Gupta, Hedley Bull, David Vital, and others.

In its exercise of membership (and in certain respects, primacy) in the community of nations, the United States performs according to varying patterns of behavior. In the changing international arena, big-power relations with developing nations have emerged into a status of first-line importance in many (not all) respects. Instant worldwide visibility through communication; widespread literacy; increased political awareness; spreading militancy; exploitation of real and manufactured grievances by political activists; rising sensitivity to ethical questions; the prospect of dwindling resources, especially those largely supplied by developing nations but largely consumed by advanced nations; changing patterns of international trade; the ambiguous course of various nationalisms--all these and other dynamics have intensified grounds for confrontation



and exacerbated relations among advanced and developing states. In the sense of symbolizing important shifts in the ways in which all modern nations deal with each other, many relations with developing states may typify broader changes. United States relationships with developing countries may become prototypes of its relations with all states.

It is in relation to this possibility that we take up in more detail the changing contexts of the poor developing nations, frequently alluded to as the Third World (and recently, by writers who distinguish between developing countries with and without oil, as the Fourth World).

One important aspect of this situation involves oil and the other valuable natural resources to the extent that they are possessed by the LDC's, and sought by industrial societies. Barnett and Müller, for example, intent upon identifying potential impacts of multinational corporations, may overestimate the decline in great-power influence on LDC's. "Today," they declare, unconvincingly, "the most spectacular characteristic of the great powers is their vulnerability."

It has only recently been widely perceived that despite their still extraordinary hold on the world's wealth, the three great industrial powers--the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan--are beginning to look, each in its own way, more like pitiful, helpless giants. Japan is nearly devoid of natural resources to run her industrial machine; she must import almost all of her energy requirements. The Soviet Union cannot raise sufficient food to support its population or to support it with the consumer trappings now deemed essential for the success of its peculiar brand of Socialism. And the United States is almost totally dependent on foreign imports of manganese, tin, and chromium. Dependence on these three imports renders the United States a 'pitiful, helpless giant'.<sup>7</sup> These circumstances mean that the rich countries now need the poor countries as much as, if not more than, the poor countries need them.<sup>81</sup>



Whether or not such apocalyptic conclusions are justified, it is clear that substantial shifts in power relationships will emerge from such redistribution of financial power as those largely attributable to OPEC. By the end of 1974, OPEC holdings of foreign exchange exceeded \$50 billion; by 1980, at current prices, OPEC holdings may exceed \$400 billion.<sup>82</sup>

Similar action may occur from other imbalances in the distribution of valuable resources, enhancing the prospects of a number of LDC's. For example, one-third of the world's copper is exported by four countries: Zambia, Zaire, Chile, and Peru. About four-fifths of the world's tin is supplied by four countries: Bolivia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. About one-third of the world's bauxite is supplied by four poor countries: Surinam, Guinea, Jamaica, and Guyana. Even timber is described by one expert as "the closest present approximation of a truly vanishing resource." What shifts will accumulate in the world balance of power are impossible to forecast.

Some of the smallest states are hardly viable. Do their desire and demand provide sufficient political and economic basis to endorse their constitutions as sovereign nations? Obviously, they cannot defend themselves--a fundamental requirement in practical terms for an independent state. What obligations (and why?) fall on other nations to defend them? To feed them? To grant economic concessions, perhaps, that allow them to limp along, possibly as a drag on other states?



The "Fourth World" comprises nations with few natural resources and undeveloped industrial bases, but expanding populations--such as the "utterly impoverished" nations of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Chad, Ethiopia, Haiti--some 900 million people whose annual incomes average less than \$75. For that matter, half of the world's 3.9 billion people live on per capita incomes of less than \$200. per year.<sup>83</sup>

As Henry Barbera has pointed out earlier, a compelling dynamic is not merely the fact of inequality, but the spreading awareness of inequalities among increasingly literate, informed, sensitized, articulate, and restless peoples. Out of this cauldron arise the "politics of resentment" and "the politics of envy." On varying premises such as equality, equity, justice, and obligation, redistribution of resources is advocated. "Equality" is increasingly advocated as a goal.

Seminal impetus has been furnished, for example, by the arguments of Harvard Professor John Rawls in A Theory of Justice; his central conclusion is that justice is not provided by equality of opportunity, but only by equality of result. Professor Brzezinski feels that "equality is becoming the most powerful moral imperative of our time, thus paralleling the appeal of the concept of liberty in the 19th century." Linking this dynamic to the LDC's, Brzezinski adds: ". . . the problem of the less developed nations is the moral problem of our time."<sup>84</sup> The 1969 "Pearson Commission" said, in reference to the issue of why the rich should concern themselves with the poor: "The simplest answer to the question is the moral one:



that it is only right for those who have to share with those who have not." Robert McNamara said in a 1972 address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank: "The developed nations . . . must do more to promote at least minimal equity in the distribution of wealth among nations."<sup>85</sup>

Most of such appeals are directed at advanced countries, alleging, sometimes explicitly demanding, that advanced countries set aside their nationalism in favor of humanitarianism. Responses are mixed. For one thing, some advanced nations respond, "Why should advanced nations set aside nationalism when you who make such a demand have not succeeded in setting aside your own nationalism?"

Robert Tucker pursues the concept of alleged obligation:

Moreover, it is hardly necessary to add that publics in advanced Western countries do not on the whole find the moral claims articulated by the new political sensibility compelling. These claims do not coincide with what continues to represent broadly held intuitive notions about distributive justice as applied to the relations between states. On the contrary, what evidence we have points to the conclusion that the great majority persists in drawing a sharp distinction between the welfare of those who share their particular collective and the welfare of humanity, and to assume that the collective is quite entitled to what its members have created. The distinction does not preclude acts of humanitarian assistance taken in response to catastrophes, natural and social. Even here, however, such assistance is seen to be rendered as a matter of grace or bounty. Although often characterized as a duty, the characterization is misleading in that humanitarian assistance is not given as a matter of duty. In view of the moral freedom enjoyed by the giver, it may just as well be characterized as a right.

This traditional, and still prevailing, attitude toward distributive justice in the relations between states may be deplored, but to deplore it is not to explain why it remains so broadly held when it denies what is alleged to be a compelling moral position. Nor will it suffice to argue--as do Myrdal, McNamara, and many others--that this



failure to acknowledge the obvious dictates of justice is due to a persisting failure of leadership. For then the question must arise why governments, which are presumably made up of men who are neither extraordinarily stupid and misinformed nor unusually deficient in moral judgment, fail to acknowledge the self-evident and, accordingly, to provide the great publics with the necessary understanding and leadership.

What is of interest here is not the answer a skeptic might be expected to give to this question, but the attitude that prompts its being raised in the first place. Why do those who share the new political sensibility simply assume that the case for global distributive justice is so apparent that it scarcely deserves moral argumentation? To some extent, the answer must be found in the conviction, however inarticulate, that the present international distribution of wealth is illegitimate in that it has come about by unjust means, that is, through 'exploitation,' whether forcible or not. To this extent, the call for distributive justice is indistinguishable from a call for reparations.

In the main, however, it is clear that the answer rests on the assumption of a shared humanity. There is in this assumption nothing novel. What is novel is the insistence that men now act upon this assumption in a manner they have not acted in the past, that they draw positive duties of distributive justice from it that they had not heretofore drawn, and that they give a scope to those duties they have never before been willing to give. The simple, though decisive, claim of the new political sensibility is that we no longer differentiate, for certain purposes, between fellow citizens and mankind.<sup>86</sup>

Theodore Sumberg, in Foreign Aid as Moral Obligation, also pursues the concept of duty. Do advanced nations have a duty to share affluence with LDC's? It would be difficult, he says, to

justify a refusal to help foreign countries in emergencies that arise from natural calamities. Even such help, however, is purely discretionary with respect to magnitude, methods, and duration. It is a gratuitous act and not the fulfillment of a duty laid upon us. There is no such duty. I have looked for it without finding it.<sup>87</sup>

A number of assertions pass beyond concepts of obligation and duty in advancing an argument that redistribution is justified as



reparations, based at least partially upon revised recent interpretations of older, different equations and concepts. In earlier times, when most colonial relationships were established, coercion over "backward peoples" was not condemned by, for example, international law; in essence, the then-existing system institutionalized force as an acceptable agent of change.<sup>88</sup>

Nevertheless, the politics of resentment and envy include elements of the politics of retaliation. President d'Estaing of France has referred to the oil crisis as "the revenge on Europe for the 19th Century." The Shah of Iran asserted that the present-day prosperity of Europe and Japan is based on "a generation of cheap fuel."<sup>89</sup> One wonders about equity in this equation. It was not Iran or Arab states that created the methods that made oil usable, or the industrial civilization that made oil valuable. Pure accident of subsoil location, and no effort of their own, made many countries oil-rich. They, too, have reached whatever current state of industrialization they have attained by means of "cheap fuel"--and perhaps via introduction of "cheap" ideas and methods from advanced countries. The latter may pay current market prices for oil, but what do they owe anyone for past exchanges?

Some ideologues, such as Pierre Jalee, pressing the Marxist-Leninist line, assert that the "imperialist" countries (Western states, particularly the United States) have exploited the Third World for centuries, in contrast to the socialist and communist states (referred to as "People's Democracies").<sup>90</sup> The Second World, the "socialist" countries, making a show of strong support for these views, never misses a chance to condemn "imperialistic" Western



countries with denunciatory rhetoric. The First World (advanced nations, Westernized nations) resists some of the rhetoric but actually makes a substantial effort to help. For example, in 1973, the Socialist countries provided the LDC's with \$1.4 billion in material aid, while the Western world provided them with \$11.9 billion.<sup>91</sup>

In this connection, one wonders about "exploitation" of Fourth World countries by Third World members of OPEC. William Safire estimated that the 1974 OPEC raising of oil prices added \$12 billion to the import bills of poor nations. He asks why poor nations do not demand that Venezuela, Nigeria, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia share their oil incomes?<sup>92</sup> Secretary of State Kissinger said in April 1974 that, after the oil price rise, the cost of energy to LDC's amounted to four times the total amount of all aid flow from all countries in the world; thus, abandonment of all aid programs would have had less impact on LDC's than the single rise in oil prices.<sup>93</sup>

Still another aspect that appears to justify questioning the validity of allegations of exploitation might be categorized under "ideology." Some LDC's insist that they have tightened their belts by reducing budgets, scaling down development plans, reducing imports, and running down monetary reserves.<sup>94</sup> Certain activities persist--religious, ideological, cultural--in some LDC's which appear to be, for example, economically self-defeating, and are even recognized as such locally, but which are clung to, and will not be abandoned even in exchange for various forms of assistance.<sup>95</sup>

Most of us would probably agree that such choices ought to be left open for societies to make; however, a society which chooses to



reject assistance because the contingent terms would require it to give up some "un-economic" practice it cherishes may consequently lose any moral basis for reproaching more affluent nations for scaling down or eliminating further assistance.

The nonaligned nations, with 82 full members in the group (almost three-fifths of the countries in the United Nations), contain internal tensions one might expect from a motley of capitalist, socialist, and feudal societies, oil producers, oil consumers, and other poles of difference that speak with many voices, many of them shrill.<sup>96</sup>

In appraising the various moral and other platforms from which denunciations of the West are launched, it contributes to clarity to keep in mind Dr. Kissinger's observation that, in reference to equity and obligation in sharing affluence, among the 150 nations in the world, "barely a score of them are democracies in any real sense."<sup>97</sup>

In the arena of the United Nations, Third World countries have been intensifying their assertion that the poor nations of the world have been ruthlessly exploited by the rich countries, thereby causing many of the problems for the LDC's, and that accordingly, the rich nations owe it to the poor ones to help them catch up, by furnishing aid at sufficient levels, and by paying high prices for LDC products.<sup>98</sup>

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has been outspoken in expressing her concept that affluent nations have an obligation to assist poor countries<sup>99</sup> (to be sure, assistance for India and assistance for some of the tiny, newly-independent nations are two quite different things). Asked Mrs. Gandhi at a 1974 conference on international law:



"Is it not a new form of arrogance for affluent nations to regard the poorer nations as an improvident species whose numbers are a threat to their own standard of living?"

Irving Kristol projects one view of what is happening in the interaction between the United States and the "Third World":

. . . any effort to create 'a new international economic order,' as is now being demanded in every international forum, must entail some basic changes in our domestic economic order . . . /There is a/ complete misreading by our foreign policy establishment of what our controversy with the "Third World" is all about, and of the political realities that lie beneath it. . . . /There is, / fundamentally, the fashionable liberal view, to the effect that we have entered a new era of foreign policy which Newsweek has termed 'The World's New Cold War'--i.e., a war of the 'poor nations' against the 'rich,' a sort of international version of the class struggle aiming to redistribute wealth 'equitably.' And since there is no liberal-chic idea which cannot find some distinguished 'concerned business leaders' eager to subscribe to it, this is also a view that many in the business community sheepishly go along with. . . As Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, of the Trilateral Commission, has put it: 'The main axis of conflict at most international conferences today is not between the Western world and the Communist world but between the advanced countries and the developing countries.'

Now, this statement is partly and superficially true . . . The statement is also partly and fundamentally false. The main axis of conflict can be more accurately described as being between liberal capitalist societies (mainly affluent) and those societies--whether communist, socialist, or neofascist (this latter category prevailing especially in Africa)--which, whether poor or less affluent, are opposed to liberal capitalism in principle.

In truth, this 'new cold war' is not really about economics at all, but about politics. At bottom, it is a conflict of political ideologies. What the 'Third World' is saying is not that it needs our help but that their poverty is the fault of our capitalism--that they are 'exploited' nations while we are a 'guilty' people. . . .

Nations are poor for any one (or any combination) of three reasons: (1) history, (2) culture, and (3) misgovernment.



By 'history' one simply means the fact that some nations began to industrialize and modernize themselves later than others, and it inevitably takes time for them to 'catch up.' . . . any nation that claims 'it doesn't have the time' is merely asserting, with a kind of childish petulance, that it impatiently wants the fruits of economic growth now, before the growth itself has been accomplished.

By 'culture' one simply acknowledges the fact that certain traditional ways of life, which doubtless have their own substantial virtues, are inimical to economic development. All immigrant groups to South America, a potentially rich continent, quickly prosper: this has been the experience of Italians, Germans, Japanese and Jews. The native and Hispanic populations do not prosper so easily--because their ways of life are not so oriented toward the production of wealth. . . .

By 'misgovernment' one simply refers, among other things, to the fact that most of the poorer countries are dominated by political regimes that are anti-liberal in their politics and anti-capitalist in their economics. These governments are ideologically committed to the redistribution of wealth and to the frustration of business enterprise which creates wealth. Since the wealth they wish to redistribute does not exist in their own countries, they have decided to redistribute the wealth of the United States and the nations of Western Europe. And their rationale for doing so is that this wealth, in the first instance, derives from an 'exploitation' of their countries by the capitalist world.

It is this last accusation which provides the impetus for 'the new cold war.' It is, on its face, absurd. The supposed exploitation derives from the fact that the poorer nations export raw commodities to the industrialized nations. Since they have nothing else to export, and since these exports are paid for, this is a perfectly natural and not at all unhealthy state of affairs. For the better part of the 19th Century the United States was in exactly this condition; it was the income from the sale of cotton, wheat, and minerals which eventually formed the basis for our industrial development. . . .

To justify this demand that we organize international trade to our own disadvantage, they offer various woolly, neo-Marxist arguments to the effect that their poverty is the result of our prosperity.



. . . Incredibly enough, many Americans (and even more Europeans) seem inclined to appease rather than repudiate this claim. The sensible response has been outlined by Ambassador Moynihan. It is to the effect that their 'economies do less well than they ought: that the difference is of their own making and no one else's, and no claim on anyone else arises in consequence. . . .'<sup>100</sup>

Let us consider the policy of certain oil-rich Arab countries of funneling such foreign aid as they provide to Arab and Moslem countries. Said the Finance Minister of Kuwait in 1974:

Nobody looked at the Arabs before. Why does everybody expect us to be the godfather? This part of the world has been neglected for centuries and its wealth has been carried away by foreigners without giving it a hand for development. The major part of our international financial aid will be put at the service of Arab countries, and to assist other Moslem countries, particularly in Africa.<sup>101</sup>

One sympathizes moderately with this view, which appears on the surface to be logical. But certain questions nag, as Irving Kristol asserted in describing the influence of culture on poverty. In seeking aid in previous years, one may ask, did Kuwait and its fellow Arab and Moslem countries encounter only rejection from, and did they reject aid from, Christian and non-Arab countries? What wealth did the Arab countries have to offer and what wealth was carried away by foreigners--and?

If that "part of the world has been neglected for centuries," was not the primary source of neglect located in itself? Let us postulate the behavior of two imaginary prototypes, A and B. A and the colleagues of his society mostly slumbered in passivity, in poverty, listening to the wind, immobile, moribund. Poverty and serfdom were ascribed to God's will; absolutely nothing could be



done to effect change, and so no effort was made and nothing was accomplished. The inevitable outcome in A's destiny while partially attributable to environment, was determined predominantly by choice of A's leaders, A's relatives and fellows, and A himself. Centuries passed.

Contrast that outcome with the fate of B, whose choice was otherwise, who worked long and hard, spreading education and advancing skill levels, inventing, traveling, developing rationales for the workings of nature and human society, turning resources into railroads and skyscrapers. Centuries of cumulative achievement passed.

At some future time, A emerges, perceives the backwardness of his own society compared to the advanced levels of B's and certain other societies, and cries "Foul!" He claims that his society is backward because "it was neglected and exploited for centuries" (can neglect and exploitation be suffered simultaneously?), and because B's nation became wealthy by "consuming A's resources." A may claim that B owes part of B's wealth to A, that B has an obligation to devote its wealth and efforts to propelling A forward to benefits and status equal to B's (it might profitably be noted here that Marxian Socialism promises that such an overarching leap into modernity can be made via its system). But how much validity attaches to A's claims, and how much of anything does B owe to A? In the case of the United States, achieving per capita prosperity only four or five decades ago, experiencing considerable "neglect" itself in an impersonal world, achieving prosperity via cumulative



self-effort, where could all the inputs allegedly exploited from others, have gone?

Let us consider one other similar forceful reproach to advanced nations. In 1975, the prime minister of a newly independent Caribbean island-nation, enjoying a middle-level per capita GNP, declared:

All the worst features of exploitative capitalism were exported to the Caribbean by colonialism. Between these two forces we were bequeathed a society which was elitist in structure, acquisitive in motivation, and dependent in psychology . . . <sup>102</sup>

These are not unfamiliar complaints. But elites and hierarchies have emerged in all societies without exception; colonial powers may impose different elites or supplementary elites, but that is not to validate any claim that elites had previously been nonexistent.

"Acquisitiveness" is sometimes, and slanderously, described as the principal characteristic of capitalism; but capitalism has no monopoly on acquisitiveness, and capitalism's dynamism, democracy, individual freedom, cooperative initiative, and innovation are characteristics at least as powerful as acquisitiveness.

As for being "bequeathed a society . . . dependent in psychology," all nations have evolved from societies that were once largely dependent. One critical factor in their emergence was the degree and duration of either their acceptance of their own dependency or their determination to overcome dependency. Some nations once dependent became independent long ago; others slumbered in submission for centuries; some made practically no progress out of dependency until independence was practically thrust upon them.



Let us, then, retain a healthy amount of skepticism about allegations intended to cultivate senses of guilt in the West, or to search the horizons of history for convenient scapegoats. Let us all, First, Second, and Third Worlds, refresh our appreciation of Cassius' comment to Brutus about whether the roots of our troubles lie in the stars or in ourselves.

These comments are not developed here to deprecate or diminish the genuine troubles being experienced in the Third World or anywhere else. They are offered here as correctives to increasingly strident criticisms of United States policies toward the Third World.

Professor Bauer, of the London School of Economics and Political Science, in August 1975, took issue with certain conciliatory points previously expressed by Daniel Moynihan in Commentary toward Third World rhetoric:

. . . Mr. Moynihan's conciliatory remarks toward the Third World on the alleged damage to it by Western exploitation and ethnic discrimination are inappropriate. Contacts established by the West have been the principal instruments of material progress throughout the Third World, where the most advanced and advancing sectors are those with most extensive contacts with the West, and the poorest and most backward those with fewest external contacts, . . . For instance, all the foundations and ingredients of modern social and economic life were brought to sub-Saharan Africa by Westerners, mostly during the colonial period.

Mr. Moynihan's essay does not convey the extent and depth of the heterogeneity of the Third World, nor the paucity of the human, material, and military resources of most Third World countries. For instance, most East and Central African countries are very sparsely populated. A few decades ago they were virtually empty. They have been developed almost entirely by Asians and Europeans. It is paradoxical that people whose numbers are small, and whose resources are so meager (and indeed even negligible), should be so influential in world affairs as are the spokesmen of African countries. Much the same applies to the great majority of Third World countries--that is, the majority in the new world order . . .



Neither the official ideology of the Third World nor the practices of most Third World governments conform to Western social democracy and Fabian reformism. . . . a distinctive characteristic of this ideology is hostility to the West and to a liberal social and economic order; and the policies inspired by this ideology are all too often radical and even brutal.



Majority rule in the accepted sense of uncoerced compliance with the decisions of the representatives of the majority presupposes a community with a large measure of shared experiences of culture, history, living conditions, and purpose, as well as comparatively limited objectives of the majority. These prerequisites of a genuine community and of acceptable majority rule are not present in most of the Third World. . . .

Many, perhaps most, Third World countries are not communities or nation states in the accepted sense of these terms, but collections of radically diverse or even hostile groups with deep-seated ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences. This heterogeneity casts further doubts on the meaning of democracy or majority rule, questionable in any case in countries where the vast majority know little about politics beyond the village or district level. The diversity is even more pronounced internationally. The mutual enmity of many Third World countries is bitter and patent. What they share mainly is politically and materially profitable hostility to the West.

. . . the traditional culture in most of Africa and Asia is not individualistic and libertarian (as Mr. Moynihan suggests), but authoritarian, though not totalitarian. It upholds authority but does not favor all-embracing politicization of life. . . .

Many Third World countries are indeed mixed economies and not totalitarian societies. This is not because the leaders reject totalitarian ideas or methods; it reflects mainly the limitations of the official administrative machinery. The present state controls of many Third World countries rely heavily on expatriate personnel; still more would be needed to run a full fledged totalitarian system. . . .

The allegations of exploitation are not only unfounded but also harmful to the peoples of the Third World. They divert attention from the personal and social determinants of material progress--namely aptitudes, attitudes, motivations, social and political institutions, and government policies--and thus from the possibilities of influencing these determinants favorably. Indeed, these allegations facilitate damaging policies, such as restrictions on external economic relations which are potent instruments of material advance. Finally, allegations of exploitation both reflect and encourage the notion that incomes are extracted rather than generated . . .



The spokesmen and staff members of the international organizations have helped to spread these notions. They frequently consider themselves as agents of the Third World, and derive major material and political advantages from such a stance. They have both promoted the familiar standard ideology and helped to put it into practice, notably by organizing and briefing the spokesmen of the Third World . . .

There are also other groups in the West engaged in promoting this ideology, such as churchmen or professional humanitarians, who derive emotional and material benefits from the image of the peoples of the Third World as helpless victims of Western misdeeds in need of their ministrations. Finally, there are the disaffected groups in the West who welcome any ideology with which to assail their own societies and especially the market system . . . Altogether it is the West which supplies both the arguments and the financial resources with which it is assailed by the Third World . . .<sup>103</sup>

Elie Kedourie, Professor of Politics in the London School of Economics, cast a sardonic eye upon the style of the United States in responding to Third World and Fourth World initiatives:

. . . the United States--and any state it dares to befriend--is attacked, denounced, and vilified at pleasure. Ingenuity is not needed, only transparent sophistry. Any threadbare calumny will do since the U. S. is anxious not to offend, and even to join in its own castigation.

Mr. Moynihan gives one or two examples of this absurd self-punishment. He tells of a UN publication, The World Social Report. This document proves that the United States is a less just society than the Soviet Union and the 'developing' countries. This conclusion is reached by 'correlating'--in familiar social-scientific fashion--'social justice' with the absence of public protest. The Report, we are told, is the most popular UN document. The U. S. did not, until 1974, protest against this travesty. On the contrary, the U. S. 'actively participated in this sustained assault on American institutions.' American help in, and approval of, such a document is attributed by Mr. Moynihan to the fact that it was a Third World document and, as such, to be treated with tolerance and understanding . . . /this kind of response is attributable to<sup>7</sup> 'three decades of



habit and incentive which have created in Washington "patterns of appeasement so profound as to seem wholly normal."<sup>104</sup>

Secretary of State Kissinger has tried to project a balanced and reasoned response as expressions of American policy. In a July 1975 address to the Milwaukee Institute of World Affairs, he admonished nations who issue baseless denunciation of America's role in the United Nations:

The most solid bloc in the world today is, paradoxically, the alignment of the non-aligned. This divides the world into categories of north and south, developing and developed, imperial and colonial, at the very moment in history when such categories have become irrelevant and misleading . . . Tragically, the principal victims will be the countries who seek to extort what substantially could be theirs if they proceeded cooperatively.

. . . The World Food Council . . . grew out of American initiatives . . . It reflects our deepest humanitarian concerns; it represents a serious effort on our part to eliminate hunger and malnutrition. Abuse by those whom we are trying to help, attacks on our motives by the beneficiaries of our efforts, threaten to undermine the very fabric of cooperation . . .

It is the smaller members of the organization who would lose the most. They are more in need of the U. N. than the larger powers such as the United States which can prosper within or outside the institution . . .<sup>105</sup>

Subsequently, Dr. Kissinger addressed related comments to those Americans who advocate public, vigorous, and frequent moral criticism of foreign countries whenever we disagree with their policies:

. . . painful experience should have taught us that we ought not to exaggerate our capacity to foresee, let alone to share, social and political change in other societies.<sup>106</sup>



These comments appear to be potentially beneficial to both Americans and foreigners, especially those in the Third World. Berating the United States moralistically, ostensibly because it is a superpower, is likely, in the end, to produce less, not more, attention to LDC needs.

Even in the New York Times (not normally critical of a critic of American policy), one editorial illustrated the swirl of political and psychological factors involved in dealing with the developing countries:

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi for years has been famous for biting the hands that feed India. But in her latest lecture to the world's advanced nations, she outdoes herself.

Mrs. Gandhi last week called it 'a new form of arrogance' for countries that have provided India with millions of tons of grain in the past to be concerned in the present world food shortage with the soaring demands of governments that have not been able to reach necessary levels of food production or adequately to curb population growth, or both.

The irony is that much of India's present problem stems from the high prices of the oil cartel, which Mrs. Gandhi hypocritically refrains from attacking, knowing that her friends there would be likely to cut off such aid as they are granting. The West, in contrast, has suffered Mrs. Gandhi's own form of arrogance for years, but undoubtedly will continue to grant aid out of human sympathy for the Indian people and Asia's most important democratic experiment.<sup>107</sup>

Perhaps some optimism is justified in projecting potential development among Third World countries. In an early 1976 analysis of the debt situation among LDC's, an analysis that is the first of its kind, the Department of the Treasury reported to Congress that the combined deficit for all 88 less-developed countries that do not



produce oil was "an easily manageable \$8 billion" in 1973. As the oil crisis and other economic turmoil quickened, the combined deficit jumped to \$28 billion in 1974, and to \$37 billion in 1975. However, a declining deficit, about \$31-34 billion, is foreseen for 1976.

The Treasury Department study, examining in detail 23 of the "more important" LDC's, and dividing the 23 into five categories, underlines that there is no monolithic condition common to all LDC's:

- a. One group--Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Colombia, and Morocco--have "no serious problem."
- b. A special group--Israel and Egypt--have large deficits but also large inflows of foreign aid.
- c. Four poor but heavily populated countries are "a major source of concern": Ghana, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.
- d. Three "success stories"--Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea--have been the heaviest borrowers from private markets in recent years.
- e. The catch-all group, with different problems, needs "to be watched very closely," including Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Zaire, Zambia, and the Philippines.<sup>108</sup>

In any event, as the United Nations continued debate on these questions, the United States adopted a largely conciliatory stance, advancing nineteen specific proposals ranging from creation of new international agencies for energy, economic security, technological exchanges, and the stockpiling of food to improvement of trade



relationships and provision of more capital to lending agencies. United States initiatives coincided with some retrenchment in the apocalyptic rhetoric and utopian demands of many Third World countries.<sup>109</sup> Whether these developments presage more cooperative relationships among the United States, other advanced nations, the socialist countries, and especially developing peoples cannot, of course, be predicted. Very deep differences in basic interests will remain substantial for a long time to come. It is certainly not clear how far down the road of concession to others' interests a nation in the position of primacy can afford to go without damage to its own interests, to the interests of other nations who depend on it, and to the existing international structure itself.

It seems perfectly reasonable for the United States, when confronted by nations large or small who choose confrontation as their means of interchange, and when confronted by rationalization, distortion, and vituperation, to respond with patience up to a certain point but, beyond that point, with strong words--and if necessary, strong deeds--in its own defense and in pursuit of realistic, scrupulous, and equitable interchange among nations.

Confrontation, however, while perfectly legitimate and possibly the most effective technique during particular and infrequent crises, becomes, over the long run, unproductive as a sustained or frequently-adopted stance, usually vulnerable to escalation of tension. Likely to be more productive than confrontation in the long run, especially for a leading nation, is concentration on constructive address to resolving the basic problems involved.



The Nation State: Moribund?

As the result of the many changes cited, and many others, is the nation state declining as the spokesman for national societies?

Fundamental misgivings about the durability of the nation state as the principal actor in international relations have been expressed by a number of observers. This trend has been pinpointed by Professor Morgenstern, who discerned a strong tendency in the social sciences "to perceive the imminent demise of the national state and to foresee its early replacement by international organizations, usually on the global level."<sup>110</sup>

This view is usually generated by recognition of the increased interdependence of societies, especially in economic and political matters, and the growth of transnational relations (e.g., corporations,



unions, tourism, exchanges, professional associations). It is perceived that national governments find it difficult to control these transactions, and that public tasks are increasingly insoluble wholly or largely by national efforts; more and more, they require international, or even "supernational," efforts.<sup>111</sup>

However, Morgenstern finds substantial refutation of the "declining nation state" view in the situation that social interdependencies are growing even more within states than among them, demanding international government action on an ever-expanding range of problems, and in the fact that nationalism, while rampant in some countries in the developing world, is only beginning to penetrate to most areas outside Europe.<sup>112</sup>

Adolph Berle has this to say on the subject:

Nation-states are still the only continuing effective institutions by which international power has been, and is, held and exercised. This has been true throughout history. It is true today. Analysis based on any other assumption would be self-deluding folly. Yet this fact must be qualified by conditions peculiar to the mid-twentieth century. Those conditions powerfully tend toward change in the position of nation-states. Already they have whittled down and qualified the power of most, if not all, of them. The next generation almost certainly will live in a world of nation-states whose autonomous capacity to use international power will have far less scope than in the past. The potentialities of the growing nucleus of world government exercising at least a minimal degree of world power must not be underestimated.<sup>113</sup>

Karl Deutsch calls this "the paradox of the nation state":

. . . the prospect before us is a world of nation-states for the next 20, 30, 50, or perhaps, 80 years--that is, for the next two or three generations. The future presents us with a paradox. Only the nation-states can administer the broadening scope of politics and public services. Only the nation-states--at best--have the governmental responsiveness to the needs and wishes of the governed that people now demand. Only the nation-states can



get the broad popular support that governments need to endure in our time. But these same nation-states cannot defend the lives of their peoples. They cannot engage in all-out war, or even come close to it, without becoming potential deathtraps for their citizens.<sup>114</sup> (*italics original*)

### Conflict and Military Power

E. B. Haas cites certain inherent limitations on peaceful interaction among certain types of politics:

"Short-run political action is determined by three styles of leadership, each typical of a particular kind of national society active in the post-1945 international scene. The styles breed mutual distrust. The most familiar style is the bureaucratic-pragmatic mode of leadership familiar to the West, stressing practical aims, the rational choice of means, quiet consultation, and negotiation. Almost equally familiar is the more ideological style of Communist nations, with its claim to an objective 'science of society' which gives them a 'certain' purchase on social reality, contrasting sharply with the skewed vision of reality attributed by Communist actors to their 'bourgeois' counterparts. Finally, there is also a charismatic-revolutionary style typical of many new nations, as exemplified by a Castro or a Sukarno. Such leadership is interested in a vision of the future that is purely political--everything else is instrumental toward the 'political kingdom' of which Nkrumah always spoke. The state must hold together a fragmented society and hence must be authoritarian. Its leadership then seeks to solve intractable domestic problems by using foreign policy more extensively than Western and Communist leadership uses it.

Consequently, in the short run, the activities of the international system will stress conflict, because these three types of actors find it impossible to negotiate meaningfully. They cannot agree on the definition of an issue, on what constitutes a reasonable proposal. Each depends heavily on immediate success as measured by domestic repercussions, on the short-term goal of immediate survival.<sup>115</sup>

We have investigated the existence of certain inequalities among nations; what potential for conflict emerges from perceived inequalities? The ominous aspect lies in the rise in awareness of inequalities among nations; this awareness, when coupled with the



existence of weapons of enormous military capabilities, may become even more ominous:

The most significant phenomenon within contemporary society is the extension of those urges toward equality which have for hundreds of years made themselves felt within states into the international arena.<sup>116</sup>

One response to awareness of inequalities is rapid change in inequalities; such change is taking place, personified, for example, by the dramatic escalation in wealth of the oil-producing countries, described by William D. Smith:

For the next five years, coping with the problems of energy . . . will require the greatest peacetime transfer of political power and wealth in history--from the countries that consume oil to the countries that produce it . . . And this transfer, whether or not it turns out to be permanent, must take place without turbulence for the sake of nations on both sides (regardless of their bloc affiliation--capitalist, Communist or third world) . . . First, the average American, European or Japanese discovers that a heretofore insignificant group of countries has the power to make him wait in gasoline lines and to turn down the heat in his home.

Then he finds out that the people in many of these insignificant countries may soon be richer than he is. This is quite a shock and I don't believe that the full impact has yet been felt or understood.<sup>117</sup>

As in perception of every other major social activity, appreciable change is also occurring in perception of military activity, some of it almost adopting the pragmatic, prescient perspective of Lao-Tse:

Where armies are, thorns and brambles grow,  
The raising of a great host  
Is followed by a year of dearth.  
Therefore a good general effects his purpose and then stops;  
he does not take further advantage of his victory.  
Fulfills his purpose and does not glory in what he has done;  
Fulfills his purpose and does not boast of what he has done;  
Fulfills his purpose, but takes no pride in what he has done;  
Fulfills his purpose, but only as a step that could not be avoided.<sup>118</sup>



/This author takes exception to one of these phrases of Lao-Tse: ". . . takes no pride in what he has done." The soldier who successfully defends a worthy society, within terms given to him, has as much reason to take pride in what he has done as president, poet, professor, or philosopher.7

It is sometimes difficult to realize that it is only since World War I that war ("aggressive war") has been explicitly outlawed even in principle as a legitimate instrument of national policy. Professor Klaus Knorr speaks of "the normative evaluation of war-- war is no longer the legitimate activity it once was."<sup>119</sup> Stanley Hoffman speaks of "the gradual atrophy of war."<sup>120</sup> Morris Janowitz asserts that total war is no longer viewed as an instrument for achieving any national goal. Karl Deutsch suggests that "even limited war is under long-term pressure toward lower levels, toward more stringent levels . . . /But/ short-term pressure in limited warfare is toward more and more escalation."<sup>121</sup>

The rise in world military expenditures in recent decades has been dramatic, from about \$50 billion per year (in 1970 prices) in 1937, to about \$204 billion in 1970. Knorr takes a realistic perspective:

It would not be particularly meaningful to assume that military expenditures at this level are irrational, at least as long as the world is politically and militarily organized as it has been and as it is at the present time. The virtually complete participation of all governments precludes such an easy explanation. The safer assumption is that governments that make these expenditures have apparently little effective choice.<sup>122</sup>



Nevertheless, governments modify their exercises of autonomy in relation to sponsorship of war before the world community.

Compared with the world before World War I, governments behave differently toward the phenomenon of war. If they participate in it, and particularly if they initiate war, they take pains to embellish their motives and go through elaborate efforts of justification. They do not wish to appear warlike.<sup>123</sup>

Another aspect worthy of citation is identified by Harold and Margaret Sprout, who have pursued the implications of continuous hostility in modern times:

One of the persistent illusions of conservative politicians (an illusion even more pervasive among their professional military staffs) has been the optimistic assumption that lawless violence on the vast scale of modern war can serve the purposes of law and order. Modern total war is a good deal like mob violence raised to the nth power. He who transforms whole populations into lawless mobs becomes a prisoner (and often a victim) of the violent upheavals that ensue.<sup>124</sup>

Walter Millis, in Arms and Men, said that war has metamorphosed from being a reasonably conceived instrument "into a horror of potential slaughter and destruction intolerable to any rational and decent mind."<sup>125</sup> Raymond Aron correlated the degree of destruction with the technological means available; once war starts, the provocation is practically forgotten, and "the stake no longer has anything in common with the cause." To categorize 20th Century wars, because of their tendency to become total, Aron borrowed from the Italian sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto, the term "hyperbolic war." The fear of defeat is intensified beyond, into fear of devastation.<sup>126</sup>

As Knorr, Hoffmann, Deutsch, Janowitz, and others indicate, important changes are taking place. We have come closer to validating



the opinion of a French statesman of fifty years ago--Aristide Briand:  
"In modern war there is no victor. Defeat reaches out its heavy  
hand to the uttermost corners of the earth, and lays its burdens on  
victor and vanquished alike."<sup>127</sup>

On September 30, 1974, Australia's Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam,  
echoed the same theme before the United Nations General Assembly:

War for resources or food or markets by any nation or group  
of nations would, in modern times, represent the supreme  
folly . . . There is no war, nuclear or conventional, by  
which the so-called winner, assuming there was one, could  
conceivably win back by war the resources used and  
destroyed in waging it.<sup>128</sup>

Incidentally, though it may be considered a digression here,  
we shall mention one modern trend which appears to be likely to  
exacerbate the level of destruction in any future major war: urbani-  
zation. If, as has been predicted, by 1990 some 90% of Americans  
(and any other peoples) are concentrated in metropolitan areas, on  
1% or 2% of the land area, the problem of targeting has been simpli-  
fied for an adversary who seeks to lay waste to populations instead  
of military forces. Of course, urbanization renders nations highly  
sensitive about their vulnerability to military threat against their  
concentrations of hostages.

Inter-nation dynamics have not changed to the extent that any  
single nation can afford to renounce war unilaterally; to do so  
would be tantamount to issuing an invitation to predators. Such is  
still the condition of international dynamics that each nation--even if  
only to retain its own self-respect, as well as the respect of other  
nations--must maintain a capability to defend itself as successfully



as its means will allow. This is equivalent to holding that no nation can afford to hold peace as a supreme goal, above its own survival in security and independence. As Walter Lippman said some time ago: "If the logic of peace as the supreme national ideal leads to absurdity, then it must be a grave error to think and to say that peace is the supreme end."<sup>129</sup>

Not every society has the same attitudes towards war as do some Western societies, in which some citizens, yearning for a warless world, risk the well-being of their fellow-citizens by premature insistence that the world is ready for unilateral disarmament. It may still be beneficial to reflect on remarks uttered by Mao (and reported by Khrushchev) at a Moscow conference of Communist delegates in 1957:

We shouldn't fear war. We shouldn't be afraid of atomic bombs and missiles. No matter what kind of war breaks out--conventional or thermo-nuclear--we'll win. As for China, if the imperialists unleash war on us, we may lose more than 300 million people. So what? War is war. The years will pass, and we'll get to work producing more babies than ever before.<sup>130</sup>

As Khrushchev "remembered," the significance of the cited figure (larger than the entire population of either the USSR or the United States) was not lost on Khrushchev at the time--or, doubtless, on Americans later when they learned of Mao's remarks.

#### Superpower Relations

In Chapter 3, we discussed the successive assessments of Dr. Ray Cline, in 1975, in which the regional, or "politectonic," assessments of regionally-grouped powers were as follows:



United States	81	USSR	80
Canada		Poland	
Mexico		East Germany	
		Rumania	
		Czechoslovakia	

Cline then integrated into his assessments elements termed "national strategy" (or national purpose) and "national will," resulting in this Table 6-5 ranklist:

Table 6-5: Rankings of Strategy and Will<sup>131</sup>

Zone	Country	Elements of Perceived Power	National		Total Coefficient	Total
			Strategy	Will		
I	United States	50	0.3	0.4	0.7	35.0
	Canada	20	0.3	0.6	0.9	18.0
	Mexico	11	0.5	0.4	0.9	9.9
II	USSR	45	0.8	0.7	1.5	67.5
	Poland	11	0.8	0.2	1.0	11.0
	East Germany (DRG)	10	0.8	0.2	1.0	10.0
III	China (PRC)	23	0.7	0.3	1.0	23.0
IV	West Germany (FRG)	18	0.7	0.8	1.5	27.0
	France	20	0.4	0.8	1.2	24.0
	United Kingdom	19	0.6	0.4	1.0	19.0
	Italy	15	0.5	0.3	0.8	12.0
	Netherlands	8	0.7	0.8	1.5	12.0
	Spain	10	0.6	0.2	0.8	8.0
	Yugoslavia	8	0.5	0.2	0.7	5.6
V	Iran	14	0.9	0.5	1.4	19.6
	Egypt	9	0.7	0.4	1.1	9.9
	Turkey	10	0.2	0.6	0.8	8.0
VI	India	16	0.5	0.3	0.8	12.8
	Pakistan	11	0.5	0.5	1.0	11.0
VII	Indonesia	12	0.5	0.5	1.0	12.0
VIII	Japan	17	0.5	0.5	1.0	17.0
	China/Taiwan	8	0.6	0.9	1.5	12.0
IX	Brazil	16	0.5	0.8	1.3	20.8
	Argentina	10	0.3	0.2	0.5	5.0
X	Nigeria	11	0.5	0.5	1.0	11.0
	South Africa	11	0.6	0.4	1.0	11.0
XI	Australia	12	0.4	0.7	1.1	13.2



We quote briefly here from Cline's explanation:

The striking fact that emerges from this table and from the entire method of analysis followed in this book is that national purpose and national will make a critical difference in the relative power of nations. A totalitarian system has many shortcomings and its suppression of individual freedom and initiative cripples the development of a high level of achievement within a society. Nevertheless, the fact that the USSR has a coherent strategy and a tightly controlled population multiplies the brute power it projects into the international arena. The high rating of 1.5 derives from the efficiency of Soviet decisionmaking and the discipline enforced on the Soviet people.

The Chinese system has some of the same advantages, but it lacks a truly coherent national policy at this juncture, despite its ambition . . . The nation is not yet unified in pursuit of its long-range strategy and hence its coefficient for national will is lower than that of the USSR.

Clarity of national purpose and coherence of disciplined political will also show up in the ratings of countries like West Germany, Iran, China/Taiwan, and Israel. Most of the coefficients for the nations rated can be derived fairly readily from their current history.

For the United States a low coefficient for strategy and will must be assigned as of mid-1975. The political malaise left as a legacy of Watergate, Vietnam, and the illusions of detente has yet to be dispelled. The debilitation of the National Security Council decision-making system under Nixon and the breakdown of Congressional-Presidential cooperation in strategic and international policy are still grave handicaps . . .

The best thing that can be said today is that U.S. political moods are volatile and its people are resilient. The United States is capable of formulating anew a reasonable strategic policy and building a consensus in support of it. If this occurs, U.S. power would again rise to high levels. National purpose and national will are the most critical factors in determining power. . . .<sup>132</sup> (italics added).

Accordingly, Cline offers a ranklist (Table 6-6) that, in the light of all the preceding rankings and evaluations, represents a "final assessment" in 1975 of relative power in eleven world regions:



Table 6-6: Final Assessment <sup>133</sup>

Zone	Country	Elements of Perceived Power	Coefficient for National Strategy and Will	Total Weighted Units of Perceived Power	Politectionic Zone Totals
I	United States	50	0.7	35	
	Canada	20	0.9	18	
	Mexico	11	0.9	9.9	
	Subtotal	81			62.9
II	USSR	45	1.5	67.5	
	Poland	11	1.0	11	
	East Germany (DRG)	10	1.0	10	
	Czechoslovakia	7	1.0	7	
	Rumania	7	1.0	7	
	Cuba	2	1.6	3.2	
	Subtotal	82			105.7
III	China (PRC)	23	1.0	23	
	North Vietnam (Indochina) (with South Vietnam)	10	1.4	14	
	North Korea	6	1.6	9.6	
	Subtotal	39			46.6
IV	West Germany (FRG)	18	1.5	27	
	France	20	1.2	24	
	United Kingdom	19	1.0	19	
	Italy	15	0.8	12	
	Netherlands	8	1.5	12	
	Spain	10	0.8	8	
	Yugoslavia	8	0.7	5.6	
	Portugal	4	0.3	1.2	
	Subtotal	102			108.8
V	Iran	14	1.4	19.6	
	Egypt	9	1.1	9.9	
	Saudi Arabia	7	1.4	9.8	
	Turkey	10	0.8	8	
	Israel	4	1.8	7.2	
	Subtotal	44			54.5
VI	India	16	0.8	12.8	
	Pakistan	11	1.0	11	
	Subtotal	27			23.8
VII	Indonesia	12	1.0	12	
	Singapore	2	1.5	3	
	Subtotal	14			15
VIII	Japan	17	1.0	17	
	China/Taiwan	8	1.5	12	
	South Korea	7	1.3	9.1	
	Subtotal	32			38.1
IX	Brazil	16	1.3	20.8	
	Venezuela	6	1.5	9	
	Argentina	10	0.5	5	
	Subtotal	32			34.8
X	Nigeria	11	1.0	11	
	South Africa	11	1.0	11	
	Zaire	6	1.0	6	
	Subtotal	28			28
XI	Australia	12	1.1	13.2	
	New Zealand	2	1.5	3	
	Subtotal	14			16.2
	Totals	495		531.7	531.7



In any global or regional system of states, /writes Klaus Knorr/ the utility of military superiority versus lesser powers (and, conversely, the disutility of military inferiority vis-a-vis greater powers) depends upon the posture that the great powers assume toward one another. Great powers will tend to derive much less utility from their superiority if they contest each other throughout the interstate system. . . . But observed difficulty of actualizing superior putative power versus lesser states has tended to make the actual influence structure far more diffuse and less bipolar, and has encouraged polycentric perturbations. The lesser states have been more secure, for this reason as well as others, than used to be the case in previous ages, except in limited areas where one superpower tacitly recognizes the other to be supreme (e.g., Eastern Europe). Hence the not infrequent spectacle of small states defying a great power with remarkable impunity. In short, as in all power situations, including situations of market power, competition between big powers works to the benefit of the weak.<sup>134</sup>

Some observers hold that, despite nuclear proliferation, fundamental military relationships reside essentially in the condition of bipolarity; says Richardson, "the secondary powers are little more than middle powers in this context. The relative military weight of Europe's secondary powers is declining, not increasing."<sup>135</sup>



US relations with the Soviets rest primarily upon the facts of strength, upon the number of divisions, the "calculation of forces" and other factors of power that actually exist on hand. Beyond the facts, relations rely upon the kinds of people we are and the Russians are. As opponents or potential cooperators, the Soviets are moved by their perceptions, their values, and their eccentricities (as we are moved by ours).

As for relations with the USSR, the United States is now engaged in what Americans call "detente" and Soviets call "peaceful coexistence," meaning competition without a shooting war.

The 1960 Statement of the 81 Communist and Workers Parties spells this out:

The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilization of the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace. Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle . . . The coexistence of states with different social systems is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism.<sup>136</sup>

Gerald Steibel sets out three senses that pervades even Russian metaphysics, as well as their ways of thinking: the sense of threat (George Kennan testified to Congress: "the Russians have no conception of permanent friendly relations between states. For them, all foreigners are potential enemies"); the sense of rightness (British diplomat Sir William Hayter wrote: "The Russians are not to be persuaded by eloquence or convinced by reasonable arguments. They rely on what Stalin used to call the proper basis of international policy, the calculation of forces"); and the sense of time--or timelessness--(as Lenin said in 1919: "We shall act as



we did in the Red Army; they may beat us a hundred times, but the hundred and first time we shall beat them all").<sup>137</sup>

Steibel also distills from the experiences of a number of American and other negotiators with the Soviets a set of advices-- incidentally citing Nathan Leites' warning that the alleged power of "negotiation" to persuade the Russians to do something they are not compelled to do is a myth:

- Engage with prudence. Inaction is sometimes better than action.

- Negotiate from strength.

- Beware of the "agreement in principle."

- Avoid the "stacked agenda."

- Learn what Soviet rhetoric means and how to deal with it (and bring your own interpreter).

- Do not be intimidated by acrimony.

- Be judicious about when to be patient, when to act ("Don't make fatuous gestures of good will," advises Kennan, for they will only upset Russian calculations and throw them off balance; if they are interested only in making propaganda, not in serious discussion, the best thing to do is break off proceedings").

- Negotiate quid pro quo (the best bargain is one that is largely self-enforcing, that does not depend upon good faith, good intentions, or elaborate supervisory machinery).<sup>138</sup>

These are the advices of experts who have been "through the wringer." It is, nevertheless, amazing how much attention is paid to other critics and commentators who have never successfully negotiated even a day's wages with anyone, let alone a treaty with foreign nations.



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POWER, PRIMACY, AND PERSPECTIVE: AMERICA AS NUMBER 1 NATION. VO--ETC(U)  
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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A



American interactions with the Soviets must be based upon realistic, not sentimental or overindulgent, appraisal. Like Marx and Lenin, Communist leaders of today see social life as a struggle between classes, an endless conflict between themselves and societies that do not agree with them. Some nations, like America, do not necessarily make the disagreement of others, a basis for conflict; the Communists do.

Does the Communist dynamic of unrelenting struggle stem from an inferiority complex, from fear? We do not know; but we know that enmity (revenge? hatred?) against free societies makes up a good part of the motivation of Communists (not of the Russian people). Insofar as legitimacy is conferred only on governments which genuinely represent the people, all Communist regimes (and other totalitarian regimes) are illegitimate; and members of such governments must know that they are illegitimate, whatever may be the rationalizations with which they assuage their consciences.

It is understandable that Communist regimes hate, fear, and seek to undermine free societies; so long as such societies exist and thrive, they constitute a visible, tangible, successful reproach to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. It is an interesting aspect, seldom commented on, that despite their protestations of overweening regard for the worker, the peasant, the proletariat, Communist regimes are elite regimes, similar to all the other elite regimes of history. For, while there have been, and still are, national regimes composed exclusively of small elites of blood, wealth, education, religion, intellectuality, beauty, strength,



and other forms of egotism and arrogance exploiting the masses, Communist regimes exemplify another form of elitism: ideological elites who, as members of the Communist regime, claim to possess some Holy Grail, some conceptual "truths" whose alleged validity entitles them to seize and hold permanent power over the masses, whose views are to be suppressed and never to be entered into national policies or decisions. In reality, this is no more and no less than usurpation of power, no matter what rationalizations are offered to self and others. Idealistic? No doubt, some idealism enters into the rationalizations of some Communists, the same kind of idealism that leads to fanatics' and usurpers' clutching power to themselves throughout history within a variety of systems. Overall, in my opinion, there is as little genuine idealism in the Communist as in any other illegitimate usurper of power.

Thus, it seems to me, that a Communist organizer in a society on the free side of the Iron Curtain, must be possessed by, or develop, some degree of paranoia to enable himself to participate in Communist undertakings--the constant dissembling about the objectives to which he has committed himself; the constant efforts to mislead, distort, and malign free institutions and activities; the constant pretense that he and his movement are furthering, rather than exploiting, preparatory to destroying, democratic institutions; the heavy thought control to which he subjects himself; and so on--and especially the cultivation of a conviction that, whenever circumstances make it possible to do so, he and his small group of secret



cohorts are entitled to take control, even after being completely repudiated via democratic methods (e.g., the 1975 events in Portugal).

There are dynamics which are common to all societies, democratic and totalitarian, in varying degrees--poverty, injustice, prejudice, imperfection. But consider the particular dynamics which must occasionally and disturbingly penetrate the self-justification shell of all but the most hardened members of every Communist regime: the corroding awareness that the regime is sustained almost exclusively by repressive power; that the primary beneficiary of the exercise of power is not the people but the Communist party; that the regime lies (by commission and omission) massively to its citizens--for example, through falsifying their own history, and through distorting or omitting information about real domestic and foreign events; that no nation's people have ever freely chosen a Communist regime to govern them; that, so long as free opportunity has existed to do so, millions of people have invariably fled away from Communist regimes, never toward them; that electrified fences, minefields, and guns must be employed on a saturation scale along frontiers in order to hold citizens against their will within Communist countries; that no Communist regime has ever given up power, peacefully or otherwise, even after performing highly ineffectively; that if the people had their free choice, the Communist Party would doubtless be permanently repudiated; and so on. To persist in any system despite such personal (and secret), if rare, reflections, must corrode the soul and detach the self even further from reality--no matter how many armored divisions and nuclear submarines the system produces.



However, the illegitimacy of Communist (or other totalitarian) regimes remains a problem primarily for the peoples of the countries concerned.

The few dynamics discussed above, however, in relation to the world's other superpower, have fundamental significance for the future status and policies of the United States. So long as Communist regimes direct the power of foreign nations, much of that power will be directed against the United States, with the United States as Number One Target and chief obstacle to the accretion of further power by the Communist movement, whether in contexts of peace or war. Will this orientation never change? Who knows?

It may decline in virulence (especially if a Communist party is ever turned out by a nation's people); but if that happens, it will take decades to occur. Meanwhile, the nature of Communist regimes cannot realistically be expected to change very much for the better. Communists cannot afford to become benign; no people, anywhere, given the opportunity to cast out Communist masters, will refrain from casting them as far out as they can.

Meanwhile, it is partly inaccurate and fatuous to insist that the Communist Bloc "is no longer monolithic." No movement ever is totally monolithic, and certain world dynamics have loosened some element of Communist solidarity. But not all elements, by any means. Whatever their difference with each other, all Communist states remain inimical to free societies, coveting the power and wealth of free states, and, when opportunities arise (as in Vietnam) to transfer



a state from the condition of freedom to the condition of Communism, all Communist states (whatever the status of their monolithicity) will provide funds, materials, manpower, subversion, and the world's most sophisticated orchestration of monolithic propaganda in support of the Communist side.

Without belaboring this state of affairs unduly, we may conclude that the United States, whether Number One Nation or not, whether it joins wholeheartedly or not in world efforts to include Communist regimes in humanitarian, mellowing enterprises, should never misunderstand the scope and direction of the Communist movement so long as it exists.

Mr. Gough Whitlam, Prime Minister of Australia, before the UN General Assembly in September 1974, appealed to the United States and the Soviet Union to:

. . . maintain the utmost mutual restraint in their relations between themselves and with all other countries. They can, of course, easily destroy each other. They can also destroy all of us. We are entitled to ask them to move forward to a stage of complete detente where their tremendous power can be used jointly for the betterment of the whole civilization.<sup>139</sup>

Stand-off at arm's length? Or joint activity? Recall the comment by a diplomat of India, "If the Russians and the Americans are at loggerheads, we are nervous, but when they get together we are terrified."<sup>140</sup>

In February 1975, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger commented of America's defense posture:

It is a truism that strength abroad must rest on strength as a nation at home . . . The United States must have a range and magnitude of capabilities such that everyone--



friend, foe, and domestic audience alike--will perceive that we are the equal of our strongest competitors . . . In the face of uncertainty and a not altogether friendly world, it is more prudent to shape the future by our own actions than to let others do it for us.<sup>141</sup>

Later, Schlesinger summed up the same perspective:

. . . unless we are prepared to withdraw into the North American Continent, the contribution of the United States to worldwide military balance remains indispensable to all other foreign policies.

Though we should pursue détente vigorously, we should pursue it without illusion. Détente rests upon an underlying equilibrium of force, the maintenance of a military balance.

Only the United States can serve as a counterweight to the power of the Soviet Union. There will be no deus ex machina; there is no one else waiting in the wings.<sup>142</sup>

Sir Robert Thompson, British specialist on modern war and strategy, has written two sentences which revisionists have tried hard for years to contradict:



Since World War II, American grand strategy has been defensive--in protection of its own national interests and those of its allies, and of what has come to be known as 'the free world in general.' Soviet grand strategy, on the other hand, has been offensive, motivated by an expansionist communist ideology.<sup>143</sup>

Thompson cites an analysis by Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, of Columbia University, which goes like this: interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union since World War II has been cyclical, first one side being assertive and then the other. Assertiveness has depended upon advantage in four major factors: relative international standing, relative military power, relative economic power, and relative strength of the domestic policy base (i.e., stability of domestic support of national policy). While the United States has maintained economic superiority throughout this period, and although the Soviets tend to maintain unquestionable domestic "tranquillity," advantage has varied in the non-economic factors.<sup>144</sup> For example, from 1969 to 1972, Brzezinski rated (1) the international standings of the two countries about equal, (2) military standing as questionably of U. S. advantage, (3) economic power as a U. S. advantage, and (4) domestic policy base as a Soviet advantage.

Since 1972, Thompson, Brzezinski, and a number of other observers assert, international standing, especially in being perceived as a reliable ally, has moved to favor the USSR; and military power has moved to equality or to Soviet advantage.<sup>145</sup>

Today, [says Thompson] the credibility of the United States has waned. It is becoming doubtful whether any solid structure of peace can be created . . . The materials for that structure are all at hand and are contained in the four factors already mentioned: military power, sufficient in both the nuclear and conventional fields to



maintain the deterrence; economic power, with all that it entails in the form of foreign aid; international standing, which requires a clear appreciation of vital interests, enforcement of agreements, and absolute faith with allies; and a supporting domestic policy base, for which nerve, will and stamina are the main ingredients.

In the end, however, the question of whether the United States will remain a great power, capable of holding the West together and of safeguarding Western Civilization, will depend less on the military, economic and political factors and more on the psychological factor which affects men's minds in every corner of the world. Unless the people of the United States understand that their credibility is at stake, and learn that the greater their credibility the less is the cost and the less the risk, it is going to be very dark indeed at the end of the tunnel.<sup>146</sup>

Political scientist Lincoln Bloomfield has a somewhat different perception, culminating in a penetrating observation by Bertram Wolfe; says Bloomfield:

I myself see the Soviet ruling elite as determined to avoid a nuclear war, desiring a pragmatic trading partnership with the West, caught in the dilemma of wanting to loosen up but not knowing how, and fearing above all to lose control over its empire, its people's minds, and its self-discipline. I know of no more insightful observation than that of veteran Kremlin-watcher Bertram Wolfe, who said that there are two things the Soviets try with all their might and skill to avoid: all-out war and all-out peace.<sup>147</sup>

There are three foci of an interrelated triangular dilemma that continues to loom threateningly over the American future (actually, there are many elements involved; the three cited here are simply the most critical). This is another facet of the evolving world scene that deserves lengthy analysis in order to receive justice, but limited space restricts our discussion here.

The three foci are the United States, the Communist movement, and the Less Developed Countries (LDC's)--in a broad sense, a



particular dilemma interrelating the First, Second, and Third Worlds.

The dilemma is this: how can the United States legitimately wrest from the Communist movement the role of image and model for revolutionary development toward social justice in LDC's?

Immediately, a number of existing qualifications of this stark dilemma should be expressed:

- Three societies (American, French, Russian) regard themselves as the fountainhead of revolution. The American claim is second to none in validity.
- The USA already serves as positive image and model for some LDC's.
- Most LDC's currently appear to be impressed by the socialist-communist model.
- The USA model emphasizes growth within a nonrigid, flexible structure of freedom and equality.
- The USA model of growth requires extended time (not hopelessly extended) for growth.
- The Communist model presents a prototype of speedier growth, achieved at the price of suppression of human liberties and the maintenance of a rigidly centralized control of all aspects of life.
- The Communist activist seeks situations of grievance, whether justified or not; through massive falsehood, distortion, and misrepresentation, he promises a utopian Communist future which, except for some economic progress, has never yet been realized anywhere.



- The fundamental core of conversion of an LDC to a Communist system is exchange of one set of masters for another set of masters.

- This inevitable fate is usually realized by the people of a society only after a Communist regime has fastened itself on their nation, when it is too late to escape.

- The Communist movement ignores the prohibitions of international law against interference in the internal affairs of another nation.

- America in its promotion of growth according to non-Communist models is hampered by American respect and support for that provision of international law prohibiting internal interference.

- Overall, the American record of relations with LDC's provides no basis for sweeping criticism. The American idea has inspired many nations and much social progress for two centuries. During and after World War II, the United States was a primary force in pressing for the end of colonialism for dozens of peoples. The United States has usually been among the first to recognize genuine revolutionary regimes (not subversions engineered by foreigners in their interest, e.g., engineered by Moscow). The United States has aided dozens of nations with massive funds, material, concessions, technology, and know-how. America has been in the forefront of the handful of nations seeking application (not mere rhetoric) of universal human rights, against the efforts of the overwhelming majority of regimes in the world who talk about human rights but do not extend them to their own people in real life.



- In the post-World War II period, just as worldwide communications proliferated at the same time as the Communist movement was pressing its proselytizing efforts worldwide, the United States unfortunately and unwillingly presented what was in some respects a misleading and unfair image of itself. The American assumption of one side of the war in Southeast Asia following the French experience seemed to some Asians to be the adoption by the United States of the colonialist side against Asians. The American sudden enthusiasm for "counterinsurgency" programs in the early 1960's contributed to erroneous perceptions of many in LDC's that America was the superpower devoted to "counterrevolution," to the suppression of the rising aspirations of disadvantaged people.

America still possesses valid claims to being the principal fountainhead, for LDC's and anyone else, of the revolutionary spirit aiming to redress genuine grievances and to promote comprehensive growth and social justice within the framework of a genuinely free society. But how can this image and model be honestly represented, despite Communist distortion and competition, without imposition and without undue interference in the affairs of others?

We have cited both ups and down in connection with rationales for potential courses by the United States, but many of us tend to oversimplify Soviet handicaps by citing mainly those imbalances that appear to lend advantage to the Soviet Union. Yet, the USSR, of course, confronts its share of frustrations and failures. For example, in late 1974, Rumania's Communist Party served notice that the Soviet Union was "no longer politically acceptable as the guiding center of the world Communist movement."<sup>148</sup> It is becoming more



widely believed in the West that, to the masses of Russians as well as to Russian intellectuals, the dogmas and ideology of Communism have become sterile and unbelievable.

Meanwhile, a policy of "Detente" is in force, intermittently defended by both sides, as a sort of "holding doctrine." The editor of Le Monde, André Fontaine, points out that Detente, since 1962, has survived Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, nuclear alerts, and two Middle East wars.<sup>149</sup> Detente holds both sides in temporary thrall, pending the emergence of a more durable relationship.

#### Concentrating on the United States

The Economist of London recently employed a heading, "The Fading of America."<sup>150</sup> As South Vietnam collapsed in the spring of 1975, La Dernière Heure, of Brussels, contemplated the status of primacy: "Never in its entire history has the first country in the world suffered so many setbacks at the same time." Wrote journalist Arthur Krock: ". . . the tenure of the United States as the first power in the world may be one of the briefest in history."<sup>151</sup>

Digression or not, we shall include here a thought which, in connection with America's role as conditions deteriorated in South Vietnam, should nag at both American and European consciences. The Observer of Britain detected in the Vietnamese situation echoes of Neville Chamberlain's perspective toward Czechoslovakia in 1938--"a faraway country, of which we know little," with the highest value given to the current avoidance of intervention and confrontation, no matter what the future reckoning; so that Manchuria, Abyssinia, Spain, and other countries subsequently fell, later to haunt us all.



John B. Oakes, a Times editor, offered a comment representative of widespread sentiment (though, like many such comments, it suggests what we should achieve, without suggesting how it could be achieved in real life):

Democratic government is on the defensive throughout the world today; American democracy, with all its systemic defects, is one of only a handful still operating with respect for the individual and the collective conscience. Particularly in so complex a democratic structure as ours, the cement of moral as well as political leadership is required to hold the stones together--and in fact to prevent a dissolution of the community into fragmented and warring parts.

What is urgently necessary for leadership to provide today is the reestablishment in the American mind of the sense of community and purpose that transcends our differences, the sense that beneath the turbulent surface of our national life is a basic mutuality of interest, a set of commonly accepted values and a collective conscience.<sup>152</sup>

A provocative compilation of views on what is happening to democracy, "Is Democracy Dying?" was published by the U. S. News and World Report in early 1976. A few penetrating insights therefrom are quoted below:

From Harvard Professor of Government Samuel P. Huntington:

. . . it's not clear how one can operate the complex society and economy that we now have by going to smaller units . . . there has to be a realistic appreciation that we can't go back to a simpler world--that we're going to have to live in a world of big organizations, of specialization and of hierarchy. Also, there has to be an acceptance of the need for authority in various institutions in the society . . .

The bureaucracy now does not just administer things, but it also makes most of the demands for new resources, new policies, new programs and new ideas. It performs many of the functions which private-interest groups and the political parties used to perform. . . .



There is some reason to doubt whether a state which totally monopolizes economic activity can also be a democratic state . . . The goals that [LDC's] have set for themselves conflict with democracy. The goal of many poor countries is reform--achieving a more egalitarian distribution of material benefits, destroying a traditional oligarchical system, and so forth. Democracy can't do that. That type of reform requires an autocratic of one sort or another. . . .

There is another fact that has played a role in the global erosion of democracy--not a decisive factor but a supplementary one universally. That is the decline in the power of the United States in recent years . . . The record shows that the expansion of American power in the world brought with it more-democratic government and strengthened democracy generally. The most obvious evidence, of course, is to be found in Germany and Japan.<sup>153</sup>

From British political scientist Professor Max Beloff:

. . . I don't think Britain is the world's oldest democracy. The United States has been a democracy much longer than Britain. Having the vote generally distributed among the adult population is the clear mark of democracy, and this didn't occur here [In Britain] until 1918 . . .

I'm not at all sure democracy can work except under the very exceptional circumstances existing in the U. S. It's worked in America because of the great degree of decentralization imposed by the size of the country . . .

Everyone thought then [the nineteenth century] that the world would get more and more democratic. Nowadays it's almost completely reversed. We're the ones fighting a defensive battle because so few people really express their conviction that democracy is the better way . . . when people come of these countries [In Eastern Europe], they can't understand what we're doing in the West throwing away the liberties which they are passionately trying to preserve . . .

. . . on the whole the United States is in a much healthier condition than the rest of the free world. I feel much more optimistic every time I cross the Atlantic. At the moment . . . Americans are passing through a period of self-examination and self-criticism. It's a sort of trauma which I hope will end very quickly, because most of it is totally unnecessary.



Apart from a few narrow circles in New York and Washington, I find there is still a great sense in the United States that this is a country of opportunity with an enormous capacity for achievement. I sometimes think if only you would close down the New York Times and the Washington Post for a year or two, America would be fine.<sup>154</sup>

George Ball has highlighted ever-tightening inhibitions restraining democratic nations:



De Tocqueville pointed out long ago that a democracy is incapable of acting in foreign affairs with the secrecy and dispatch of an autocracy--and he was speaking in a day when reporters did not crowd close to green baize tables or television cameras peer through chancellery windows.

Nor is secrecy the only advantage foreclosed; democracies suffer from two further inhibitions. The first is that they must, if they are true to themselves, use raw power sparingly; and the second is that they can no longer, within the sanctions of the new morality, assert direct political control over subject peoples . . . For they are dealing with nations deeply suspicious--and not without good historical reasons--of superior power . . . Thus, while democracies must have gunboats at their command, they can use them only at high political cost . . .

With the substantial liquidation of overseas empires, . . . the Western European nations have been progressively withdrawing from world responsibility. They have receded into an isolationism not unlike that of the United States before the world wars, preferring, as we did then, to criticize the players from the spectator stands while staying out of the game.

. . . Just as Western Europe is reducing its participation in essential tasks around the world because its individual nations are no longer able to define interests related to specific territories outside Europe, is it not possible that we Americans are diffusing our power and employing it with too little discrimination because we have not fixed clearly defined limits to our world interests and responsibilities?

This latter question goes to the heart of a proper American policy and we cannot allow it to stand unanswered. We urgently need a satisfactory rationale for the use of American power and resources, or we may find ourselves increasingly involved in ambiguous quarrels far distant from our shores while the Europeans content themselves with carping from the sidelines.

. . . Every age has its own scale. Alexander conquered much of the known world with only forty thousand armed men. Two and one-half million Romans commanded an empire of fifty million that extended from the North Sea to the Arabian Desert. Sixteenth-century Spain controlled most of Western Europe and the New World with a population of seven million, and two hundred years later a France of



twenty-five million was the largest and most aggressive nation on the Continent. As late as 1939, Germany with seventy million people could still make a bid for global power and scare civilized man half to death in the process.

What distinguishes the present from the past is not merely that the requirements of world power have become greater and more demanding but that, since 1945, they have been given a quantum jump by the vast changes that have occurred during the period. Today . . . only a cohesive society with a population approaching two hundred million and a national income of at least \$300 billion can claim a commanding position of world power.<sup>155</sup>

[It is a fact of life] that there are a few large, populous, and highly developed countries whose command of military, economic, and technical resources gives them the capacity to conquer or dominate their neighbors.

To be sure, such nations may not want to conquer or dominate others, but they may still be constrained to exercise considerable power and influence in relation to others:

No power in the world has desired an imperial position less than the United States; none desires it less today.

Wryly, [says Berle] one sometimes wishes the United States had the power and capacity attributed to it. Anyone working inside its government knows it does not have a fraction of it.<sup>156</sup>

Jerome Slater asks the critical question: "If the United States is an 'imperial' power, where is its empire?"

The growing acceptance of the 'imperial' model or metaphor to the contrary notwithstanding, we may boldly but confidently conclude that the United States today does not 'control' any country anywhere, and in only a slightly more qualified manner we may also reject the notion of United States 'domination.' That the United States has varying degrees of influence in the Third World is of course undeniable, but it is a declining influence, and limited in scope and effectiveness to only certain matters . . . still . . . we may expect the attacks on United States 'imperialism' to continue, however inaccurate and misleading they in fact are, both because



the shibboleth of 'imperialism' provides a convenient myth to deflect attention from the indigenous problems of Third World countries and because inequality per se has become the real focus of Third World resentment of the advanced industrial societies.<sup>157</sup>

#### Some Possible Outcomes

Cox and Jacobson after roughly analyzing international dynamics, have speculated about the future:

Thinking ahead, perhaps even beyond the next fifteen to twenty years, one possible structure of future world politics may be envisaged as no longer resting exclusively upon the nation-state, as in the past, but resting instead upon three different types of political systems: (1) large concentrations of territorially organized economic and political power, with world peace depending upon their consensus; (2) crosscutting lines of universal functional organization, some private--that is, not state-based, such as the corporations--and some public or state-based agencies for the performance of some tasks on behalf of the international



system as a whole; and (3) a flowering of local autonomies, sovereign in certain primarily cultural issue-areas.

Alternatively, some of the forces identified above may combine to bring about a resurgence of the nation-state in a new nationalism.<sup>158</sup>

Professor John Burton, of the "London Group" (Center for the Analysis of Conflict, University College, London), raises the question whether international relations should continue to be defined in terms of inter-state relations, or be approached in terms of a World Society. Interaction of states is only one of many systems at work; rather than a concept of states interacting, it may be more relevant to dwell on a concept of systems interaction--such as all transactions, domestic and international, government and nongovernment, in a wide area of behavior; the nature of authority, including effects of domestic politics on wider environments; peaceful change, purposeful deviance at all levels; and other dynamics not usually covered in texts on international relations.<sup>159</sup>

A number of approaches to a world view beyond nationalism have been suggested; it is a recurrent theme. Simply as one example, one notes the activities of Theodore F. Lentz and his Peace Research Laboratory at St. Louis. His book Humatriotism: Human Interest in Peace and Survival, concerns the what, how, and why of loyalty to all men instead of only to men within a circumscribed geographical area.<sup>160</sup> Whether the approach will someday emerge as more admired, preferred, and effective, something like it will have to emerge widely before any meaningful progress can be made toward genuine international morality, international law, and "world government."



Speaking of predilections toward peace, it may be of considerable interest to Americans and Russians to recall that pre-Communist Russia produced a spokesman who, with Gandhi, became one of possibly the world's two most famous advocates of nonviolence: Count Leo Tolstoy. He exerted important influence on American, as well as other, pacifists. He wrote:

It is a terrible thing to say, but there is not, and there never has been, a combined act of violence by one set of people upon another set of people which has not been perpetrated in the name of patriotism.<sup>161</sup>

#### Miscellaneous Insights

In this exploration of the impacts of change upon primacy, one might do worse than include a few references to changing insights on techniques and methods of interaction among individuals, groups, and nations, as they compete for advantage.

Such movements as Synergic Power advocate such desirable (if farfetched?) goals as the humanization of society, the objective of promoting the well-being of each and every member of society. Many of these consultants endorse what James and Marge Craig call an "all-win program," not excluding the hope of transforming even adversaries into allies. The pursuer of an "all-win program" (whether a sectional chief in a competitive business enterprise or an international negotiator) moves beyond the perception of all conflicting interests as mandatory zero-sum games. Instead, they foster the approach that accepts that one side may prosper without necessarily doing so at the expense of the other side. Resolution may provide a basis for a claim of "partial win" by both sides. It may be possible to eliminate any basis for a



subsequent identification of "loser" and "winner." Such approaches require "high institutional tolerance for ambiguity" as perceptions and objectives change during the course of negotiations.<sup>162</sup>

The ignorance and apathy of many (most?) individual citizens beyond the essentials of their own lives are familiar, enduring phenomena. Are suggestions about the resolution of conflicting interests mere recurrent blueprints, to be resurrected again and again by discrete individuals who happen to be interested, but destined never to achieve influence through endorsement by thumping consensus in the real political world?

Robert Heilbroner recently recalled Adam Smith's conjectures in 1859 about a hypothetical British humanitarian who might learn, say, that fearful disasters had recently occurred in China, wiping out millions of its people. How would he react? Smith guessed that he would reflect with melancholy on the vicissitudes of life, feel some sympathy for the generalized Chinese, slide into speculation about the effects on Europe's commerce, and then cease to care.<sup>163</sup>

Then Smith hypothesized that the same man might learn that in a few days he must undergo an operation and lose his little finger. How would he react? With fear, dread, and sleeplessness, guessed Smith. Subjectivity makes a difference; is another major difference in these reactions the fact that he never saw the millions of Chinese involved, or touched them, or knew them?

Heilbroner was struck by the implications of Adam Smith's comparison in relation to the modern dilemma. He reflected that concern for the children and grandchildren he has personally known



and who have known him would have no meaning beyond, say, 75 years after his death, when his grandchildren would be dead or close to death. As a philosophical exercise (not as a personal policy), he asks: "Why should I lift a finger to affect effects that will have no more meaning for me 75 years after my death than those that happened 75 years before I was born?" And then Heilbroner comments: "There is no rational answer to that terrible question."

Heilbroner quotes a distinguished professor of political economy at the University of London, on the same point:

Suppose that, as a result of using up all the world's resources, human life did come to an end. So what? What is so desirable about an indefinite continuation of the human species, religious convictions apart? It may well be that nearly everybody who is already here on earth would be reluctant to die, and that everybody has an instinctive fear of death. But one must not confuse this with the notion that, in any meaningful sense, generations who are yet unborn can be said to be better off if they are born than if they are not.<sup>164</sup>

Here, we are in areas of metaphysics, ethics, and advanced speculation. We must assume, however, that most persons alive, even though they may not be able to articulate why they feel moved to support a particular position, would choose to accept some responsibility for the continuity of the human race, for the preservation of some life-sustaining conditions, and for the restriction of total exploitation of earth's resources by current human denizens of earth.

One guesses that, no matter how much change arrives, and no matter how much change is disliked, most men will accept an imperative that change must be coped with. However indefinite the future



may be, most men must act in favor of there being a future. Or, could this expectation be optimistic? Could man gradually come to not caring, one way or another?

Morgenstern offers a disturbing insight. It is curious, he says, how complex modern systems resist change (although resistance is to some degree understandable when one is aware how much money, effort, training, and intellectual effort have been invested in existing systems); but it is even more curious how very-long projects are resisted--projects that are likely to exceed an individual's life span (e.g., energy-source projects). One reflects how, in earlier times, generations worked on projects expected to extend beyond one's time--pyramids, cathedrals. Even in prehistoric times, Stonehenge took at least a hundred years to build. In terms of economic and other resources available in those times, such projects far transcended in scope and vision any modern public investments, even space projects or the military establishments of the superpowers.<sup>165</sup>

Another aspect of our relationship to the arriving future that we might well ponder is suggested by Harold and Margaret Sprout, the emeritus team of eminent political scientists at Princeton, who have been trying for years to draw attention to what they call a "statesmen's dilemma": the growing insufficiency of disposable resources at every level in America, and increasingly in other countries.

The Sprouts point to "widespread expectation of endlessing expanding affluence" as a built-in feature of our culture, particularly the inflexibility of government budgets at every level. The inflexibility derives in large part from advance commitment of income and



resources; such built-in "immobility" already rises to 50% or more of our annual budget, and the percentage is climbing steadily. The Sprouts point out that "income-maintenance mortgages on future revenues alone preempt at least a quarter of federal funds."<sup>16b</sup>

In other words, an increasing proportion of future revenues and resources (that is, according to some vision of the future imagined today) is being committed in advance, to programs in such fields as defense, education, agriculture, highways, aviation, social security, pensions, veterans' benefits, grants for public assistance, interest on public debt, and related programs. Not only is the committed proportion steadily increasing, but much is simultaneously being locked in; so that when the real future arrives, at least partially different from advance expectations, officials and electorates will find it increasingly difficult to reallocate revenues and resources realistically, to fit the circumstances they actually live in.

Of course, we must undertake programs to stave off apparent disaster. As social interchange becomes more complex, planning and to some extent resource-commitment must be extended farther into the future. Nevertheless, we ought to resist the temptation to project our perceptions as far into the future as we can; we ought to, in fact, do the exact reverse--project our perceptions into the future only so far as we must, thus leaving maximum flexibility to cope with the real future available to those people who will actually live in that future.

An editorial in Change commented provocatively:



'We are not used to a complicated civilization,' Walter Lippman once reminded us. 'We don't know how to behave when personal conduct and eternal authority have disappeared. There are no precedents to guide us, no wisdom that wasn't meant for a simpler age. We have changed our environment more quickly than we know how to change ourselves.' How is it that in a world whose population grows by nearly 100 million people a year, in a world where this country burns up to 30 to 40 times as much energy as each of a hundred 'developing' countries, in a world with 27 days' food supply, educators at their countless gatherings can still see these problems as somebody else's business? If these seismic issues appear on any academic documents at all, it is likely to be some catalog listing for Ecology 102. As Gibbon observed of Constantine, 'as he gradually advanced in the knowledge of truth, he proportionately declined in the practice of virtue.'<sup>167</sup>

John Rader Platt suggests that more incisive priorities be identified and that problem-solving be organized to follow these priorities:

Several types of crisis may reach explosion-point in the next ten years: nuclear escalation, famine, participatory crises, race crises, and what have been called the crises of administrative 'legitimacy.' . . .

Take the problem of nuclear war, for example. A few years ago, Leo Szilard estimated the 'half-life' of the human race with respect to nuclear escalation as being between ten and twenty years. His reasoning then is still valid now. . . .

Many agricultural experts also think that, within this next decade the great famines will begin, with deaths that may reach one hundred million people in densely populated countries like India and China. . . .

But if famine does come, it is clear that it will be catastrophic.

In addition, the next decade is likely to see continued crises of legitimacy of all our overloaded and surprised administrations, from universities and unions to cities and national governments. . . .

A high-information society now insists on being consulted and not commanded. . . .



What finally makes all of our crises still more dangerous is that they are now coming on top of each other. . . .

Nothing less than the application of the full intelligence of our society is likely to be adequate. I think we are going to need large numbers of scientists forming something like research teams, or Task Forces, for Social Research and Development. We need full-time interdisciplinary teams, including natural scientists, social scientists, doctors, engineers, teachers, lawyers, and many other trained and inventive minds, who will put together our stores of knowledge and powerful new ideas into action-oriented, policy-directed 'social inventions' that will have a chance of being adopted soon enough and widely enough to be effective. Even a great mobilization of scientists may not be enough. There is no guarantee that these problems can be solved in time, no matter what we do. But for problems of this scale and urgency, it is the only chance we have.

Scientists, of course, are not the only ones who can make contributions. Millions of citizens, business and labor leaders, city and government officials, and workers in existing agencies, are already doing all they can to solve these problems. No scientific innovation will be effective without extensive advice and help from all these groups.<sup>168</sup>

Platt's reaction may be apocalyptic. It seems unlikely that mankind, especially mankind distributed in nationalistic enclaves, will grasp the urgency that attends some of these forces so as to mount an orderly campaign. Experience tells us that mankind is more likely to defer action until orderly approaches are too late, but then demand instant solutions while denouncing somebody else for not foreseeing the crises and preparing for them. But if we do feel uneasy with some sense of impending crisis, Platt's prescription is one constructive approach. Are there others equally compelling?

We have set forth herein several compact references to liberty and equality, two values that are said to lie jointly at the very



heart of American motivation--and, presumably at least, close to the heart of all human beings, and, in the end, of all strategic objectives. Actually, though both liberty and equality are prized in civilized societies, the deference paid to them varies considerably. It may serve a constructive purpose here to attempt to decide which is the more important of the two

It has been pointed out enough times that these two values are antithetical; yet we mostly discuss them as though they were of equal idealized stature--in some way complementary; perhaps even mutually supporting. We are aware of numerous contexts, within and without American society, in which both values flourish, though in different degrees and in somewhat uneasy juxtaposition.

As resident components of the human condition, they may always be uneasy with each other. Even on a simplistic level, it is not difficult to understand why. For, if it were important to see that everyone in a society were free to reach whatever social heights he can, people in that society must not be equal; otherwise, there would be only one level, with no "heights" to reach. Or, to put it the other way, in order to maintain absolute equality, individual liberty would have to be suppressed; no one could be permitted even the slightest freedom to realize such superior qualities as he actually possessed in brains, brawn, training, endurance, deferred gratification, skills, leadership, and many other attributes.

We evade the spinning of subtle webs of analysis here in this discussion of American primacy; neither liberty nor equality are discrete dynamics in any society; they are, of course, intermixed



with economic, social, and other dynamic factors, varying in intensity with each social group. Nevertheless, in oversimplified terms, it is the contention here that liberty is clearly the most valuable quality and the superior choice of any society in the current stage of human development. Every society attempting to provide a better life for its members must inescapably drive toward liberty for the nation, liberty for sub-groups, and liberty for the individual. Of course, even liberty cannot be absolute; any two individuals joined together in common purpose must concede some proportion of their personal liberty to the common enterprise.

The same concession must be expected en masse when the libertarian principle is applied to a society of 220 million people, as in American society. What should be sought as a practical goal is the provision and protection of the greatest possible amount of liberty, consistent with the collective requirements of the whole society. In a conflict between national interests (in which all share equally, such as in national security) and individual interests, the interests of the whole people must take precedence; but in any society genuinely pursuing liberty as its primary value, there will surely always be preserved a large area of liberty for every individual.

After a society has enjoyed liberty over a long time, so that many of its members, to a greater or lesser degree, tend to take its and their liberties for granted, other values receive increasing attention--probably none more than equality.

However, there are at least two "subpackages" of equality. Essentially the "Equality I" same cluster of equalitarian precepts



advocated for centuries, and the same as the Founding Fathers endorsed, includes basic equality for all citizens under the law, and a number of basic equal rights (such as equality of opportunity, and those covered in the Bill of Rights); essentially, such aspects of equality depend as much on the principle of liberty as on the principle of equality. All democratic, open societies early establish the provision of "Equality I" with high priority.

The elements of "Equality II," however, while partially overlapping "Equality I," primarily involve alleged entitlements which no society has ever yet granted or achieved on a mass, permanent basis, such as equality of status, of income, of education, of prestige-- that is, guaranteed equality of result regardless of differences of effort, talent, sacrifice, quality, social value, and other characteristics. Since people are not automatically and equally deserving of "Equality II," a society that enforced "Equality II" would be unjust.

In modern democratic societies, it is argued by increasingly vehement reformers that elements of ascription (inherited wealth, power and influence conferred through family prestige, etc., instead of via achievement) remaining in society continue conditions of unwarranted advantage. This argument is now widely conceded. Free societies, however, have steadily eroded the power and privileges rooted in ascription, and have increased the power and privileges rooted in merit (inarguably, there is quite a ways to go along this line).

The workings of ascription are relatively clear cut; whether one regards the principle as good or evil, the principle is not



mystifying; and the sources of status of one who benefits is usually not fuzzy. The workings of the principle of "merit," however, are hardly ever clear. Some enthusiasts of equality may press for the imposition of "Equality II," because they prefer clear-cut criteria, because they are uncomfortable with such a fuzzy principle as "merit." Accordingly, they would level all persons in a society to a single plateau; the expected result is extolled in advance as "justice."

I do not believe that equality of result represents or provides justice, and do not accept that principle. To me, however difficult it continues to be in application, the more just and valuable principle is that of merit. Giving priority to merit would necessitate rejection of "Equality II" and acceptance of inequality of some degree. I suggest that enormous differentials of status, income, wealth, and power need not be accepted, not even to the extent that still exists in American (and all other) societies; I suspect that differentials would still be effective if they were much smaller. The important aspect would be that differentials still exist, and that they be clearly visible (as rewards and, hence, as incentives), fitted as closely as possible to differences in merit. There is considerable basis in the literatures of sociology and psychology for the conclusion that people accept inequalities if they are convinced that distinctions are earned according to personal performance.

Admittedly, as noted, merit is a far more difficult quality to measure than, for example, entitlement through inheritance. Even market values are not the same as merit values, and a number of



merit values conflict with other merit values; yet merit values should be clearly identified as prime social objectives.

Meanwhile, as society struggles toward means to identify and measure merit and worthiness in order to establish (modest) social differentials, "Equality II" will remain a vague and unattainable ideal unwanted except by utopians and by those who expect to fare worse by any other principle. In the real world of practical possibility, "Equality II" is simply unattainable. To pursue the realization of "Equality II" with the intention that it transcend or even equal liberty as a primary social value is to keep a society in ferment over attainment of a value that not only cannot ever be attained but one that never should be attained.

To pursue equality on the merit principle and as a value clearly subordinate to liberty in importance, to seek improvement of the general condition of equality among people in ways that, and so long as, liberty is not compromised unduly, seems to me the way of sensible progress for American or any other modern society.

The point of this discussion is to establish the primacy of the value of liberty in American society and, by extension, in every other society pursuing modernization. Essentially, liberty stands unmatched and unqualified as the primary value and objective; in strategic terms, this objective is articulated as political freedom, as independence, for any society capable of mustering the material, cultural, and other requirements for nationhood.

Samuel Huntington has commented on linkage between American power and the fate of democracy (and hence of liberty) generally in the world:



. . . contrary to the rhetoric of the 'New Left' and the 'new politics,' the record shows that the expansion of American power in the world brought with it more democratic government and strengthened democracy generally . . . In the past 10 years, there has been a decline in American influence . . . and that, I think, has been a factor contributing to the decline of democracy.<sup>169</sup>

America, then, in sorting out challenges to its own independence, and to its primacy among world powers, will continue to receive appeals for aid along a gamut of rationales. In general, appeals from nations with socially utopian systems promising primary emphasis upon equality should be set aside as, at best, polities trying to involve the United States in matters properly left for their own internal resolution, or, at worst, systems in which some group of outs are bidding to become ins by promising utopian and unattainable results--systems likely to be opposed to genuine democratic societies and to harbor among them enemies of America. Regimes putting "equality" first, ahead of liberty, are, on the record, unlikely to achieve either. For liberty is, with effort and difficulty, a realizable ideal; equality is not realizable, but is a chimera, an abstraction.

As a value and as an objective in strategic terms, liberty is something quite different from equality. A great part of the "American idea" that has quickened the pulse of peoples for 200 years involves the single principle of liberty. America has stood forth as one of the few friends and bulwarks of liberty, not only for itself, not only for a few, but for all. In political, military, and economic ways, America has aided many peoples to become free and independent. While the United States, in its own interests, has supported a selected few authoritarian regimes already repressing



their peoples, it is difficult to think of even one instance in which a nation of free people was permanently deprived of their liberty primarily by acts or policies of the United States.

On the principle that when liberty is diminished anywhere it is diminished everywhere, it appears to be still highly important for America to remain vitally interested in the status of liberty around the globe, in the rise and fall of liberty, and in the transition of states into and out of conditions of liberty. Since it is a prominent characteristic of free peoples that they refrain from roles of predator and aggressor; and since predators and aggressors characteristically strive to eliminate freedom and free nations from the free part of the world, liberty remains a factor of profound strategic importance. It will continue to make substantial difference--and at times, crucial difference--whether and to what extent America, as the champion of the free world, exerts any effort to resist anti-liberty forces, anywhere in the world.

The catch phrase "world policeman" was a nonsensical caricature which some persons tried to hang on the United States. In reality, the United States was never a "world policeman" and never tried to be. What the United States did do was to try to assist, prop up, defend, support, and enhance free nations to retain and increase their freedom, on the premise that what happened to the liberty of every one of them added to or subtracted from the total of liberty existing in the world, and eventually affected the liberty of America itself.



In a context of change, it is also important to recognize factors which will not change. Concern for liberty is one vital characteristic of America that America cannot afford to let diminish. Otherwise, we have, of course, merely scratched the surface of change in this chapter and in passages in other chapters. Certainly, the



great problems of expanding population, burgeoning demand for food, increasing thirst for more energy, the ambiguous cross-nation influence of multinational corporations, the potential power of China, the self-conscious surge of the developing nations are all important problems; and so are a hundred, or a thousand, others. Which are most important among them, it is not our purpose to declare, other than by implication here.

We have presented a number of appraisals and predictions about the direction of change. Some are pessimistic, some sanguine. Obviously, many are not compatible with others. It is difficult to identify any major trend which will not affect the primacy of the United States. This is not necessarily to expect (despite a number of gloomy forecasts) a net effect of eviction of the United States from the position of Number One Nation. Change in the direction of America's status seems, at the moment, more likely to be down--but it might well be up.



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I am convinced . . . that we must walk  
the extra mile . . .

John Scali  
US Ambassador to United Nations



CHAPTER 7  
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES:  
COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Nature of This Final Chapter

Essentially, this final chapter discusses various conclusions about what the United States, as Number One Nation, ought to do in the evolving world environment. Few judgments are absolute. The conclusions are modest and muted; no exhortations to crusade or thundering recommendations are included. This choice of style is deliberate. The more insistent are the proliferating demands for action along one line of national policy or another, the less persuasive they are that the proponent has access to any uniquely reliable vision of the future. We do not, none of us, possess enough prescience to select the certain course of the future out of the welter of candidates.

Some readers may be disappointed that a more mechanistic and quantified structure of interaction has not been attempted--such as might cope with questions like these: What are all the components of international primacy? What weights of relative influence should be allocated to each component? What is the precise effect of change in each component over time? If current domestic and international dynamics are effecting change in different components at different rates, how can these rates of change and effects be measured and quantified?

Fortunately or unfortunately, depending upon the point of view, no such quantified conclusions are included in this final chapter.



### Primacy and Its Attainment

The prevailing tone of this final chapter is frankly based on expectations that American primacy, while declining in relative terms, will remain distinctive and distinguishable, probably until 1990, possibly until 2000 and beyond.

To begin with, some reduction in the American standard of living vis-a-vis the remaining 94% of the people on earth can be expected. The "days of wine and roses," of American consumption of one-third of the world's energy and up to one-half of certain products, of rich diets and unlimited gratification, are over.

Kenneth Boulding asks:

It is pretty difficult to come out against greatness. Nobody wants to be thought small, or petty, or narrow. I would not have the nerve, therefore, to come out against the Great Society. Nevertheless, between the great and the grandiose is a hair's breadth . . . grandiosity is greatness without realism, without tenderness, without sensitivity, and it eventually produces a frame of mind that eventually becomes deaf to the ominous messages of the free world. I believe the United States is frighteningly close to this boundary . . .

It is, of course, our image of ourselves not only as a great power but as the great power that is at the root of all our grandiosity. Can't we have a Moderately Great Society? . . . By almost all the world's standards, the United States is an inconceivable success. We have attributed this largely to our virtue and good management, not wholly without reason, but a certain amount of it is due to luck--the fact, for instance, that we have so often done the right thing for the wrong reasons.

What is dangerous, however, is that because of our success, it is hard for us to learn that we may be operating with an image of the world that has in fact passed away. The conditions of success in the future are not the same as the conditions in the past. What we do not understand, and seem almost incapable of learning, is that in the long run, legitimacy is



much more important for survival than either wealth or military power; and that though up to a point, wealth and military power create legitimacy, beyond a certain point, they destroy it . . .<sup>1</sup>

Despite its overall eloquence and reasonableness, one wonders a bit about this passage. Is the comment viable? Would the United States have been better off doing the "wrong" things for the "right" reasons, whatever the reasons might have been? In any event, one can readily assume that most Americans would be content to confront the future in a Moderately Great Society. Or would they?

When, in July 1969, Americans landed near the Sea of Tranquility on the moon, the first human beings ever able to do so, millions of earthlings around the globe watched them on television screens, and marveled. To even the most phlegmatic, it was an electrifying occasion--the concept, the organization, the daring, the successful execution. The prestige of the United States had possibly reached some peak of world admiration, far from its status in 1797 when that dapper young officer, escorting John Quincy Adams to the Prussian court, confessed that he had never even heard of the United States of America.

But time, now as then, moves on; and new heroes (or villains) fill the headlines at other peaks of world interest.

We might glance back at the loose synonyms for primacy that we referred to at the beginning of this study and reflect, here at the end, whether reconsideration of them sheds any additional light on the privilege, or the problem, of being Number One Nation:



- "Power": obviously indispensable in a world which is still organized and which still operates with great emphasis on power, though the utility of even great power is more complicated than it used to be.

- "Influence": obviously indispensable, as the means of projecting influence multiply. Influence follows the possession and projection of power, but other attributes also affect influence. The influence of example, for instance, depends not so much on physical power as on demonstrated power over self, self-control, self-restraint.

- "Winning": its significance is ambivalent--positive, when winning results in suppression of malevolent forces and provides upgrading of the human condition; negative, when winning is pursued mindlessly, concerned with trivia and dross, more destructive than is necessary to prevail, achieved through trickery, unaware of the element of chance, concerned exclusively with the one winner but not with the many losers. Perhaps the healthiest and most readily justified alternative to winning is simply not losing, a considerably different thing.

- "Authority": still a major source of legitimacy of the power and influence that support primacy, for the first or foremost in any activity is still conceded some degree of authority. On the other hand, especially ascriptive sense, authority is an ambivalent, perhaps declining, source, leaving one primary criterion for authority. More and more, the basis for accepted authority is empirical,



emphasizing visible, convincing superiority in some performance demonstrating brains, brawn, or virtue.

- "Leadership," "hegemony," "dominance": All variants of the same dynamic, primacy. These concepts are also ambivalently regarded--positively, if the "leader" demonstrates incontrovertibly superior competence, and is generous, tolerant, and, especially, willing to assume burdens while leaving colleagues to benefit without comparable effort; negatively, if the leader or hegemon attempts unilateral dominance, or rejects a consultative style, or, sometimes, insists that others share burdens equally with the leader.

- "Competition" and "cooperation": The payoffs from cooperative approaches are becoming better known; however, competitive approaches have been programmed into human motivation, especially Western societies, over many centuries and are not about to fade soon into impotence.

Whether these reconsiderations shed additional light on being Number One Nation may be debatable; they may simply close a loop with earlier chapters.

Henry Fairlie, a Briton, wrote in 1975:

The future of the world lies with America--that has not been questioned for two centuries . . . To understand that the leadership of the West had passed to the United States, but not to believe in the spirit of America, or even that the spirit could live in America: was this not the empty valley of the hollow men . . . ? The improvement of the day-to-day lives of ordinary people, which has owed so much to the inspiration of America, is disparaged. Moreover, with this material progress there has been carried also the idea that culture might equally be made accessible to all.<sup>2</sup>



. . . This process is usually observed only in its material manifestations, and it is overlooked that, with the traffic of its commerce and its arms, America carries also an idea. The energy of the American presence in the world is both welcomed and feared, both a cause of hope and a source of anxiety, because with its idea it keeps on unsettling the established forms of the past. Not merely old but ancient customs are surrendering to a presence that is not imposed and yet seems irresistible, to an idea that appears to be more powerful than the slogans of any revolution. 'All American influence on Europe,' said Cyril Connolly, 'however vulgar, brings with it an improvement in the standard of living and dissipates certain age-old desires.' While these are wanted, they are also resisted and questioned.

It is my own belief that the mere presence of America, what Americans have become and achieved in their own country, has done more to change the world, and improve the life of its peoples, than any revolution in the past two centuries. . . .<sup>3</sup>

For the benefit of those who appear frustrated by the failure of the United States, as Number One Nation, to establish world harmony, to effect universal prosperity, or to cure the ills of the human condition, it may be chastening to reflect upon how recently it has been that America entered into a position of primacy.

#### The Brief Span of American Primacy

In 1890, far from having achieved a homogeneous society, over one-third of the population of the United States was still comprised of people of foreign parentage.<sup>4</sup> While the transcontinental railway network was integrated in 1880, the Lincoln Highway, the first paved coast to coast road, was opened only in 1913. The Army Chief of Staff reported in 1938 that the United States Army, with fewer than 200,000 members, stood 18th in size among armies of the world.<sup>5</sup>

Scholars Oscar and Mary Handlin describe the affluence of America as a period of uneasy wealth, reached after a long journey



from desperate want, from the widespread poverty and hardship of colonial times and after.<sup>6</sup> As late as 1920, over 30% of Americans still lived on farms; and as late as 1932, electricity was available only to one farmer in ten (in Mississippi 1 in 100); 90% of all rural families were without bathtubs or showers; 75% lacked any indoor plumbing; 50% still carried water from wells or brooks.<sup>7</sup>

As A. A. Berle was quoted in the preceding chapter:

In two generations, most of the American population has been lifted from a condition of endemic want and privation to a condition of comparative comfort. The America of my childhood looked much like underdeveloped nations--such as Brazil or Argentina--in 1967. Most of its people then literally struggled against fear and too frequently experienced want, hunger, even lack of shelter. . . .

What does such recency connote?--that America has not wallowed in affluence while generations of foreigners suffered in misery; that until recently, if there were societies enjoying the good life, they did not include America among them; and that America's advanced status today was not achieved by long-time exploitation, or at the expense of other nations.

#### The 1976 World Context for Modifying the Behavior of Nations

Despite whatever real progress has been made, the world is not ready for any form of world government. It is closer to acceptance than, say, a half-century ago; but acceptance is still far away.

Some people keep saying that such and such will happen if so and so is done. God knows we hear often enough that if we act rationally and extend love, the rest of the world will respond with love and peace. There is little evidence of this approach's being



successful in history on any overwhelming scale, but much evidence to the contrary.

An impression from the record of communal man's activities over time (or from what we know of them) raises assurances that vague good will, however vigorously espoused, (so often predicated upon no more evidence or sustained motivation that the expresser's concentration on approving of himself) has done limited good in the world; due to its predilection for conveying misunderstanding, it may have actually done more harm than good. It has led to repeated interventions into the affairs of others in attempts to improve them, or straighten them out, or show them the way of love or some similar program.

On the other hand, it may be so that relations between nations have been conducted most effectively, with less strain and more benefit for both sides, when neither intrudes on the other, each maintains its frontiers and defenses without forwardness or backwardness, neither exhorts, neither expects too much, and each keeps an open mind but minds its own business--in the sense of Robert Frost: "Good fences make good neighbors."

We can provoke some kinds of admirable behavior--but not many, not much, and not for very long.

When will conflict cease? Probably not before man becomes extinct; certainly not before man ceases to be perverse--to a large extent a mystery even to himself. Roots of some conflicts are deeply imbedded, producing very hardy perennials, and new seeds are planted annually. Several forms of injustice have been widely corrected, but many others persist and flourish.



Meanwhile, to cope with conflict, complex forces of push-and-pull in international affairs have replaced the simpler forms of conflicts of interest that were characteristic of earlier days, when simple Might tended to make Right. Nuclear arsenals exist, largely choking off the automatic escalation of force-usage towards the highest levels available. More and more people, achieving literacy, inject themselves into the political process, diffusing power among masses rather than elites.

Many argue that man increases in knowledge, but few argue that he grows in wisdom. Knowledge increasingly identifies for us those tools that are likely to be successful, and others likely to be unsuccessful, in addressing and resolving conflicts. We know better what to do, though we are less certain of how to do it. In any event, knowledge provides newly sharpened tools, but we fail to use them because so many perverse pressures of our human nature intrude (Remember the months of argument precluding the start of the Paris peace talks to end the Vietnam War? Remember that the issue in those arguments was the shape of the table over which the postponed negotiations themselves were someday to be conducted?).

Some argue that man grows steadily in virtue, in ethical stature; but there is little evidence to support that argument. For example, in many ways (not in all) man has become more cautious in approaching violence; but the reason may well be simple prudence in perception of nuclear arsenals, rather than refinement in ethical awareness.

So that man's current ethical status, compared to the ethical standards of Socrates, or Aristotle, or the Buddha, or St. Augustine,



or St. Francis of Assisi, or Sun Tzu, is not clearly superior.

In any event, whether or not most people today are "better" than most people used to be, predators still exist as individuals, groups, and nations (the latter, usually in the form of small elites who cause whole nations to do their predatory bidding). Predators are always ambitious, usually equipped with lists of grievances (real or manufactured), expansionist, willing to give up nothing of their own but contentious over the possessions of others, and exercising only one compunction about using force: Are they likely to get away with it? Without suffering more losses than are compensated by gains?

Unfortunately, the roots of much of erupting violence--e.g., in Ireland, the Middle East, India-Pakistan-Bangladesh--are still religious, exemplifying the rash conviction that "others must believe as I believe," that those whose spiritual beliefs are different from mine deserve to be discriminated against, to be punished, to suffer.

Various compilations of advice are being circulated as "needed guidelines" or "survival imperatives" by imaginative forecasters, with variable persuasiveness. One brief list that appears more persuasive than most is a set of four principles for a "fundamental reorientation of values for planetary man," which was developed by Mihalo Mesarovic, of Case Western Reserve University, and Edward Pestel, of Germany's Hannover University:

1. Every individual must realize that he is now a member of the world community; in many respects, there is no basis for continuing a "we-and-they" relationship, for the "we" includes everybody;



2. A new ethic must emerge for the use of resources that is compatible with coming scarcity, emphasizing having and conserving instead of spending and discarding;

3. Attitudes toward nature should be directed toward achieving harmony rather than conquest;

4. A sense of identification with future generations must emerge, abandoning the rationale that "this generation is entitled to exploit all that it can reach and get."<sup>8</sup>

One hears of a "new" spirit of humanitarianism, embracing all men beyond one's own shores. The hearer is attracted, yet repelled, simultaneously, by exhortations to world brotherhood, to the erasure of distinctions based on the coastline, on national frontiers. Can such exhortations be relied on? In what realities of international life are these expectations validated? How can one begin to interact with other human beings based initially on any principle other than those of interaction within his natural family, then expanding from there to local group interaction, to living community, to region, to ethnic nationalism, to political nationalism--all of that as essential prelude before he can make the leap to citizen of the world? Can one's orientation overleap any of these steps, to embrace foreigners at the outset ("what have they done for me?" "what do I owe them?")? If there is a genuine universal "new spirit" in the world re tension, conflict, etc., how did we get there from where we were up to the minute before now, despite border fortifications, guards, patrols of air-sea-land, weapons stockpiles, etc. etc.? In what significant major current "super"-national agencies is this "new" spirit manifested?



### Opposition to American Primacy

Certain individuals, groups, and nations--born ambitious or acquiring overweening ambition along the way--still arise, scheming and plotting to enjoy fame, fortune, and power via some shortcut, usually by grasping what others have. I have briefly discussed Communist interests elsewhere in this study; and we are not going to recreate here the acrimonious debates of the Cold War period. Nevertheless, in relation to American primacy, one of the fundamental determining realities of the world context continues to be the strength and adversary orientation of the world Communist movement. It is increasingly asserted by indulgent Westerners that the Communist movement is no longer monolithic, as though declining monolithicity rendered the Communist threat invisible or imaginary or impotent. The world has rarely if ever been monolithic; did that fact make it a safe world? Common religion, for example, makes bedfellows of even some highly incompatible nations; yet, when enterprises like the Crusades lost their monolithic spirit, and alliances fell apart, did one religious orientation cease to be a danger to others?

Among other aspects of being Number One, the United States is the Number One Target for the Communist world, which has so identified America many times. Even though other Communist states may not knuckle under completely to the USSR, they are far from being autonomous. Monolithic Communist and Soviet control of Czechoslovakia, for example, has declined from 100% to what? To 98% control by the Czech Communist Party? To 88% control by Moscow? To listen to the breezy claims of some observers about the "no-longer" status of



monolithicity, one might gain an impression that control had declined to 10% or even 0%. Not so. Not nearly so.

The Communists, monolithic or not, retain long-range goals inimical to America. The Communists seek to cut America down because it is strong (an effective obstacle to their ambitions) and free (a living disproof and reproach to their claim that citizens must accept repression in order that a country be strong). So long as powerful America remains democratic, it is a judgment against all Communist and all other totalitarian systems. Whenever an opportunity arises to damage America without suffering damage in return, the Communist world approaches monolithicity again--whether through voting in the United Nations, in supplying means of war to North Vietnam, or in orchestrating the sophisticated worldwide propaganda apparatus of the anti-American Communist network.

Despite all its partial and temporary abandonment of vicious stridency and distortion against America, despite its smiles and wiles and hearty styles, the Communist movement shows few signs of redirecting its long-range goals into any semblance of live-and-let-live. Communists mean to dominate, not to cooperate. Many Americans assume "detente" means diminution of malevolence, but the Soviets have no such illusions. Pravda wrote--not in 1919 or 1955 but in 1973:

Peaceful coexistence does not mean the end of the struggle of the two-world social system. The struggle . . . will be waged right up to the complete and final victory of Communism on a world scale.<sup>9</sup>

And it was not some reactionary, hysterical with anti-Communism, who said it; Pravda said it.



We realize that, insofar as the Communist leaders are concerned, they cannot afford to redirect their course abruptly; for they have a tiger by the tail. Were they to permit any substantial redirection from the goal of power-seeking mastery that they have taught their people to pursue, millions of their voiceless citizens might throw them out while unraveling the structures of distortion constructed by every Communist regime, bar none.

Thus, it is one difficult, not-minor aspect of America's problem to differentiate between genuine world opinion, some rooted in adversary nationalism or other perspectives, and the worldwide false "consensus" orchestrated by the Communist movement.

There are some cracks and rents widening in the Kremlin Wall, the Iron Curtain, and the Communist international conspiracy. Incontrovertible denunciations of Soviet policies and systems have somehow reached the outside world from such insiders as Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, Almarik, and the Medvedev brothers. The Communist Parties of France and Italy have announced heretical new directions, including the junking of the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat, achieving independence from Moscow, and (in Italy) agreeing not only to take political power if invited, but also to give power up if the Party were later to be repudiated.<sup>10</sup>

The New York Times commented editorially on similar changes among French Communists:

. . . it is some kind of advance when what was formerly one of the most orthodox of the world's Communist parties finds it advisable to present a more flexible exterior and to proclaim greater independence from Moscow. Some day there may even be deeds to demonstrate that the French party really does operate on its own.<sup>11</sup>



It would be to misunderstand grossly the foregoing discussion to infer that it suggests that America must live in constant anxiety behind ramparts, or that America would not know what to do if it did not have Soviet initiatives to respond to, or that America need refrain from every opportunity to join Communist or any other states in genuine cooperative endeavors, or that America will become other than the open, generous society that, in the main, it is. The primary purpose of the discussion of Communist states above is to recognize the current status of the most powerful and explicit opposition to America's role of Number One Nation.

#### The Exercise of American Will

In my opinion, the following 1954 passage by Thomas Cook and Malcolm Moos overstates the "mission" of the United States to some minor extent, but still provides a reasonably accurate description of the interdynamics of American primacy in the current world environment:

America, possessed of England's sometime power, must also adopt and adapt its concept of policy. It must not naively rely on international good will. To hope and strive for a genuine community of interests between nations is futile. For their inequalities render such community impossible and make the search itself delusive. America must acknowledge to itself its own power and must fearlessly use it. It must clearly recognize that an international organization is at best a convenient instrument, and often an impediment.

We must speedily become aware that the United States can by deliberate action create and preserve a balance of power in the rest of the world. On the other hand, it cannot impose its will or its way on that world, or over a major part of it.<sup>12</sup>



In the meantime, while disparities, old grievances, and quests for vengeance will continue to retard the growth of a world spirit of homogeneous and humanitarian community, we shall need more and more to develop a genuine scientific spirit (not the spurious pseudo-scientism of the Communists, nor of our own prejudices misrepresented as scientific). We need less and less of grievance and counter-grievance, of bias and counter-bias, of stereotype and myth, of the "feelings" and "impressions" used as guides for action by presidents, parliaments, popes, and premiers; instead, we need more and more data--accurate data, realistic data, verifiable data, plus a skepticism about hypotheses and assumptions put forward to cover the absence of hard data.

We need not belabor the distortions consciously and unconsciously promulgated by Communist regimes to their vulnerable peoples. We ourselves may have a number of difficulties with our own perceptions to cope with. As a basic exercise in reverse xenophobia, we might propound a few provocative questions for each of us to answer ourselves--something like the following:

Q: When you think of different nationalities or groups of foreigners, perhaps of immigrants, which ones do you think of as being inferior to "Americans?" Dumber? Slower? Dirtier? Unlucky? Do you think they were all born that way, or that they acquired those characteristics collectively?

Q: Despite their having less money and fewer cars, would you place any other peoples on the same levels as Americans in



intelligence? Goodness? Cleanliness? Sense of justice? Dexterity and strength? Virtue? Luck? Which peoples?

Paradoxically, as developed by a number of critics of the Vietnam War, there sometimes seemed to prevail a delusion of American omnipotence--a delusion that the major events and decisions in the world, in foreign countries, and in the brain centers of foreign officials all took place at the direction of the United States. Many critics of the Vietnam War always discussed American activity in Southeast Asia as though the lands were barren, devoid of human life of other nationalities, uninhabited by Thais, Laotians, Cambodians, and Vietnamese, and particularly, as though there were no enemy forces and regime fighting a war against South Vietnamese and Americans. The Canadian reviewer of a best-seller about Vietnam complained that, as in many other such popular treatments, the entire Communist presence in the war was missing from the book. Many such authors are guilt-allocators, and so their one-sidedness results in placing most of their blame on the USA for whatever "went wrong" (i.e., whatever displeased them).

Despite such unawareness, the rest of the world is very much there, causing events, shaping turns and twists that the United States does not want, would cause to vanish if possible, but must respond to. Some challenges must be responded to now, with or without generalities and abstractions, and without waiting for utopian response conditions. For the critics to lecture policymakers later (on Monday morning) on what should have been done (where were they when the decision had to be made in the face of ignorance and uncertainty?) comes only with ill grace and much hubris.



What is the significance of being Number One in a world becoming increasingly interdependent, in which cooperation is supposed to replace competition? Surveying the international arena in relation to primacy, we have suggested that there is not only one significant question to ask: viz, which country is most powerful and important? Also of considerable weight in determining primacy are various spin-off questions, such as: Which is the most admired nation? The most respected? The most impressive combination of power and restraint? What other nations form the context that makes primacy meaningful?

Morton Deutsch's findings on competition and cooperation have been cited, as has J. L. Richardson on the vanishing of world contexts for unilateral decrees:

. . . the world today has grown far too complicated and dangerous for the United States to mold and manage world affairs without the active help of others who share our humane political heritage and aspirations and our security requirements.<sup>13</sup>

Garrett Hardin came up with the useful analogy of the lifeboat as a symbol of mankind's course ahead. Dennis Pirages and Paul Ehrlich have come up with another useful symbol: Ark II. Buckminster Fuller suggests Spaceship Earth. All amount to warnings that international behavior must be reoriented on a preponderant basis of cooperation, rejecting central behaviors of competition and confrontation. Karl Deutsch recommends to advanced nations three words from Lao-Tse as inspiration in coping with difficult conditions related to the underdeveloped countries: "outgrow, not overpower."

As Cline and others have demonstrated, there is a modern school of thought that identifies one crucial element of the status of



nations in that aspect of achievement that we call determination, or volition, or will. We can readily adapt David McClelland's conclusions that, given two societies with equal resources but unequal thrusts towards achievement, the one with greater dynamism, with more will-to-excel, will probably achieve more. Yet, we are also aware, with Skinner and Homans, that systemic pressures will also exert irresistible impacts.

If Skinner and Homans are right, our conviction that we exercise free choice is largely an illusion, shared even by the people who regard themselves as most free--an illusion at least to the extent that even our choices are pre-determined by forces outside ourselves interacting with responses and forces inside ourselves.

Whether we call such interacting forces systemic imperatives, or determinism, or blind chance, or fate, can sheer "will" overcome them? Clearly, contrasting two communities, of which one sits and passively accepts whatever happens, while the other exercises vigor and imagination in coping with, and shaping, events, it seems incontestable that vigor in the service of "will" can make some difference. But how much difference?

Can sheer will push a society to "success," even to primacy, despite substantial combinations of adverse pressures? Sometimes? Providing the counterpressures do not exceed some measurable limit? Can "will" push a society enough, at least, to avert failure? Sometimes? Can "will" overcome adverse pressures, no matter how great? Has "will" changed the inexorable course of history much? Compared to selection of correct policies, is the exercise of "will" more important? Can



any nation with great resources become Number One Nation primarily through the exercise of will?

The data so far available to answer these questions, one way or the other, are unconvincing and elusive. We are not knowledgeable enough yet to apply definitive judgements to theories of individual behavior, let alone to transfer them to contexts of the behavior of nations. So far, they emanate only enough of an aura of possibility that we should probably leave room for eventual emergence along the following lines: we do not know all or many principles by which to predict the behavior of another nation. We understand (partially) certain ways of influencing another nation's behavior to some degree; but we are far from being able to guarantee positive or negative responses that we desire. Much of every other nation's behavior, as well as of our own, will remain not only unpredictable but also unexplainable. Nations will continue, at times, to act in patterns of behavior that appear to others to be contrary to their own best interests, and that appear to violate various norms. Some other nations, even though such national responses are not unprecedented and have been discerned throughout history, will continue to be dismayed by behavior they cannot account for.

In effect, to employ a specific hypothesis, the people who are citizens of a political entity called Japan, for example, will continue to act as Japanese, acting out of the dynamics of their past and present; influenced by their unique combination of climate, resources, diet, and environment; according to the events and their perceptions of events occurring in their own past and in the world



outside; partly influenced by others, manipulable to a modest degree, largely not manipulable. They will doubtless continue to respond in relation to America in ways we partly do and partly do not understand, expect, and prefer.

Out of all this, we may derive a fairly reliable though modest principle that what we do can influence other nations only partly, not necessarily in ways of which we approve, and in ways largely beyond our understanding. In many respects, they will act as they will act, no matter what we do. Whether the determining influence in their behavior is some free choice or some combination of forces in their environment that operates with indifference toward us, we may come to accept that we, too, must act in our own interests and with the best insight we can muster. And we may wish to subscribe to a premise that there exists some rubric, some key concept, some approach to unlocking the mysteries of international behavior, if not of the universe; but there probably is no such key. And so, it is appropriate to resign ourselves to acceptance of that probability, but not to dismay. And among several interim guidelines, such as those suggested by Ray Cline, we keep our powder dry.

In relation to leading and managing, David McClelland and David Burnham differentiated among different types of managers. Some are entrepreneur-managers who are achievement-oriented; there are also two kinds of power-driven managers, a personal-power group and a group oriented toward social or institutional power. A fourth group are called "affiliative managers"; more than power, they want fellowship and being liked, and in the process they often cause confusion,



damage morale, and lower productivity.<sup>14</sup> As with a number of insights concerning individuals, which we can transfer to nations only with caution, we wonder whether some aspects of this categorization can be ascribed to nations in positions of primacy. As Number One Nation, which category does America fit?

As the incumbent of a position assailed by recurrent analogous pressures, the United States cannot afford to cloud its strategy or leadership with much sentiment, or with an overactive, gratuitous sense of guilt. A humanitarian approach--yes, of course; but sentimental, no. For the international arena is still primarily a context of power. One of the dangers of American unawareness of that fact would be the creation of unwanted confusion in the expectations of foreign leaders and nations toward American behavior. The world needs to rely on traits a great deal more important from the Number One Nation than fellowship and likableness.

Secretary of State Kissinger, referring to Latin American policy, indicated a general bearing for American behavior between sentiment and hegemony:

We don't expect agreement with all our views, but neither can we accept a new version of paternalism, in which those with obligations have no rights and those who claim rights accept no obligations.

The choice for the United States is not between domination and indifference. The choice for Latin America is not between submission and confrontation. Instead, we should steer between these extremes toward a new equilibrium.<sup>15</sup>

One reflects on sporadic attacks on the United States rooted in resentment of the fact that America is strong. But, among critics



who are not enemies, what would the attackers have--weakness? Of what value is alliance with, or dependence on, a weak superpower--a contradiction in terms? If the United States stands, certain other states may nevertheless fall; but if the United States falls, many other states are sure to fall with it, and much of the world will find it impossible to sustain any pattern of order other than totalitarian relationships. The fact is that, as men, nations, and international dynamics are currently constituted, there is no other acceptable candidate in sight for the position of Number One Nation than the United States.

Many are the prescriptions passionately advocated about what the United States should do, or the Communist nations, or the West, or the world. But then, one can often secure widespread agreement on what should be done, which is seldom much of a secret. The real challenge lies in finding out how to do it effectively, and in securing agreement on how.

#### Shooting the Rapids in the American Ship of State

We have cited, particularly in Chapter 6, a number of indicators of approaching change; some manifestations may wreak more disturbing change in our society than has yet occurred or than we expect. It seems quite possible, however, that by 1985 we shall be beset by a number of really profound changes whose approach has been discerned but whose full impact appears to be yet a few years away. As the result of the massive sums and massive efforts already expended, study, research, and turbulent forces are approaching the vicinity



of breakthroughs in certain activities--such as, for example, in nuclear proliferation, population and food pressures, energy shortage, unified theory of the earth, generation of fuel from water, or the development of a single cell into multivariate structures.<sup>16</sup> Some results will no doubt prove to be benign, but not all. Other problems, dilemmas, and crises loom, some along lines of pressure only lightly experienced so far. By 1985, the brief fuel shortage of 1973-1974 may seem in retrospect like a mere pinprick. New political forms, improved explanations of cancer and deviant behavior; solar power; revised terms for the media; restructuring of world food production and distribution; genetic manipulation via electricity or chemistry--these and many other possibilities coming to fruition within a short period of time may make the next decade a period of unprecedented perturbation. Analogous earlier experiences may provide few guidelines.

All agree, for example, that the arms race ought to be halted soon; the real problem is how to do it. We must, for example, substitute cooperation for competition. All right, but how do we do that? Rhetoric in UN speeches will not achieve such ends. Claiming to represent "what the American people want" is rarely persuasive, for on most occasions the speaker cites only his version of what "the people" want; and many other Americans are sure to want something different--perhaps, even the opposite.

What do America and Americans want? In several earlier passages, we have already given expression to various inspired (and some banal) perceptions of what is wanted, and we add a few more persuasive insights here.



George Ball says:

We want, by and large, what other advanced peoples want. We should like to be safe from attack and destruction. We should like to improve our material lot and have happy and interesting individual lives. At home we should like to see less crime, more social justice, cleaner rivers and skies and an end to racial inequality. In the lands beyond we should like to have as many friends and well-wishers as possible, but we have learned from history that a rich and powerful country like our own is more likely to be envied and feared than liked and admired.<sup>17</sup>

. . . A sense of priority dictates that we regard our vital interests--things that touch our very life and existence--as most heavily concentrated in the world's north temperate zone. This is where our strongest competitors and all of our most deadly enemies in this century have been located. That is the heartland of industrial might . . .<sup>18</sup>

Professors Cook and Moos put the matter this way:

The objectives of our society are to maximize the amount and variety of available consumer goods; to maximize the release of men's energies in producing them and to insure personal satisfactions in the process; and, finally, to provide the highest possible development and enjoyment of the moral, spiritual, and aesthetic capacities of all our members.<sup>19</sup>

Army General Edward Atkeson has abridged in bedrock form American strategic interests:

- First, the interest to which all others are related and on which, to greater or lesser extent, they all depend: internal and external physical security of the United States, and its dependencies;

- The security of certain other key countries and regions against Communist predators or groups of other predators (most of Western Europe and Japan are in this category, more or less permanently; other nations, for various reasons, become highly important



to American interests from decade to decade, but their identities are susceptible to change);

- Variable degrees of participation in maintenance of order in other selected areas of the world, so that they do not provide catalytic roles in spreading confrontation and conflict;

- Access to critical resources;

- Air and water transit rights through key places, providing open communication with allies, resources, and markets.<sup>20</sup>

D. W. Brogan observed:

. . . There is no hope at all in creating a world society whose unity is to be bought at the cost of sacrificing what the nations (the only communities that now exist) have painfully learned about themselves. Each nation will have its own handicaps to overcome, but this is given by the nature of the case. The American people can contribute to the world community only as Americans. As Americans they have much to give, materially and spiritually: a well-founded optimism about their own possibilities; a well-founded belief that some of the problems of unity in the absolute essentials, combined with diversity in all departments of life where diversity is possible, have been solved in the American historical experience.<sup>21</sup>

We should have learned that neither individuals nor collectivities are saintly or wise because they are poor and weak, that they are not any better or wiser than the strong, than those exercising power responsibility--possibly not as good or as wise. There is no logical (or mystical) justification or obligation for America to apologize for not being poor or weak. High on America's list of priority themes should be refusal to concede the role cultivated for America by Marxists: guilt. In comparison with the record of any other nation on earth, the United States has little reason to succumb to



feelings of guilt, nor any reason to indulge in masochism over allegations of injustice by idealists, enviers, neurotics, and ideologues.

It is obvious that the degree of American preeminence has declined, but not that the condition of preeminence has declined irreparably. As Raymond Aron, Michael Howard, and others (including some Americans) have expressed it: "American power has reached its zenith and apparently passed it." In this paper, we have presented a few indicators of what may turn out to be mileposts of incipient decline. Drew Middleton, for example, has published a book entitled Can America Win the Next War? in which the author's misgivings about America's current lack of cohesion and political will lead him to conclude that popular support could not be mustered for anything less than a direct attack on the United States.<sup>22</sup> Yet such clues may turn out to be indicators of temporary dips in condition rather than of permanent decline.

By now we and the rest of the world should be well aware of American resilience. Is evidence unequivocal that the indicated decline is more than a temporary reversal of an upward trend? Will this incipient decline become irreversible? It is too soon to tell. Those predicting dire outcomes can no more predict the future successfully than can optimists.

In any event, any nation rated as overall Number One will doubtless (as we have clearly shown) also rank Number One in numerous important activities, though not in everything. In many aspects and activities of life, it does not really matter much which nation has the fastest or the highest or which does the most, nor is the



Number One Nation called on to do anything, one way or the other, about primacy in many miscellaneous activities. In some endeavors, it is enough to be near the top of the list, or at least, not to be near the bottom.

Cook and Moss have observed that Americans, in certain ways, do not appraise the meaningfulness of their lives solely in national terms; they do not put all their eggs in their own "nation-state" basket:

In general, Americans have rejected outright the idea of a nation as a real super-being, endowed with independent life and interests, as they have well-nigh escaped the European concept of the state. Certainly the idea that men should be sacrificed to the one or the other, or to the two in combination, is repulsive to them; as is the view that public authorities are the primary force in the formulation of concepts of national interest.<sup>23</sup>

. . . the American experience gives little warrant, as the great ethical systems give no sanction, to a concept of national interest based on those doctrines which hold that the state is a super-being, whether as the locus of perfected reason or as a quasi-biological super organism.<sup>24</sup>

. . . The peculiar conception of the American self is a product of a long-lived individualism, of local community, of the open horizons associated with the frontier, and of the vast range in place and in ways of living of the American adventure. It reflects, commemorates, and preserves the pluralistic diversity of a variegated environment populated by persons and groups of highly diverse origins and experience.<sup>25</sup>

The American regards his government as an instrument designed for his use and convenience. But unlike those Europeans who share this view, he does not attain a simple monistic view of national interest by making the state his central symbol of loyalty and identification.

It is for such reasons that the American nation may properly be called social, rather than narrowly political. American loyalty tends rather to center around institutions, from the family outward; around regions, sections and scenery, and ways of life; around personal freedom and



enterprise; and around neighborliness. These interests may be loosely summed up as the much-vaunted American way of life . . . glory and aggrandizement of the nation-state are not, for Americans, synonymous with national interest.<sup>26</sup>

. . . National interest is of necessity the inescapable criterion of policy. To argue that politics, internal or international, ought to be conducted in disregard of the national interest or in opposition to it would be nonsensical, and would involve internal contradiction, logical or psychological. But the view which holds that national interest is a purely self-regarding matter and is to be conceived and pursued without respect for other nations is equally erroneous and equally nonsensical. The power and purposes of other peoples should not be treated merely as terms in an equation for our solution, and as of no moral concern to us. Our national interest is not simply to generate power and use force for ends peculiar to ourselves. It is misguided for us to neglect or minimize the interests we share with others, or to look on such sharing as chance and temporary consonance of power objectives only.

Unfortunately, defenders of a narrow realism in foreign policy have tried to monopolize the term "national interest," and to equate it with tough-minded unconcern for the well-being of other peoples.<sup>27</sup>

. . . in practice our interests cannot be realized by parochial narrowness, by selfish exclusiveness, or by a power which relies on force as its primary instrument. Success in struggles between Powers, and the achievement of ascendancy among them through fear and compulsion, are not America's interest as a people. Rather, we must offer and freely export to others our own values, and, insofar as we may, means to pursue and realize them, without any attempt at imposition. We must bid for world leadership on the ground that we represent a moral order and purpose which, by reason of its own binding logic, imposes no dogma and demands no conformity beyond commitment to the method of freedom.<sup>28</sup>

. . . A great nation, endowed with power and forced into leadership, can retain its position and secure its values only by making that power the servant of morality. Its appeal and its promise must be universal. Its authority in the world must be grounded in principled function serviceable to others as well as itself, rather than in protected privilege. In this sense, the American national interest is international.<sup>29</sup>



. . . As a nation, our principle of international interest is not power or empire over others, nor enforced hegemony among them. . . .

Senator Edmund S. Muskie is one who rejects the idea that America is declining; the image of a fading America, he says, is "so much scare talk." Yet, he said, Americans must live with the realization that they cannot manage world politics through traditional techniques of force, foreign aid, covert conspiracies, or grand alliances. This may be the place to observe that many Americans are obviously well-informed and well-disposed toward increased international cooperation. As of February 1976, for example, Harland Cleveland reports that, as a Bicentennial event, some 128 members of the United States Congress had signed an international "Declaration of Interdependence."<sup>30</sup>

#### A Measure of Potential Redirections

Thus, insofar as we can perceive clearly what must be done, and bring ourselves to do it, we shall need to perceive and appraise ever more clearly, not only the rest of the world, but also ourselves.<sup>31</sup> Some of our most dearly treasured beliefs, even about ourselves, may need profound adjustment.

To illustrate the extent of adjustments that may be required in some of our perceptions, let us consider the "standard" American reaction to the social and economic doctrine known as socialism. As Bloomfield points out, there is nothing in the Constitution requiring us to oppose all socialist states. Some Americans have suffered fits, quakes, and seizures at the mere spectre, or mention of the very word,



socialism. They have denounced it as a concept of the Devil, capable of undermining the very "foundations of American life." Among other questionable aspects of this reaction, it appears to consider the "foundations of American life" as being dangerously weak.

In reality, socialism and communism arose out of the same idealistic, humanitarian, Judeo-Graeco-Roman-Christian roots as Christianity and capitalism. They are all theories proposing at bottom the betterment of the human condition. None is evil in itself, although distortions, facades, and extremism in the name of one or the other may be evil; capitalism, like the others, possesses a capability for evil if not closely monitored. Each has advantages and disadvantages. Neither has any monopoly on virtue. In fact, each has now splintered into so many sub-types that it tells little to merely categorize any nation as "capitalist" or "socialist." In real life in real countries, capitalism and socialism have each absorbed aspects of the other.

America, for example, has institutionalized a number of practices that surfaced first in socialist contexts, but have since been incorporated into American statutes. Why do a number of Americans hate to admit this? Perhaps, because socialism is closely associated with social planning; so that, even as we are forced by world-system pressures, to engage in social planning ourselves, we feel impelled to invoke long-standing American rhetoric and denounce socialism because, among other characteristics, it explicitly engages in national planning. In reality, all modern enterprises--nations, businesses, churches, families--engage in planning. At the same time, even the Soviets have found it ineffective to withhold differential incentives and



rewards, because they are allegedly capitalistic, in order to distinguish differences in performance and for designating stratifications familiar in all societies.

Daniel Moynihan has pointed out<sup>32</sup> how socialism has spread vigorously among the new states, primarily ex-British colonies. Of 87 new states joining the UN since the charter members effected its foundation, more than half--47--had been part of the British Empire. In a special role amidst the world's most influential (British) culture between 1890 and 1950, the students who flocked to the imperial city, London, were in large numbers "captured" by British Socialism (the London School of Economics has been called the most important institution of higher learning in Asia and Africa).<sup>33</sup> As many Americans recoiled from the very thought of socialism, one strong characteristic of British socialists (not all of them, and certainly not all Britons) was anti-Americanism, more pronounced than anti-Sovietism.<sup>34</sup> In the perceptions of such ideologues, America was seen as pushy and capitalist--the synonym for exploitative. Among other results, there are hundreds of Third World representatives, as well as social documents in United Nations channels, which are suffused with a neo-authoritarian, socialist, anti-American bias.<sup>35</sup>

So far, insists Moynihan and other analysts, socialism has proved to be a poor system for the production of wealth (satisfactory for redistribution, but not for production). Even so, British socialists have not known how to redistribute income effectively, and have not been able to do so in Britain.<sup>36</sup> Some of the basic arguments over the merits and defects of socialism and capitalism are rooted



in the more fundamental argument over freedom vs equality. Socialism tends to give priority to equality; yet, curiously, as reported by William Buckley, an Israeli socialist expressed the opinion that those societies which have put liberty ahead have done better by equality than those which put equality first.<sup>37</sup>

It should be noted, as Joseph Schumpeter remarked, that the humanist spirit emerged along with capitalist principles. Capitalism, he observed, is unlike any other type of society, in that, by the very logic of its civilization, it creates, permits, and subsidizes a highly critical social spirit which directs withering criticism even at itself.

One reflects that socialism, similar to though less fanatical than capital-C-Communism, envisions social progress for the benefit of all; like all other social doctrines, it continually talks about sharing benefits for the masses, for everyone; yet, universally, it insists on doing by conferring control (of the means of production, etc.) on some small group--the Party, or the "elite," or the regime. Whatever is the form in which it appears, and however egalitarian and all-inclusive is the flavor of its rhetoric, some small group is to be entrusted with the Holy Grail, with control according to some Revealed Truth of ideology. Capitalism is vastly more untidy, full of groups constantly checking and balancing each other, working out pragmatic (if short-lived) exchange agreements for living together.

One need not swallow socialism (certainly not the Communist version) whole in order to accord it reasonable respect. We need to recognize, for example, that every advanced nation, including our



friends and allies, has either been governed by a Socialist Party or has seen the Socialist Party as the principal and loyal opposition. One notes that one small mixed-but-largely-socialist nation, Sweden (possibly the exception that proves the rule), has recently passed the USA in a single-year standing in GNP per capita. Some of us seem unaware that in a number of countries, the most effective, most dedicated principal adversaries of the Communists have been the Socialists.

Xenophobic and reactionary assertions that socialism is a corrupt and evil system indicate enormous contempt for other peoples; it implies (or asserts) that adoption of socialist systems testifies to the stupidity and venality of foreign peoples, incapable of understanding (as Americans do) what political and economic principles are in their own best interests.

Equally mindless are denigrations of the capitalist system by Third World or other nations in anti-American, anti-capitalist diatribes, especially when they come for assistance, for benefits, to the same capitalist countries. Where else could they expect appreciable help? The socialist countries have relatively little help to give. Thus, some denouncers of capitalism seek gratuitously to share some of the very fruits that have materialized out of those very same "corrupt" capitalist systems.

In any event, we may need greater tolerance and understanding than we have shown in our past dealings with socialist nations. After all, we are deluding ourselves if we refuse to recognize that our system is already partly socialistic, having incorporated, like



Bismarck, some of the socialists' best ideas (as socialist and communist systems have incorporated some of the best ideas of capitalism). To become hysterical and denunciatory about socialism is to imply, at least, that most of the other nations in the world, including the capitalist nations (e.g., Germany, United Kingdom, France, Japan) that have entrusted socialist parties with their government, must be stupid, unable to discern their real interests, sort out priorities, and organize their affairs in their best interests. Such an implication does not normally lubricate relations between states.

What we have been discussing, of course, are primarily socialist regimes, not necessarily socialist-oriented societies. What we normally hear are the spokesmen, not for societies, but for regimes. In this connection, Peter Berger's observation is particularly telling: "The 'mythic' appeal of socialism is enormously powerful throughout the world--except in socialist societies."<sup>38</sup>

We need not fawn on socialist doctrine or defer to it, while granting it respect. We may not choose to absorb that doctrine, but we do not have to diabolize it. Karl Deutsch recalls one analyst who labels capitalism and socialism as merely "two competitive forms of ignorance." Yet capitalism has seemed highly congenial to American civilization and has served America (and others) remarkably well, especially over the past century, during which more progress, more innovation, and more prosperity have been provided for more people via capitalistic systems than via any other during the world's history. A single indicator suffices here: the entire "Socialist" World to



this day accounts for only about 10% of world trade, and East-West trade for about 5% more. The steady expansion of world trade over the past 25 years has been essentially a triumph of the capitalist societies.

As Secretary of Commerce Rogers Morton said in 1975:

. . . all those good things are not to be found under a cabbage leaf, nor are they dropped down the chimney by the stork. They come from business making a sufficient rate of profit to reinvest in plant and equipment and to attract external capital.<sup>39</sup>

In truth, contemplating the record of growth under capitalistic systems, one wonders why so many new states choose to extol, if not employ, socialist systems rather than capitalistic systems. There are a number of possible reasons, about which we may speculate in passing:

- To be sure, capitalistic systems require capital to get started; and new, poor, weak states have difficulty attracting capital. Still, capital beginnings are required in all systems.

- There is a highly perverse element in the totalitarian claim that social justice is reflected in "social stability," meaning the absence of social ferment. (We have cited earlier a United Nations "World Social Report," in which the USSR, because social protest is absent in that repressive totalitarian state, emerges as "the just state"!)

It is one of the enduring moral paradoxes of communism that it arrogates to itself a right to intervene in other societies in support of "wars of national liberation," but brutally represses within its own borders the slightest incipient gesture towards the liberation of its own people.



In this connection, one recalls Joseph Schumpeter's identification of one of the uniquenesses of capitalism:

. . . unlike any other type of society, capitalism inevitably and by virtue of the very logic of its civilization creates, educates, and subsidizes a vested interest in social unrest.<sup>40</sup>

On the other hand, as Robert G. Wesson has commented, Marxism in general arouses a favorable response in emerging nations because it justifies their blaming their disadvantaged positions on the "greed" of "imperialist" nations, and because it promises a utopian leap into the future; for "the logic of history" is alleged to reside in the socialist cause<sup>41</sup> (In this connection, one recalls the disastrous "Great Leap Forward" in China in the mid-1960's).

- Socialism is an idealistic concept, yes. To this author, however, it also seems to be, in the end, an elitist concept, another in a succession of doctrines that have asserted that the people's interests are paramount, but that a special group (the Socialist Party) possesses a conceptual Holy Grail which entitles the party to monopoly in the determination of just what are the people's interests, and which insists that the Party (not the people themselves) must be entrusted with government in the best interests of the people. No doubt, the people's interests do receive much emphasis. Still, well-entrenched elites in developing countries, forced to choose some modern system, choose one with a high content of rhetoric about the people's interests but with provision for the actual exercise of control (usually in the name of order and social stability) by a dedicated custodial group. This cosmetic change may be perpetuating



the same old elite under the new guise of "the Socialist Party." Doubtless, such a transfer of power is no simple matter, and this explanation may possess only partial or little validity. Still, one wonders, especially as one speculates about the possibility of improvement in relations between the Number One Nation and other, especially new, nations.

National attitude toward foreign socialism is only one subject among many that appear to be suitable candidates for possible rethinking and revision. A few such candidates that suggest themselves are control of multinational corporations, linkages of foreign trade with domestic policy, widespread possession of guns, control of communications media, capital punishment, accountability of intelligence agencies, off-shore exploitation of the oceans and seabeds, participation in international peacekeeping forces, allocation of energy-related resources, channeling foreign aid, arms sales, transnational pollution, utility of international organizations, and many others.

Many American values and attitudes will endure as being still sound and competent to cope with the future. But few, if any, can be assumed to be still eminently serviceable unless they survive reappraisal. After all, it is trite to observe, the past is over and will never again (except, perhaps, vicariously) challenge us. However proud and grateful Americans may be as we bask in the results achieved by our precursors whose past methods worked out well, our first priority must go, not to preserving or perpetuating any particular method from the past, but to evolving methods, whether they



preserve or destroy familiar beliefs, that will be the most effective in the future. Considering the extent of change in progress, it is reasonable to expect radical change in some methods, and in some traditional beliefs. If some traditional procedures seem to retain validity, to be still the most useful, it makes good sense to hold on to them. As for others that may have worked well for 200 years but now seem overtaken by more modern techniques, out they should go, whatever ideological or sentimental label is attached to them.

We must not fall victim to propaganda, even our own. We must not become prisoners of anti-socialist or any other brand of folklore. As the past constantly falls behind us, we cannot forget what we were, what we used to be; but, on balance, we must be more concerned with what we shall become. And though we cannot know precisely what that will be, we intermittently discern glimmers as we are constantly changing in approaching the unknown future; and our priority must go to making the future work.

#### Diagnoses and Prognoses

Harlan Cleveland, former ambassador, university president, and assistant secretary of State, asked in September 1975 about "Our Coming Foreign-Policy Crisis":

Two-thirds of the world wants a fairer shake in the distribution of material riches. Will America react with sympathy or truculence?<sup>42</sup>

This question reintroduces echoes of earlier themes that it is America that is principally responsible for the well-being of itself and two-thirds of the world, besides. We shall dispose summarily



of that dilemma (having already discussed it earlier) and pass to consideration of a number of alternatives open to America in dealing with the rest of the world, of which the prototype procedures are sure to be, in many important ways, those that deal with the varied nations of the Third World.

Professor Irving Kristol has underlined one approach to the Third World:

There is always a good case, in both principle and prudence, for the more affluent being charitable toward the poor--even to those whose poverty is largely their own fault. Nor is there any reason to expect, much less insist on, gratitude: Such benevolence is supposed to be its own reward. But when the poor start "mau-mauing" their actual or potential benefactors, when they begin vilifying them, insulting them, demanding as of right what it is not their right to demand--then one's sense of self-respect may properly take precedence over one's self-imposed humanitarian obligations. If the United States is to gain the respect of world opinion, it first has to demonstrate that it respects itself--its own institutions, its own way of life, the political and social philosophy that is the basis of its institutions and its way of life.<sup>43</sup>

In relation to exporting democracy, the record is mixed. As we have seen, a number of influential Americans have approached other nations in a missionary spirit, but the prevailing spirit of American exchange has been live-and-let-live coupled with curiosity and exploratory vigor. It is unlikely that the United States, beyond the influence of self-spreading American culture, will undertake to proselytize other peoples unduly on the virtues of the American way.

Nevertheless, it should not be lost sight of that there is a positive relationship between American security and the expansion of democracy in the world, and in a corresponding decline in the world, of



authoritarianism, paternalism, totalitarianism, and anti-democratic elitism. Since democracies appear to have been distinctly in the minority in the activity of generating and initiating wars, for example, it is possible that the spread of genuine democracy will be accompanied by a decline in the incidence of war.

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) provides an example of states exploiting special leverage against others in their own interests (even by Third World states against their "brothers"--other Third World States). One eminent scholar has suggested that the United States consider the establishment of "OFEC" and "OTEC," implying the possibility of the United States' exploiting two of its transcendent advantages: food-production and technology. In any event, as earlier discussions of offensive and defensive options toward Third World nations have suggested, there is no reason why the United States, even if it refrains from offensive programs, should not defend itself firmly, even vigorously, in the United Nations or any other forum. Defense should be as skillful as possible, and as firm as necessary; but, except tactically, it may lose more than it gains by going on the offense, seeking out opportunities to deprecate or denounce.

Professor Bloomfield recommends a number of meritorious underlying assumptions, or premises, as foundations for United States policy. The first should be the highest value for Americans and the pace-setter for all the other premises:

1. Neither states nor ideology nor things, but people, represent the highest value for American policy.<sup>44</sup>



The others follow logically:

2. The balance-of-power mechanism still keeps the peace.
3. Hostile or incompatible forces remain in the world.
4. Military power remains relevant to some--but by no means all--national strategies.
5. The United States has an influential world role, but no God-given mandate.
6. The risk of nuclear war cannot be tolerated indefinitely.
7. Worldwide strivings for economic, social, and racial equality (not to mention strivings for superior advantage) will intensify, creating new instabilities.
8. International conflicts are likely to continue, and some of them will endanger a wider peace.
9. The major forces affecting human life on the planet are increasingly trans-national; in order to confine them to constructive channels, they require purposeful steps toward world order.
10. A policy is not established as good merely because it is ours but only because it is right.<sup>45</sup>

Bloomfield suggests four simple tests for self-application to any foreign policy proposed for us:

Is it strategically important?

Is it politically feasible or viable?

Is it cost effective?

And finally: Is it humane?<sup>46</sup>

A number of such thoughtful recommendations amount to advice about alternatives, mostly suggesting that the United States avoid



attempting to direct world affairs itself (the cards are pretty well stacked against this), or attempting to engage in a limited concert (say, with Western Europe, the USSR, China, and Japan) for purposes of world direction. Klaus Knorr suggests:

The ability to act as an international leader may . . . rest on a blending of coercive and noncoercive influence. Or in the complete absence of coercion, a state may lead on the basis of several shared values, e.g., information, expertise, and trust. . . . The choice of means, however, depends not only on their availability to government and on the expected cost and efficacy of their employment. It depends also on the character of past relationships between states.<sup>47</sup>

For the interests of the people of this nation are inescapably international.

We must make clear that the concept of our international interest signifies no lack of concern for American well-being. Rather, it emphasizes the fact that such well-being rests on a positive participation and leadership in world affairs. For the sake of success we cannot, as in morals we should not, treat other nations as means only. We must discover a principle by which to steer between ruthless power politics on the one hand and naively utopian unrealism on the other.<sup>48</sup>

Bloomfield calls for "policies of greater cooperation and economic equity." Brzezinski recommends balance:

In that new setting, we must be responsive both to the more traditional political problems and to the new planetary issues--in effect, a combination of 'power realism' and of 'planetary humanism.' . . .

At the same time, we must also try to exercise whatever leverage we have in our possession, including food, to obtain greater cooperation from other major powers in dealing with the new global problems. Détente with the Soviet Union will become pointless (and primarily beneficial to the Soviet Union alone) if the Soviet Union is permitted to maintain a stance of self-centered egotism in respect to the new and increasingly urgent global problems. . . .



The above arguments are designed to outline, obviously in a highly condensed fashion, a policy of 'cooperative activism' as an alternative to a posture of confrontation with two-thirds of mankind. Such confrontation would inevitably strengthen the present tendencies toward domestic isolationism, increased division, and historical pessimism. The necessary precondition for such a policy is a sense of confidence and optimism. In politics, pessimism tends to be a self-fulfilling prophecy, and pessimism is incompatible with the democratic system. The very notion of democracy involves confident and hopeful assumptions about the future of social change.<sup>49</sup>

The eminent British historian of Eastern Europe, Hugh Seton-Watson, penned reasonable advice several years ago:

It may be unoriginal to argue that the West can only 'be patient and strong,' handle its own social and national problems on their merits, watch for every opportunity of influencing the Communist regimes in the direction of freedom, deal fairly with the uncommitted nations, and keep an open mind. If there are ready-made 'solutions' which are better than this, then I shall be happy, and so will the whole human race, to learn what they are. But if such panaceas do not exist, denunciations for unoriginality do not seem to be very helpful.<sup>50</sup>

There has been exhibited much discussion, hand-wringing, and genuine concern in the past two decades on nuclear equations--on supremacy, superiority, sufficiency, and so on. No doubt, it was necessary to go through the experience as the reality (and the included aspect of unreality) of the equations changed. Those faced with responsibility for coping with these dilemmas were subject to outbursts of frustration, such as Kissinger unleashed on one occasion:

What in the name of God is strategic superiority?  
What is the significance of it politically, militarily,  
operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you  
do with it?<sup>51</sup>

Concerning arguments that the United States should aim for something less than equality in strategic posture, as a vague "concession," Paul Nitze asked:



Why shouldn't the United States be entitled to equality? Is not inferiority the opposite of superiority? What degree of inferiority is it proposed that the United States accept? Is a deterrent posture such as that of the French adequate? What is the probable political effect of various degrees of recognized inferiority? What would be the effect of such inferiority upon the quality and thus the prospect of war? What could the effect be should deterrence fail? Is inferiority more tolerable in the absence of agreement than if ratified by agreement?<sup>52</sup>

In just over the past eleven years, fully half of the members of the United Nations have suffered at least one violent change in government. America's record is, relatively speaking, one of great stability. As the "party of liberty," in some respects "representing" the few (28 or 29, Moynihan said in the UN on December 17, 1975) democracies existing in the world, the United States has no reason to concede disadvantage in this particular equation of power. Nitze's argument appears irrefutable.

Is America the best nation? This was not a question to be investigated here. It is not perfect; to this parochial author, it is the best of which I have knowledge, but there are great voids in my knowledge. But what is best for one may be merely satisfactory, or unsatisfactory, for another. Let us leave the question open, each to answer for himself, and to himself. Still, among democratic societies, as Daniel Moynihan asked, does anyone know of a better one?

In commenting upon America's Number One Nation, perhaps one should at least acknowledge, in passing, one meaningless category: the "might-have-been-otherwises." A specific representative assertion would be: "the US might have done better." Of course it might have,



but it might have done worse. Or, another representative assertion could be: "Another nation might have done more with America's opportunities." True, though unlikely; fortunately or unfortunately, they didn't get the chance.

The world is not as it might have been, nor yet as it might be, but exclusively and totally as it is. As to whether the United States deserves its primacy or does not deserve its primacy, the question is moot. Over time, the United States took many steps and made many positive and negative choices which, in retrospect and on average, appear to have enhanced America's accession to primacy. However, in relation to any nation, it is impossible to determine whether or not the net effects of its policies have been primacy-inducing or primacy-retarding, let alone whether they have been good or bad in some meaningful sense; such ambiguity applies with full force to America as Number One Nation. Nor does the question of whether America has justly earned the position (or, as somewhat variant assessment: whether it is worthy of the position) does not seem to exercise any large proportion of people, either in the United States or in foreign countries.

Some provocative questions emerge from time to time; they may lead to some interesting kinds of metaphysical speculation, but otherwise they seem somewhat frivolous for they cannot be answered. For example, which nations have produced the greatest men, or the most great men? During which periods, and in what fields? Who can say?



Is there some way to establish that one country's political structure or culture or pattern of generational relations is superior to another's? Can it be argued persuasively that one nation should adapt its patterns to those of a different nation? Is the United States a better society than others? Is it a better nation than any other nation? Than most other nations? Than all other nations? Does anyone want to argue such issues?

Rather than rail fruitlessly against such unexplainable and irreversible phenomena as relative worthiness of leading nations, it may be a more fruitful choice for other nations to act in accordance with some Olympian conclusion that advises, simply: "America is there; learn to cope with it so long as it is there."

For the United States, in return, it seems prudent indeed to conclude that other nations are also as they are, and not necessarily as they should be. All have strengths and weaknesses; graces and gaucheries; advantages and disadvantages; moralities, immoralities, and amoralities; successes and failures; virtues and faults. Of assistance in the avoidance of hubris is the self-assurance that none, including oneself, has any monopoly of virtue.

From what has been said so far in earlier chapters of this study, any attempt to summarize in a few sentences must be superficial. Still, a few capsule points seem to stand out:

a. Man's desires are infinite, and his attempts to realize them relentless. The attempts concentrate preponderantly though not exclusively upon the struggle over power.



b. All men and nations are partly like all others, partly like some others, and partly like no others.

c. America, partly unique, has achieved preeminence firmly, though not exclusively, rooted in the context of power, not much in the context of sentiment.

d. Americans have worked hard and effectively in the process of attaining international preeminence, and other factors have influenced this outcome. To be sure, other peoples have also worked hard.

e. Hierarchy and inequality, among complex networks of collective characteristics, are endemic to the human condition; until world government is universally and thoroughly accepted, there will always be some nation identifiable as Number One.

f. Despite the rise of strong competitors, such as international organizations and multinational corporations, the nation-state will not soon disappear as the primary actor in international contexts. Neither the United States nor any other nation is likely to be accorded by other nations some singular superstatus involving some consensual "grant" of international authority. The term "superpower" should not mislead anyone into appraising or expecting the international status of any nation, at least through another generation, to be other than that of a nation-state, fundamentally identical to that of every other sovereign, independent nation-state. Whatever any nation aspires to achieve, it will have to proceed in unrelenting awareness that it is a nation-state in a world of sovereign equals.



g. Whether the United States does or does not deserve its current Number One status, with more or less justification than one or more other nations, is moot, constituting a fruitless argument.

h. As the Number One Nation in an anarchic world, the United States, beyond its own direct interests, also legitimately bears some responsibility (not normally or readily specifiable as to kind, scope, and intensity) for the maintenance of international order.

i. Conflict between nations is not likely to disappear in our lifetimes, and neither America nor any concert of nations will succeed in eliminating conflict soon. More likely to be functionally profitable will be the study of the management of conflict--how to reduce its ravages to the feasible minimum.

j. The possession of great power and the employment of it with restraint appear to constitute the most prudent formula for a responsible Number One Nation to follow.

k. Having analyzed problem situations with fairness and due sensitivity toward the legitimate interests of other parties, the United States should proceed calmly towards its chosen objectives, despite calumnies and invectives. Successful, stable performance of critical roles, such as the role of Number One Nation, is impossible without healthy exercise of self-confidence in employment of whatever means turn out to be necessary.

Concerning international interactions potentially involving the United States as nation-state actor (whether as leader, participant, follower, partner, hegemon, primus inter pares, or Number One



Nation), it may provide some useful intellectual and emotional perspectives to suggest that:

(1) there are some international problem-situations in which, for a variety of reasons, improvement cannot be expected unless the United States participates. Although this category includes many minor bilateral and multilateral situations, it will also include the most crucial issues in broad international contexts.

(2) there are some problem-situations which can be improved by the participation of any superpower or major power; but improvement is not contingent upon that participant's being the United States;

(3) there are some problem-situations which can, at best, be only marginally improved (and at worst, adversely affected) by United States participation.

(4) there are some international problem-situations which can be influenced by the United States only if there exists some minimal international consensus that the United States should be invited, for whatever reasons, to play a special (and transient) international role. Such a consensus would seem to provide a normal basis for United States entry into almost all of such situations as it decides to enter. In the absence of such a consensus, the United States cannot realistically expect that its intervention will be likely to influence resolution constructively, or that its intervention will be welcome.

(5) it is in the nature of relations among nations that, from time to time, problem situations will arise involving direct



American interests or precarious international interests, which, despite indifference or objections by certain other nations, the United States should and will enter in some form of activity, at some level of performance. Each such entry is likely to raise apprehension in a number of other nations and to strengthen negative aspects of the American image abroad; therefore, such entries should be undertaken only rarely, only in connection with issues that are genuinely crucial, only if there is no satisfactory alternative, and only when accompanied by candid explanation.

(6) there are some international problem-situations to which there are no real solutions, no matter who participates. Some are perennials, not likely ever to disappear from the human agenda. Certain others may resolve themselves eventually, but not for another generation or another century. The only useful guidelines concerning such problems is to learn to live with them.



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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A



(7) One occasionally sees a framed advisory on the wall of a bureaucrat's office, as follows: "I cannot give you a formula for success, but I can give you one formula for failure: try to please everybody." America will doubtless have to take account of this principle in relation to certain problems, namely, those problems for which no solution proves satisfactory to many, or any, others. After reasonable efforts to consult others legitimately involved (even "going the extra mile," if necessary) the United States may have to go ahead and, if possible, do what it feels it must do, whether in that circumstance approval is extended by all, many, most, some, or none.

#### Summary Prescriptions

Free nations, in general, are not aggressors. Among the not-free nations, several would be aggressors if they could, and some already are. The gravest challenge to other free nations and to America remains the Communist movement, particularly the aggregated physical power under the control of the Soviet Union. Despite a number of qualifying exigencies emerging over the past decade, the Communist movement, as its thrusts in Southeast Asia, South Africa, and the Middle East demonstrate, intends to take over as many parcels of neutral and free polities as it can, steadily reducing the total strength of free-world nations and eventually diminishing the strength of America and its capability of helping other free nations to defend themselves and, eventually, of defending itself. Rosy anticipations



that the Communist movement has mellowed or will abandon its expansionism voluntarily are marks of perverse gullibility or unrequited sentimentality. No matter how jaded, or bored, or surfeited, or impatient, or disbelieving we become toward the requirement for steady and clear-eyed recognition of the Communist dynamic, we must keep re-awakening ourselves as long as is necessary. They are determined to outlast us; and they apparently believe, in mid-1976, that the momentum of international preponderance is swinging to their side. It is not. Only if we exhaustedly concede to their endurance can they exploit their imaginary momentum. We must rededicate ourselves to outlast them.



Reflecting upon available superpower styles of dealing with other nations, John Scali, Chief United States Delegate to the United Nations at the time, said in early 1975:

Resolving the current trend toward division and confrontation in the United Nations does not depend on our efforts alone. I am convinced, however, that we must walk the extra mile to overcome suspicion. We are not the guardians of the status quo . . . <sup>53</sup>

It may appear old-fashioned but not yet inappropriate, in exploring styles of leadership from a position of primacy in the modern world, to cite Robert E. Lee's "Definition of a Gentleman" (perhaps substituting for "gentleman" a term such as "leading nation"):

The forbearing use of power does not only form a touchstone, but the manner in which an individual enjoys certain advantages over others is a test of a true gentleman.

The power which the strong have over the weak, the employer over the employed, the educated over the unlettered, the experienced over the confiding, even the clever over the silly--the forbearing or inoffensive use of all this power or authority, or a total abstinence from it when the case admits it, will show the gentleman in a plain light. The gentleman does not needlessly and unnecessarily remind an offender of a wrong he may have committed against him. He cannot only forgive, he can forget; and he strives for that nobleness of self and mildness of character which impart sufficient strength to let the past be but the past. A true man of honor feels humbled himself when he cannot help humbling others.

George Ball recommends a reasonable stance:

I would not, therefore, want us to put aside our exuberance altogether--merely to temper it with both practical and conceptual thought. For while exuberance can get us into trouble, it can also be an attractive, magnetic quality, and it would, in fact, be tragic if we Americans were suddenly to become too cautious and restrained; if we were ever wholly to lose the brash, fresh vision of Candide--the ability to see through sham and injustice and still build a better world--as we grow up amid stern tests and dry, hard, humorless tasks.



The years ahead are largely opaque and we shall have to steer by the stars and our innate good sense. There is no prophet to foresee clearly where science, and exploding population, and a senseless arms race may lead. But optimism is still our great national asset, and we will do well to believe that we can solve these problems as we have solved others before.<sup>54</sup>

Still a simple but powerful candidate for sensible "rules of engagement" in these uncertain and dangerous times is Theodore Roosevelt's great line: "Walk softly, but carry a big stick."

In trying to articulate a reasonable concept of what constitutes acceptable behavior for the mixed-reality-and-fiction that is an entire nation, especially a superpower, many analogies to personal behavior seem far-fetched and forced. Yet some, if not relied on too literally, shed some illumination. Thus, we might consider the position of primacy, being Number One among nations, loosely analogous to being preeminent among persons--such as president, pope, emperor, or prime minister. Such persons are said to bear an extra burden of loneliness and isolation because they sit alone at the summit, the apex. The position is sometimes said to deserve great sympathy on this score. While there is something in it, this appraisal is sometimes overdone. One four-star Air Force general is said to have refused a dinner invitation from fellow officers with this response: "A man should have dinner with his friends, and the commanding general has no friends."<sup>55</sup>

For this author, that response smacks of masochism and even self-pity. The Number One Nation can hardly expect to impress other nations by gloating; but equally harmful to maintaining the respect



and confidence of other nations would be self-pity and egocentric posturing as heavy-laden. America need not, as Number One Nation, be friendless--and, indeed, is far from being so.

It may enlighten and reassure many Americans to learn that there is far more understanding abroad of the exigencies pressing on America (i.e., of the demands made on the Number One Nation) than many Americans think there is, or than some may want to acknowledge. There appears to be, at times, even considerable sympathy. When the United States follows its national interest, with reasonable regard for world order and the legitimate interests of others, this course is understood and readily accepted by many abroad.

As for the others, many would not accept whatever the United States did.

Some aspects of endorsement (or at least tolerance) are tacit, unexpressed, or expressed quietly as "not raising serious objections." In that sense at least, the United States receives considerable positive endorsement in many corners of the globe. If such endorsement is selective, it still adds up to a substantial total. On many issues, the United States can afford to move ahead, depending upon such support, explicit and implicit. As Lord Bryce predicted a century ago, and Jean Francois Revel only a half-decade ago, the rest



of the world seems destined to undergo at some subsequent stage the same internal stresses and ferment that afflict the United States at any one time; i.e., the United States, not only because of its size but also because of the kind of society it is, is destined to be the frontrunner as the experimental society occupying the position of primacy for some time to come.

One French writer, Albert Memmi, described a recent television discussion by French and American intellectuals on American life and civilization. He first mentioned that French attacks on America merely join a "worldwide chorus; the entire world seems to be anti-American." In the TV discussion, the French members initially ganged up on everything American, while the Americans good-humoredly admitted the legitimacy of some criticisms but denied any general decline in American vigor and success. Abruptly, the tone changed; suddenly everyone was in agreement on the continued soundness of the United States.

Memmi asked, why so belligerent in the first place? If they chose to do so, France and Western Europe could establish greater independence. Europe could,

if it wanted to, construct its own nuclear force and defend itself. The truth is that it doesn't want to. It prefers to leave it to America. The same thing goes for science and technology, social and political models, culture, even styles . . .

History will say that America was the Rome of the modern world. No one loved Rome, but no one could afford not to imitate her. One may hate America, but no one can help being more or less American. What the French see in America, what appalls and attracts them, repels and fascinates them, is not simply machines, gadgets, cereals, movies; it is the image of their own future.<sup>56</sup>



What this passage suggests is that much of what is called "hatred" of America is not hatred at all, but mere envy, and occasionally, anxiety. More important, it implies that Europe, for example, does not refrain from arming itself and making itself more independent merely because it "doesn't want to." If the nation on which it depends were other than the United States, Europe would possibly exercise its capability of mustering itself in short order. What seems significant here, stronger than merely that it "doesn't want to," may be that it feels it does not have to, that it has confidence in the United States to protect Europe successfully in tolerable ways. Amidst the imponderable dynamics of international relations, this implication amounts to more than a vote of confidence; it appears to constitute a remarkable tribute.

The Memmi passage reinforces another theme mentioned earlier, one noteworthy of being struck as a ringing conclusion to this discussion of primacy. A number of developments are occurring in other countries simultaneously with their emergence in America, and some appear to have preceded the emergence of their American counterparts. Overall, however, consistent with many perceptions of the American scene as the bellwether of change, the patterns of change discernible in the United States may provide for many other nations an "image of their own future." Thus, another dimension of a Number One Nation may attain importance: being the first to experience the impact of the common future.



### What Is There Left To Win?

There are elaborate trophies and prizes awarded for being Number One Nation in specific activities (e.g., the Nobel Prize; the World Cup, in soccer-football; the Davis Cup, in tennis). However, there are no trophies or loving cups or "world-championship" flags awarded to the overall Number One Nation.

Such prizes and trophies are, after all, mere symbols. The real prize is not the trophy, but the achievement. The real value of primacy is contained in the security and standard of living enjoyed by the citizens and allies of the foremost nation; in the security partially shared by all nations, if the Number One Nation is a peaceful nation, a non-initiator of violent conflict, and perhaps a defender of weaker states that have been or may still be the targets of aggressors; in the sophistication of skills and facilities enjoyed by those citizens who have worked hard and effectively in the course of their nation's attaining primacy; in relatively free choice among available alternatives; and in the attention (even deference, for those who look for such things) paid to the Number One Nation and its representatives.

It is in the guardianship of such conditions, not in some prize or title, that the power and influence of primacy resides. After a visit over a century ago, the great British scientist Thomas Huxley addressed some provocative comments to the United States:

. . . there is something sublime in the future of America. But do not suppose that I am pandering to what is commonly understood by national pride. I cannot say that I am in the slightest degree impressed by your bigness, or your material resources, as such. Size is not grandeur, and



territory does not make a nation. The great issue, about which hangs a true sublimity, and the terror of overhanging fate, is what are you going to do with all these things?<sup>57</sup>

Perhaps it would help in orienting ourselves toward the future to realize that in equations relating to primacy, America is competing not only with other nations, but also with its own American past, which, despite its imperfections, has established certain remarkable, unmatched standards of achievement.

From those who have been "given" much, much is expected. A hundred years after Huxley, looking to the future of primacy and the United States, the critical question is still pretty much the same one Huxley asked. The fact of primacy will inevitably produce effects, although improvement of the whole globe is beyond the possible influence on any single nation. But the quality of such effects as do ensue depend upon the basis for America's eventual response to the question: "What are you going to do with all these things? As you, America, pass the torch of primacy to some other nation some day, will the human condition be getting worse, or better?"

And if and when the time comes for America to pass the torch of primacy, we may find it satisfying--if we are able to reflect that America gave it a good run while incumbency lasted, and if America were to refrain at that time from paranoiac tenacity and an overlong grasp on delusions of grandeur.

Meanwhile, recognition of certain realities of grandeur appear warranted. Perhaps the most important and fundamental perception for America to hold onto firmly throughout the remaining period of its primacy is this: Underlying all the other important



internationally-oriented attributes of sovereignty, equity, morality, realism, exchange, behavioral norms, fairness, humanitarianism, democratic representativeness, and others, the attribute that informs all the others, the one that remains absolutely indispensable, is power.

As for what there is left to win, one resounding answer should still impress us, and still move us, namely, preservation of our liberty, for what it means to us, and for what the existence of a bulwark of liberty means to the rest of the world. It is a cliché to remind ourselves that eternal vigilance is still the price to be paid, whether 200 years ago, 100 years ago, right now, the next decade, or the next 100 years--in short, for as long as we intend to remain free. Not free in terms of rhetoric, or approximately free, but as nations of humans go, genuinely free.

For America, "first things first" means that, to support the foreign policy of the only free superpower in the world--critically important to the freedom of others, whether or not they recognize it or acknowledge it--the United States must continue to project the image of strength--to look strong, to act strong, and to be strong.



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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) (Volume I covered theoretical and analytical aspects of being Number 1 Nation. Volume II presented hard data, as well as foreign and domestic perceptions, on United States status among nations.) This Volume III completes this study of American primacy, exploring dynamics of change in the international context and implications for the future of American primacy. America worked with great energy and imagination toward success (not necessarily to attain explicit status of primacy), without exploiting other peoples, and in limited time; for current		



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preeminent status is of relatively recent attainment. No other system is likely to supersede that of nation states for a half-century or more; the United States will have to make its way on its own. America's record is not perfect, but it is still better than that of any other major power; and many analysts remain optimistic about American leadership. The US standard of living is likely to decline, as well as relative preponderance. Despite buffetings of change, American status will probably remain No. 1 through 1990, and possibly to 2000 and beyond.

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